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DEMOSTHENES

The Origin and Growth of His Policy

BY

WERNER JAEGER



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PREFACE

THIS BOOK embodies a series of lectures which I delivered at Berkeley as Sather Professor of Classical Literature in the University of California. It gives me pleasure, now that they are ready for publication, to express my profound gratitude for the honor shown me in the appointment to that professorship in 1934. This invitation introduced me to the New World which has subsequently become my second home and the scene of my permanent activity.

After a period of flowering in the nineteenth century, studies on Demosthenes were neglected more than any other field of classical literature. The verdict pronounced by modern historiography on Demosthenes as a statesman exercised a paralyzing effect also upon philological research. But nevertheless, without Demosthenes it is impossible to understand the fateful intellectual and political struggle of Greece in the fourth century B.C. This book does not give a biography or a reconstruction of the historical events. It aims at a reinterpretation of Demosthenes' orations as the authentic documents of his political thought and action. Paradoxically, the practical political thought of the Greeks has been investigated less than their political theory. The present book may help to elicit from Demosthenes' orations themselves the criteria for their political understanding.

For many years I had planned to publish a more analytical study on this subject. The Sather lectures prompted me to cast my thoughts into more accessible form. I am grateful, moreover, to the University of California Press for allowing me to add extensive footnotes which not only contain the necessary reference material, but also treat a number of special questions. Since many of the footnotes digressed, all have been placed at the end of the volume and have been printed in a larger size of type than is usually employed for the purpose. I had originally intended to include also four

appendices; only one of them—that on Isocrates' *Plataïcus*—has been retained. The others—on Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*, Demosthenes' *First Philippic*, and the *Thirteenth Oration*—have had to be omitted because of their length; they will be published separately. The text of the lectures was given to the translator early in 1934 and to the University of California in the latter part of the same year. Since that time only the footnotes have been added; they were handed over to the printer in the summer of 1936. Therefore I could not refer extensively to the recently published works of Piero Treves, Paul Cloché, and Gustave Glotz, which came to my attention, or which became available, after my manuscript was finished.

Finally, I wish to thank my translator, Mr. Edward S. Robinson, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio, for the extraordinary care and understanding with which he fulfilled his task. I am also greatly indebted to my friend and colleague, Professor George M. Calhoun, of the University of California, for his generous assistance in correcting the proofs.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
SEPTEMBER, 1937.

WERNER JAEGER

CHAPTER ONE

THE POLITICAL RECOVERY OF ATHENS

INTRODUCTORY

THE MAN with whom these pages are concerned can no longer be counted among those figures of antiquity whose high reputation in the learned world remains undisputed; it may even seem that I ought to give some excuse for selecting him as my subject. No one who hopes for the unanimous applause of his readers ever does well to take a politician for his hero, especially a politician uncrowned with victory. History is always ready to acknowledge the greatness of a poet or philosopher, no matter how awkwardly he may have fitted his times; but it habitually judges the practicing statesman by his success, not by his intentions. The task of history is to understand the accomplished facts that confront it; and this understanding can all too easily take the form of an apology for those facts, with only a shrug of the shoulders for the side that loses.

But Demosthenes, we may object, was no mere stepchild of *Tyche* stirring our deeper sympathy by his undeserved fate alone. Nevertheless, the classicism of earlier centuries, which venerated him as the unhappy last champion of Greek liberty, has given way to a new type of historical thought arising with the nineteenth century, the effect of which has been sobering. We have now learned that in the time of Demosthenes there was an underlying law of development leading the Greeks away from the old limited city-state to the world empire of Alexander and the world culture of Hellenism. Seen in this vast new perspective, the figure of Demosthenes dwindles to a tiny obstacle in the path of an irresistible historical process. It now seems purely accidental that the tradition preserved so many of his admired speeches while allowing the systematic historical works of the period

to disappear, thus giving posterity a permanently distorted picture of this epoch, with the true proportions quite upset. But this very calamity has been made a virtue. What Herodotus and Thucydides did for the fifth century, the modern historian has had to do for the fourth. And has he not shown true historical discernment in unmasking Demosthenes' eloquence as empty verbosity despite its two-thousand-year renown, and in making himself pleader for the actual historical forces that overcame Demosthenes' resistance to the march of events?

This has been pretty nearly the *communis opinio* of nineteenth-century historians. It was, of course, natural enough that Johann Gustav Droysen, the discoverer of the post-Alexandrian Hellenism, should have been little interested in Demosthenes; for his enthusiasm for Alexander as the true hero and pioneer of the new age made everything else lapse into insignificance. The situation is different when we come to the great historical works of the positivistic period at the close of the century, especially the *Griechische Geschichte* of Karl Julius Beloch.^{1*} Beloch may be regarded as the most consistent representative of this group, not only because his work is rich in the virtues of matter-of-factness, as is well known, but also because his description of Greek development is dominated by the same theoretical bias by which the entire historical thinking of our times has been determined more or less consciously. We have all grown up in this way of looking at things. The fact that Greek political life took the form of a number of autonomous city-states, was, for the national unitarianism of the nineteenth century, a historical scandal. There was a strong feeling that in the end, at any rate, this "particularism" must somehow have terminated in a larger national unity, as in the small states of Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century. The rôle of unifier which had there fallen to the military powers of Prussia

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 207-211.

and Savoy, seemed to have been played in Hellas by the kingdom of Macedonia. On this false analogy the whole of Greek history was now boldly reconstructed as a necessary process of development leading quite naturally to a single goal: unification of the Greek nation under Macedonian leadership. That which Demosthenes and most of his contemporaries had looked upon as the death of Greek political liberty, was now all at once regarded as the fulfillment of all the promises with which Fate had blessed the cradle of the Greek people. As a matter of fact, this amounted to judging Greek history by an altogether alien standard; and Demosthenes fell a victim to this misunderstanding. Indeed, a complete revaluation of all historical facts and personages now set in. In general, positivistic scholars have a better developed sense for political, military, and economic factors than they have for the human personality, and this was here operative. Otherwise how could it have happened that just at the time when Demosthenes' stock went down, that of men like Isocrates and Aeschines went up?—a situation which even the most rudimentary sensibility would find psychologically false! Perhaps it is now no longer so difficult to recognize the unhistoricity of the standard that Beloch and others of the same school applied to the events of Demosthenes' period. But when a man has made it his endeavor to obtain a general view of this sort and has at last succeeded, he will find infinite difficulty in escaping its spell when he comes to deal with particulars. For the distortion will extend to the very minutiae of historical judgment. If the standard of measurement is artificial, the findings must likewise be artificial, especially if, as with Beloch, they involve an emotional overtone; in this way the historian becomes little better than a writer of *Tendenzliteratur*, pursuing his prey in every nook and cranny with all the inherent pertinacity and obstinacy of the scholar.

Naturally there have still been defenders of Demosthenes

even after this great reversal of historical opinion. Arnold Schaefer's work, the first volume of which appeared in 1856, was prepared with the utmost philological care and is still of fundamental importance for all special problems. It was virtually untouched by Droysen's novel views; the very title, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, indicated that Demosthenes would here be made the point of orientation for the history of the entire fourth century. In this work Schaefer attempted to create a detailed historical picture suffused with that hero worship which classicism had devoted to the great orator of liberty, so as to keep the ideal well fortified against the latest onslaughts. But unfortunately this lovable German scholar was the son of a land not yet politically conscious; he had no eye for the dynamics of political life. Accordingly his enormous zeal remained ineffectual when he came to the critical point of judging Demosthenes' politics, and, to tell the truth, his moralizing orthodoxy is often rather hard to endure. George Grote's version is another thing altogether. But Grote was a banker and a member of Parliament; he views the struggle of the Athenian democracy against the Macedonian empire too much from the standpoint natural to a man of his strong liberal principles, and therefore fails to do full justice either to the opposition party or even to Demosthenes himself.² For, as we shall try to prove, Demosthenes' political development was much too complex, and its center of gravity too peculiarly situated, for it to be branded with any partisan label.

If I feel that the time has come for a new evaluation of Demosthenes, that does not mean that we should go back to Schaefer and Grote. Mere reaction is never right, and this would be no more than reaction. Demosthenes can never again be made the focal point of a whole century during which the pendulum swung violently from the sturdy regionalism of a long-established folk to a universalism sweeping away all national barriers. But the fact that history de-

cided against Demosthenes does not diminish our interest in the spirit which made him resist the forces of his time. And what man of understanding would esteem him the less because he was not an Alexander? Thus the history of Demosthenes becomes something more than the biography of any mere party man. For it embodies vicariously a destiny of universal significance: the downfall of the polis or city-state, which had been the typical form of the Greek state throughout its classical period. It had now become inevitable that the old highly developed unity of Greek life as manifested in the polis should be dissolved in the cosmopolitanism of the world empire. The fruit was ripe and ready to fall. This process may seem quite "organic" to the modern historian; but for those to whom it was part and parcel of their daily life—those in whom the spirit of Greek history was still alive—it was an act of unheard-of violence against the moral and spiritual nature of the older Greek civilization. Of this fearful crisis Demosthenes' struggle is one aspect; Plato's attempt to renew the state is another. To overlook the importance of Plato's endeavor as a factor in history on the mere ground that his ideal state could not be realized, is certainly no more false than to deny the historical greatness of Demosthenes' death struggle to maintain the actual polis, simply because sober reason shows us that it was hopeless.

In our effort to approach Demosthenes anew, we must not expect to understand him entirely in terms of modern politics. Demosthenes is only one man; but his history needs the context of the whole intellectual and emotional history of the Greek state from the end of the Peloponnesian War onward. Perhaps there is no respect in which we have so far advanced in our understanding of the fourth century since Droysen discovered the later Hellenism, as in learning to see how indissolubly the inner development of the Greek spirit in the age of Plato is connected with those outward processes of political history from which we once did our best to keep

it immaculately aloof.³ I shall begin by sketching this inner history up to the time when Demosthenes first appears, and shall then follow its development through his orations. It is, of course, true that a politician's thinking and willing are at every moment bound up with the actualities of the outward situation that confronts him; and anyone who would judge him in his rôle must keep an eye on those actual events in which he actively takes part. Therefore we cannot confine ourselves to the picture which Demosthenes' speeches will give us. Our appraisal of these must be corrected in the light of the facts as far as we are in a position to ascertain them. Unfortunately there are narrow limits to what we can know; for the thing that leaves an impress on our tradition is always the intellectual personality, which gives to events the form of its own thought and experience, whether it is the personality of one who describes, like Thucydides, or of one who participates, like Demosthenes. We can never reconstruct the actual course of events. No matter how hard we may try to free ourselves, we shall always see the fifth century with the eyes of Thucydides and the fourth with those of Demosthenes. Let us therefore *reread Demosthenes' speeches*, but this time for that which they *really* contain—that is, *as sources for our understanding of the inner process by which his political thought develops*. It is not enough to select a few surface facts, throwing away all the rest, as is too often the way of the historian; nor is it enough to limit our study to the art of Demosthenes' rhetoric, as Friedrich Blass has done in his excellent history of Attic oratory.⁴ Whichever of these two latter methods we follow, the real intellectual substance of the speeches—that which gives them their life and determines their form—will slip through our fingers. For in the end neither historical nor philological analysis will give us the true Demosthenes. Such a "division of labor," it seems to me, hardly advances our knowledge. Let us try, then, for once to understand Demosthenes himself.

THE SITUATION AND THE MAN

The great struggle for supremacy between the Spartan and Athenian confederations was over. According to Thucydides, it was toward this that the whole development of the political, spiritual, and economic balance of power in Hellas had been tending ever since the amazing rise of Athens during the Persian Wars. It is because of this inner controlling necessity that Thucydides considers Greek history a unity from the battle of Salamis (480) and the founding of the first Athenian confederacy to the time of Athens' capitulation in 404—a unity which the historian's field of vision must include at a single stroke if he is to understand it for what it is.⁵ When we come to the fourth century, it is tempting to follow Thucydides' example mechanically, as his successor Xenophon has done, letting the Spartan hegemony follow that of the Athenians from the fall of Athens until the battle of Leuctra in 371, when it is put down by the newly ascendant power of Thebes, never to rise again; then adding a brief period of Theban supremacy under Epaminondas, to be ended in 362 with the battle of Mantinea, when the commander falls in the midst of his victory, leaving his city to sink back to its former position, orphaned and leaderless.

But quite apart from the fact that each of these periods was shorter than the one before, and that after Mantinea no one state definitely took the lead in Hellas, the dominance of Sparta was not really comparable to the Athenian hegemony that had preceded it. Once her rival was overthrown, Sparta had, to be sure, maintained sole mastery in Greece for several decades with a moderate use of her power. But Sparta's mastery, though it was such as Athens had never achieved even during her most vigorous territorial and maritime expansion in the early years of Pericles, was from the outset purely military, with no cultural or economic foundation. It was now impossible to assert, as at the time of

Athens' rise, that by the overwhelming vigor and transforming force of a single state, a new development and redistribution of all the vital powers of the nation had been brought about. Sparta merely caught hold of the slipping power of the Athenians and held it fast for a while, relying on her own peculiar methods—authority and army discipline. But in thus assuming the functions of a great power she was drawn violently out of her old course, and her inner strength began rapidly to disintegrate. Even less was Thebes prepared for the sudden rôle of leadership which fell to her lot with the success of her uprising against Sparta's arbitrary rule.

Thus the principle of division into hegemonies breaks down when applied to fourth-century history. At best it serves only to demarcate certain obvious subdivisions of the period. Not until we consider these in the light of the overwhelming events of Demosthenes' time does the whole line of development after the collapse of the Athenian empire draw together to a true unity, even if only in a negative sense: this was the period of attempts to rearticulate the structure of political power in Greece, attempts culminating in the utter demolition of that which had so long been its basis as to seem almost identical with Greek civilization itself—the autonomous city-state. These attempts were made first by one state, then by another, following in quick succession; for none of these states had the natural qualifications for establishing itself as a leading power. And as little as Sparta or Thebes could long maintain her position, no more could Athens remain permanently in the condition of weak dependence to which the peace of 404 with its annihilating terms had reduced her. After less than a decade we find her again pursuing an active policy and successfully overcoming her isolation; from then on she takes a permanent part in the general competition for dominance in Greek affairs. The curve of her efforts to regain her old position goes up and down. Of this curve Demosthenes' policies form

a part, and ultimately the decisive part. And all the while that this political development is going on outside, the Athenian spirit is grappling with the inner problem of man's relation to the state, and with the very problem of the state itself, which Athens' fall has profoundly disturbed. These outward and inward exertions toward regenerating the Athenian state, which occupy the first third of the fourth century, determine the atmosphere into which Demosthenes was born. And it is by these that we must understand his aims, his struggle, and his ideals.

The Athenian orator whom Thucydides introduces⁶ at the critical negotiations in Sparta before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to set forth at length the underlying motives of Athenian policy during the past half-century, points out that the basic principle of all Athens' behavior has been the desire for security.⁷ He explains that it is entirely human for Athens to have pursued this ideal to the full extent of her power; and he sees clearly, without illusions, that no state which acts in this way can expect any sympathy from the other parties concerned. But he points out that the general hatred of Athens which her imperialism has called forth is not to be attributed to any peculiarly bad character in her people, and that if a realignment of power should come, the same hatred would be leveled against the new overlords—the Spartans themselves.⁸

This prophecy is, as I think there are good grounds for concluding, a summing-up of Thucydides' own observations after the Peloponnesian War. The general sympathy for Sparta, whose war propaganda had had for its watchword the liberation of Greece from Athenian tyranny, had changed to antagonism within a few months, when Sparta's despotism under Lysander replaced that of Athens.⁹ A short while before, the Spartan commanders had found it hard to restrain their Theban and Corinthian allies from razing the whole of Athens and not merely its walls;¹⁰ but now, when the Spar-

tans proceeded to meddle in the domestic politics of the conquered people, treating their country as a mere Spartan colony, the Thebans and Corinthians intervened in Athens' behalf.¹¹ This intervention, to be sure, was at first only an isolated symptom; but it lay directly in line with the subsequent alliance of Thebes and Athens and their overt attack on Sparta in 395 at a moment when her army was fighting in Asia Minor under Agesilaus and Greece could easily fall a prey to the rebellion of these ill-sorted allies.

The Theban envoy at Athens who discusses the alliance in Xenophon's history of Greece gives in his speech a very interesting characterization of the internal state of affairs under the Spartan rule, which can only be taken as a deliberate companion piece to the speech in Thucydides, for it records the exact fulfillment of the prophecies there made.¹² It seethes with a passionate hatred of the Spartans, who, though their victory had been gained with foreign help, were garnering its fruits for themselves and oppressing their allies instead of carrying out their promises. Instead of bringing freedom to Hellas, they had brought double bondage by setting up a system of military supervision in all the cities; furthermore, there was as yet no sign of those economic advantages for the sake of which Athens' old enemies—especially the Corinthians—had gone to war. In this way a new solidarity with Athens came about. That Athens' recovery from the catastrophe was comparatively quick is indicated by the way in which Xenophon's Theban envoy¹³ angles for Athenian aid, even if there is little else that we know at all precisely about this gradual return of strength. "We all understand," says the envoy, "that you Athenians wish to regain your former leadership. How can you do this better than by supporting those whom Sparta has treated unjustly? Do not be alarmed by the fact that the Spartans rule over so many; but let this give you confidence, remembering that you likewise had the most enemies when you ruled over the

greatest numbers." An elaborate plan is now worked out, in which the defection of the most important Spartan allies and the support of the king of Persia are counted upon as certain, and much weight is placed on the numerical weakness of the Spartan populace in the coming struggle. Out of the dark background of Spartan pleonexy there rises already a phantom of the future—the vision of a new Attic hegemony which, unlike its predecessor, shall be no mere thalassocracy but shall include Sparta's continental allies.

I have taken some pains to describe the state of affairs at the outbreak of the Corinthian War (for Corinth and Argos as well as many cities of central Greece all joined in the conspiracy against Sparta) in order to show the excellent prospects for Athens in matters of foreign policy after the great war was lost. The goal, to be sure, was not attained; for although the coalition fell upon Sparta while her army was fighting in Asia Minor, she not only succeeded in parrying this rear attack by speedy and decisive military successes on land, but also outstripped her opponents diplomatically in dealing with their mighty Persian backers. But complete retrogression was avoided; for in the meanwhile the Athenian Conon, after his victory over the Spartan navy at Cnidus, had, as admiral of the Persian fleet, rebuilt the long walls of Athens with Persian money. Thus after the Peace of Antalcidas, which closed the war in 387, Athens was no longer so defenseless against Sparta as before. Actual revision of her status was, of course, deferred; for the peace treaty solemnly proclaimed the principle of autonomy and thus effectually prevented any combination of states in a major league against Sparta. This formula of autonomy, shrewdly adjusted to the average political mentality of the smaller states, gave a definite legal status to the supremacy of Sparta; for she now became the recognized guarantor of the politics of atomization upon which her further predominance in Hellas depended.

Ever since the overthrow of Athenian control, Sparta had been faced with the problem of finding a formula that would permit her own actual despotism to be combined with the formal autonomy of the other states; and we must admit that she had now solved this problem well. As early as the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War she had set herself up as the defender of liberty, a rôle to which she now remained apparently true;¹⁴ and though this rôle inevitably made things somewhat difficult for her by the time her autocracy was achieved, she turned this very difficulty to advantage by her success in reducing the liberty of the other states to mere unproductive weakness. In this paralyzing situation sanctioned by international law lay Athens' hardest problem in any constructive attempt she was yet to make at a maritime confederacy.

In her inner life also, Athens must have become steadily stronger during the seventeen years from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Peace of Antalcidas. Of course, anyone who compared her with Sparta in external matters alone must have had a quite different impression of the relative power of the two states, as Thucydides says in a passage which, in my opinion, can hardly have point unless it was written after the war was over, and not long years before, as is generally held.¹⁵ Of the economic distress which must have prevailed at first there are many isolated symptoms; but we have no adequate picture of the situation as a whole, and this is true of the long process of recovery as well.¹⁶ Our tradition gives us much deeper insight into the spiritual and moral distress of these decades. Even the victors had their share in this: in Spartan conservative circles particularly, the inward change from the old simplicity and discipline to the new opulence and the unscrupulous brutality of men like Lysander was felt to be a serious danger. But only the vanquished had to endure the full depths of suffering, in which every sort of problem was involved. In

Athens the Periclean empire, of which Thucydides has left an imperishable memorial in the funeral oration, had fallen; and everything centered on how to come to terms with this unnerving experience. The more firmly Thucydides believed that under the leadership of a statesman like Pericles Athens was predestined for victory, the more distressed he must have been as a student of politics by the problem of the internal dissolution which, he was convinced, had been the cause of the collapse.¹⁷ He felt that even for a people of sound health and good resistance the endurance test of the long years of war with its sacrifices and privations was more than their human nature could bear, no matter how heroic their will; and this master portrayer of all realities, whether outward or inward, has well grasped the situation when he characterizes the disintegrating effect of the struggles for party leadership in the several states with their constant interchange of brutality, their progressive blunting of conscience, and their debasement of all accepted ideals, as the deadly disease of the social organism.¹⁸

Thucydides here looks upon the will-to-power of the old Athens as the natural expression of all her natural strength, and justifies it in retrospect by the course of historical development, which, in his opinion, had assigned this rôle inevitably to the Athenian state. But the postwar period also witnesses the growth of a whole literature dealing with the problem of the state in relation to ethics. This literature begins in the circle of Socrates, and radiates the same intense political passion which we may detect in his indictment and execution no less than in his willing martyrdom for that morally better form of state for which he had always fought. Plato makes Socrates prophesy in his "apology" to the jury that among his pupils there will be some who will carry on his work after his death; the Athenians are not to be left in peace; from now on they will never escape his questioning. And indeed Socrates is truly brought to life in Plato's dia-

logues, where he returns to his already repentant countrymen with all his old demands and admonitions—a true citizen, seeking the knowledge of a new and invincible moral norm for human life, and ready to die for it. The young Plato places him in the very midst of the agitated state as it struggles to regain its vanished inner authority. In the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* he even ventures to pit him against the Sophists as the one true teacher of political virtue, decrying their purely formal training in rhetoric and political sagacity. But Plato's boldness carries him farther still when with true revolutionary power he brings before the tribunal of his own conceptions the ideal figures of old Athens,—not the demagogues of the period of decline, but men like Themistocles and Pericles,—measuring their policy of outward force and economic prosperity against an educative ideal in which he has distilled the very essence of organized society. Thus Socrates, who kept aloof from political activity throughout his life, becomes for Plato not only the one true teacher, but also the one true politician of his time. For if anyone really wishes to serve the state, he should not begin by building new wharves and ships and arsenals, but should—in Socrates' sense—make the citizens better.¹⁹

Behind Plato's strangely paradoxical but stirring dialogues, in which the participants are no mere idle chatterers but the best-known personages of public life, there lie hidden certain inner developments that are of tremendous bearing on the relations of man and state. There was at this time one great new fact perhaps even more fundamental for the state's very existence than the regaining of outward power and authority: the rise of the independent individual. To cope with this had become the state's central problem. The democratic form of government in Athens had done its bit to accelerate this individualizing process; for, although equalization and individualization are by no means the same, no other form of public life had hitherto given so wide a

scope to individual ambitions and opinions. But no sooner had men begun to enjoy the advantages of this emancipation than the war had shown the dangers behind the harmless façade, and the conflict of all against all, which was raging between one state and another, was now carried into the very heart of the state itself. The revolt of the aristocratic opposition party had proved that this problem was not to be solved simply by tightening the reins of outward authority. Even among the sophists, who on the theoretical side had contributed no little to the collapse of the old respect for law, the problem of authority was now considered the focal point of the situation; this we may learn from an interesting piece of political reform literature by an unknown author, written soon after the war.²⁰ This author's arguments, however, are purely utilitarian; and to reestablish authority on this basis was impossible. A single event like the judicial murder of Socrates—the most upright of men, as Plato calls him—casts a glaring light on the desperate state of affairs; and the whole significance of the new will-to-citizenship, which is revealed with increasing force in Plato's writings up to the *Republic*, becomes clear to us only if we bear in mind that Plato is here going against the stream with all his might.²¹ He is struggling not so much for the moral regeneration of the present state, which he considers past healing, as against the flight of the individual from public life to a cultivated private existence, which had become general among the intellectual classes. This, the ideal of the metic, at least made for clean living and was therefore not uncongenial to Plato; but the sense of social obligation was missing, even if one took care to pay one's debts and taxes with promptness.²² Plato would not grant that man and state should be strangers, or that a man of true spirit should be a metic rather than a full citizen. And in the very face of the fact that true spiritual force was despised no less by the masses than by the thin upper stratum

of men of the stamp of Callicles, men who were quite without illusions and had no respect for anything but the right of the stronger, Plato deliberately drew up a picture of a state ruled on an aristocratic basis by a picked group of Socratic governors who should primarily be men of wisdom. Plato himself says that these thoughts came to him and were advocated by him in the decade after Socrates' death.²³ His *Republic*, which immortalizes them, was written decidedly later.

It is well known that Plato attempted to realize his reform with the powerful aid of the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius the First and his successor. We must never forget this if we are to understand how great a factor in the actual government of the time was the intellectual movement that had begun with Socrates. Whatever one may think of the concrete proposals of the *Republic*, the minds of Plato's contemporaries could not help being affected by a work like the *Gorgias*, which opened up a wide chasm between the might-makes-right conception of the state and the educative fervor of those who championed a new communal ideal.²⁴ The tyrant Dionysius even carried consistency to such a pitch as to write a drama in which he openly spoke of Tyrannis as the mother of Injustice,²⁵ though while doing so he rigorously banished the new gospel from the realm of all actual politics. A true Machiavellian, he had profited by the lessons of the war, drawing conclusions from them which, as he had some reason to believe, states like Athens and Sparta, with their great intellectual and moral traditions, would never be able to face frankly. These states, indeed, would always have to suffer from an inner contradiction, as had become apparent during the Peloponnesian War.²⁶ The conflict of might and right never seemed so fundamental to the Greeks as when they were considering the nature of the state; but from the end of the fifth century onward it pervaded Greek political life as an unsolved problem, making it all the more precarious.

Perhaps Socrates' strictly moral demands had actually contributed more to this state of affairs than the much decried relativism of the sophists. At any rate, it was because of some feeling that this was so that patriotic but limited citizens like Anytus and his associates could bring about Socrates' execution on the charge of corrupting the youth. Plato's profound criticism, which penetrated to the very foundations of the state, was certainly a spiritual force in Athens of the postwar period, even if it seems rather imponderable in its immediate effect on the world about him.

But there was another and quite different personality of intellectual Athens, whose influence is much easier to grasp: the rhetor Isocrates, who first got himself talked about in these years and slowly rose to be the center of a large and influential circle and head of a flourishing school. He lacked neither literary celebrity, length of life, nor the riches befitting his craftsmanship; only one thing stood in the way of his perfect happiness: a somewhat unfortunate ambition, which made him feel all through his life that he had been unjustly put in the shade by Plato. If there was any justification for his thus comparing himself with Plato, it lay solely in the fact that the public is generally glad to lavish disproportionate acclaim on those who have the gift of mirroring its own opinions in a felicitous and easily understandable form. Isocrates wished to give some such training in politics as that for which the first generation of sophists had stood. When we examine his curriculum in the light of Platonic criticism, it seems merely a training in the common sense of politics,—a mixture of journalism, pamphleteering, and festival oratory, with a course in politics thrown in,—quite impotent to fire a multitude to action. Isocrates' academic and rather stilted form of literary eloquence aspired to be more genteel than the usual public speechmaking; yet he shared with the practical man and the Philistine an instinctive rejection of everything in Plato's genuine intel-

lectual depths that struck them as high-flown and useless in everyday life.

Above all else, Isocrates' course of political education was intended to be useful; but it also was intended to rise above the level of mere routine in the law courts and public gatherings by a little leaven of political reflection, and it even paid tribute to the new era by admitting a few ethical notions. Side by side with the ideas then in common currency, we may find in Isocrates no little Socraticism, which trickles through the filter of his mind into the thinking of wider circles, even reaching the politicians.²⁷ But in his political thought there is a second element, even more important, which comes from another direction. The sophists had been fond of talking about political unity; in the *Olympicus* of Gorgias, for instance, this tendency had even resulted in a proposal that all Greeks should join in a common war of retaliation against Persia, so that the Greek states might stop mauling one another and turn their powers to better account outside.²⁸ This ideology Isocrates adopted in his *Panegyricus*, which he wrote for the most part in the years after the Peace of Antalcidas. Of course if Isocrates thought there was any chance of putting his ideas into effect when he proposed that Sparta—at that time the sole dominating power in Hellas—should join fallen Athens in a project of this sort, that hope was naturally quite utopian. But the very fact that it was then already possible to speak of a Sparto-Athenian duality in Hellas, a duality which would have been quite impossible in the first decade after Athens' fall, is indicative of Athens' reviving self-assertiveness. We can now see how effective an impulse in her political recovery was her tremendous spiritual force, and how well it served to justify that recovery. Here political ambition once more lifts its head. Isocrates' speech criticizes the policy of force that has kept Athenian vitality from expanding again after the war. He demands for Athens a share in the hegemony of

the Greeks, particularly the maritime hegemony, and establishes Athens' claims to leadership from the very earliest times. Indeed he speaks an altogether new language, that of one equal to another, and this, even if there is no real power behind it, nevertheless catches our notice, and must have found an echo throughout all Greece.²⁹

The events that set the stagnating politics of the Greek states again in motion were the occupation of Thebes by a troop of Spartans, who took advantage of their march northward through Boeotia for this exploit, and Thebes' success in throwing off the yoke, which stimulated Athens to new self-assertion after some preliminary vacillation and delay. It was in the year 378 that the hopes of the Athenian patriots were to be fulfilled. A band of men, widely varying both in descent and in qualities of mind, united to lead the state at the long-awaited moment of decision. Thrasybulus and Cephalus of Collytus were old practitioners and traditional friends of Thebes, but possibly had no important ideas of their own; they were chiefly important as representing the old democracy, which was restored after the war. Along with them were such newcomers as the general Chabrias, a genius at improvisation and the inventor of trench warfare, who had just stocked himself with the most up-to-date military lore during the Egyptian insurrection, and Iphicrates, a man of great personal bravery and the inspired inventor of the peltast tactics that had been of such extraordinary importance ever since the Corinthian War. Then there was the dominating figure of Timotheus, the son of Conon, whose path had been smoothed for him by the fame and wealth of his father, but who was himself a personage quite out of the ordinary, intellectually superior, with a greatness that transcended party lines. He was doubly gifted, both as strategist and as diplomat, a rare combination; and it was to him above all others that Athens owed the organization of the new so-called second confederacy. To

these we must add Callistratus, who was later to be Timotheus' dangerous rival, a man who joined the company as a statesman of exceptional talent for oratory and brilliance in negotiation, perhaps without any too strong personal stamp, but admirably fitted for the delicate business of allied politics.

It was not because of any democratic sentiments that the more important of these men gave the Athenian state their support. In ordinary times they would all rather have lived elsewhere than among their fellow citizens.³⁰ Chabrias was in private life a man about town; Iphicrates, an ardent professional soldier, a great craftsman in the art of war; Timotheus, a prince residing on his own estates abroad, and happiest in the company of kings. When men so different joined in a common program so little in accord with their own individualistic careers, it was obviously no mere boredom that drove them to exercise their powers in this way, but rather the inspiration of a high ideal. Perhaps they had no love for the demos; but they loved very much the genius of old Athens and wished to help it achieve new splendor.³¹ This was indeed a moment of history. We may see its impetus no less clearly in Athens' negotiations with the other states and in the spirit of the new treaties concluded at the founding of the second confederacy. Of course there was also a good deal of political experience and shrewdness behind Athens' avoidance of any compulsion that might savor of dominance over her allies; but undoubtedly she was influenced in large measure by all that had been said since the end of the Peloponnesian War concerning pleonexy as the root of all political evil. Unfortunately this feeling was later to become steadily weaker when the second confederacy was having financial difficulties; but during the first years, at any rate, there was complete confidence in Athens, and this cannot be explained merely by the universal hatred of Sparta. The new men and the new spirit had won for Athens the hearts of Hellas; and thanks to them, the recovery of her former position was now

being looked upon as a matter of historical justice. We need not review here the course of the military operations themselves, though it would be interesting to see how they reflected the somewhat too self-willed character of the leaders. The Peace of Sparta in 371 brought to Athens an undisputed maritime supremacy. Callistratus, who almost alone after seven years of war still kept the reins of politics in his hands, thought that despite the strong opposition of the uncompromising war party the time had come to rest for a while and reap the fruits of victory before Athens' strength was exhausted.³²

In the treaty of peace she succeeded in separating herself from her Theban confederates, thus giving an entirely new direction to her politics; and immediately afterward Sparta's predominance on the mainland was ended by the Theban victory at Leuctra. But it is not my primary objective to describe the historical events that next took place. It has rather been my aim to show the intellectual and emotional environment of Demosthenes' youth. As he grew to adolescence, tremendous impressions, which must have helped to determine his whole life, stamped themselves indelibly on his soul. The rise of his fatherland from resigned weakness and hopeless isolation to a position where its prestige was renewed and it could once more carry out its policies actively and independently must have filled the best of men with joyful hope and the feeling that their state's cause was their own; and in the generation just coming to maturity, weighed down with so much philosophical seriousness, the memory of Athens' great past—radiant with new luster and drawing fresh power from the experience of the present—aroused faith in a future when life would indeed be worth living.

DEMOSTHENES' YOUTH AND HIS
LEGAL CAREER

DEMOSTHENES is the very first person since the world began about whose youth we have really detailed information. This is partly because he lived in an age when the human spirit, or rather the Greek spirit, had just begun to take an interest in the development of important men's careers and was consciously collecting relevant data. Even more important is the circumstance, a lucky one for us, that Demosthenes had no sooner come of age than he had to go to court to take action against his guardians for misappropriating his patrimony, and made at the age of twenty a number of speeches which have come down to us together with the forensic and political orations of his after years. On these occasions he had to describe in detail the sad complications in which his property and his family affairs had become involved. So we have in Demosthenes an exceptional example of a type rare even in later antiquity and therefore of inestimable value to us: for here is one man of the ancient world whom we can know not merely as a walking canon of virtue, the hero of some largely fictitious school biography patched together a century or more after his death, but as a real person in a real environment, waging a lifelong struggle against all his human frailties.

Perhaps it is just as well that we have been denied so deep an insight into the youth of other great men, for there is no doubt that if we are too familiar with an important person's everyday appearance and the casual happenings of his private life it is much harder for us to judge his real nature and achievements. Only from a distance can he be truly known. Our curiosity is not aroused by hearing the aged Sophocles' sigh of relief that at last old age has freed him from Eros'

heavy yoke;^{1*} and what could we gain by seeing at close range all the misfortunes that have left their tragic mark on the face of Euripides? When, however, we find ourselves forced willy-nilly to look into Demosthenes' personal affairs, this intimacy cannot but make us see the whole man in a very different light. We are now beginning to understand him afresh, or at least to reinterpret him, with the help of what we are now learning from psychology. We know so little about the ancients that we can seldom approach them in this way; and even of Demosthenes we do not really know enough. But his forensic speeches of the period before he became active in politics give us a picture of contemporary Athenian society that is of great historical value as a background for more personal matters, and one that has not yet been utilized to the full.

Demosthenes' father died when the boy was seven and his little sister five.² He had been the owner of several factories, and his wealth was considerable. In his will he had made his two nephews Aphobus and Demophon and his old friend Therippides his trustees, at the same time confiding to them the guardianship of his two minor children. As often happened in Athens, he had married a half-Greek Scythian from the Crimea, Cleobule by name, who was thus the children's mother. In later years the young Demosthenes' opponents sometimes refer to him as a Scythian, and Aeschines even calls him a Greek-speaking barbarian.³ The elder Demosthenes had also made arrangements in his will for the future care of his wife and daughter; for, according to Greek custom, a woman could be given in marriage not only by her parents but also by her husband if he should designate a new husband for her in the event of his death. Other arrangements, by which the wife was left to make her own choice, as in the will of Aristotle, were probably unusual, at least in the propertied classes, where the widow's remar-

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 212-217.

riage was as a rule bound up with the succession in the business.⁴ However, Demosthenes' guardians did not marry either his mother or his sister.

When the young Demosthenes came of age at eighteen, his guardians gave him only thirty minae of silver in addition to the house and fourteen slaves, making his whole inheritance worth about seventy minae. In contrast with this, Demosthenes presents in his first speech *Against Aphobus* a balance sheet according to which his father's total estate ran up to about fourteen talents, a vast amount of capital for the time.⁵ Thus it is quite understandable that, as Demosthenes declares, his guardians had registered in the tax lists a valuation of his property that put him, while still a minor, in the same class of taxpayers as Timotheus the son of Conon and the wealthiest people in Athens.⁶ The will itself had disappeared. Presumably Demosthenes' reconstructed appraisal was based as far as possible on account books and documents; the accounts outstanding at several banks, for instance, could easily be ascertained afterwards and were produced with the firms' statements. But after twelve years it must have been very difficult to set a value on the stock, the house, and the material property in general on the basis of the books alone, as anyone will realize if he has ever looked at a commercial balance sheet. Here there was plenty of room for conjecture, even though Athenian business transactions were then, as we know, in large part executed in writing; and naturally the values which Demosthenes presented in court were to some degree only ideal values. Moreover, it was probably necessary to ask for somewhat more than he could legitimately hope to get; for it is well known that even today suits of this type, once they have reached court, usually wind up as mere matters of bargaining. So we can hardly help smiling when, two thousand years later, modern philologists and historians pounce on Demosthenes' balance like strict auditors and

calculate to a hair how many extra talents he demanded.⁷ At any rate, a relatively high valuation of the stock on hand was perhaps warranted by the favorable market conditions that an arms factory must have enjoyed at the time of the elder Demosthenes' death, when the second confederacy's war against Sparta was at its height.

The trial gives us a good picture of the wealthy circles of Athens in the seventies and sixties of the fourth century. It was at this time that Plato wrote the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*—where we find that unforgettable description of the philosopher as a stranger to this world, unaware of the way to the market place and the courthouse. In the eighth book of the *Republic* the Athenian democracy's ways of thinking about common matters are characterized in terms quite applicable to those of the "indulgent and not in the least pedantic" company⁸ to which Demosthenes introduces us in his forensic speeches. We find here, first of all, his three guardians, who had pocketed not only the sums set apart as the reward for their exertions, but all the money there was, and who had maladministered the factories until almost nothing was left.⁹ Demosthenes was forced to bring a separate suit against each of them.

Aphobus, whom he attacked first, had shortly before, in 367, married the divorced wife of Timocrates, who became archon three years later. She was also the sister of Onetor, a very rich man of fashionable Athens; and obviously Aphobus had married her in order to recoup his finances. Demosthenes estimates Onetor's fortune at more than thirty talents, and that of Timocrates at more than ten.¹⁰ Two years after his marriage Aphobus had obtained a second divorce. Meanwhile Demosthenes had brought suit against him and won;¹¹ but when, relying on the legal force of the judgment, he had attached a piece of land belonging to Aphobus, he had been promptly ejected by Onetor,—the brother of Aphobus' divorced wife,—who seized the land, protesting that Aphobus

had not returned his wife's dowry to him after the divorce. In consequence, Demosthenes was forced to bring a new action against Onetor.¹² He accused him of treacherous connivance with Aphobus, and tried to prove that the divorce had been nothing but a bluff to enable Aphobus to retain his wife's property. For Aphobus had continued to be friendly with Onetor; in the suit against the guardians Onetor had been his warmest supporter; and Aphobus' wife, in spite of her youth and her riches, had not remarried. Indeed, Demosthenes summons the family physician to testify that after the divorce Aphobus had sat by her bedside at a time when she was ill. Demosthenes avers, moreover, that Onetor's seizure of the land was a fraud. Onetor had no claim to the return of the dowry; for Aphobus had not received it, but had agreed at the time of his marriage that the former husband should retain the dowry on payment of a suitable rate of interest, so that if he should himself be called to account he would not lose possession of it because of any joint tenancy with his wife. For when Aphobus married, the negotiations over his ward's misappropriated funds had already been going on before the archon for a long time, and he must have realized that Demosthenes, on reaching maturity, would take legal action against him.

These vexations and nerve-racking disputes lasted for several years. Demosthenes had, to be sure, made formal complaint against his guardians as soon as he came of age; but it was then time for him to begin his term of military service as ephebus, and Attic law forbade his carrying on any lawsuits during these years. Not until he was twenty could he argue his case in court. Probably the affair had cast its shadow on his family life for a long time.¹³ The mother had led a rather cheerless existence with her two growing children. The boy was delicate, and she had thought it best to keep him from going to the gymnasia where the Attic youths spent their days and struck up their friendships. Ac-

cordingly we find him burying himself in his books at home with excessive and premature seriousness. But when we see how he takes his life into his own hands and fights for his rights at an age when most young men would be occupied in the harmless pleasures of youth, we can perceive already the stubborn tenacity with which this quiet young man can carry out an inflexible resolve. With all his youthful modesty there is a surprising firmness in the way he conducts himself throughout the trial; and more than once there breaks forth a power of mature and controlled passion quite unusual in a man of his years.

These speeches, in which Demosthenes handles his own case, are really the beginning of his career. In their whole construction, despite the youth of their author, they reveal already the schooled jurist and orator who has chosen his medium deliberately. It can hardly have been for the present occasion alone that Demosthenes mastered this form of writing; for behind it there lies hidden a long and arduous course of study requiring years of training—a course that only a deep-seated predilection could have made him attempt.

Of course what Demosthenes studied was by no means what we should call a definite branch of learning. In fourth-century Athens, jurisprudence had not yet been developed to a science into which one could plunge oneself for years of theoretical study. Juristic science did not really begin until the time of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus, who laid the foundations for a systematic study of legal matters in his lost work *On Law*.¹⁴ And it was chiefly the Romans who brought jurisprudence to perfection, not theoretically, to be sure, but as far as was necessary for practical mastery of the branches of law then in force. From our remote point of view it seems almost paradoxical that a people of the highest theoretical genius like the Greeks should not have approached this phase of life in the scientific spirit. But what the Greek

calls *θεωρία* is originally something profounder and more comprehensive than that which our rather meager word *theory* denotes. It is an observant contemplation of the world as a whole in all its interconnectedness, in the ultimate grounds of its existence. Out of this great connectedness the special sciences gradually emerge, each taking for its province a single subdivision, as, for example, empirical meteorology or geography. Thus in the fifth century, when causal thinking tends more and more to displace mythological interpretation, a science of medicine develops out of the practical art of healing, just as the earliest mathematics had arisen a while before. All these branches of learning originate independently; not until the school of Plato are they grouped in one all-embracing system of knowledge and subjected to a single conceptual method.¹⁵ As the fourth century progresses, we can clearly see the effect of this on the systematic courses of training in such special sciences as medicine and mathematics. The same thing happens in the field of law. As early as the seventh and sixth centuries we find the Greeks meditating deeply on the nature of justice and the significance of a righteous ordering of human life. Then one by one come instances of legislation in the cities; and as law-making becomes further developed, it necessarily becomes more and more a special study. Thus we hear in comedy that the sophists in Athens have already given their students practical exercises in the interpretation of legal texts, besides setting forth their own general views on law and state, and the young people must now acquaint themselves with the venerable jargon of Solon's laws instead of the glosses in Homer. The sophist Protagoras even sees in knowledge of existing law the most important part of the Greek adult's education.¹⁶

At the same time the formal art of oratory swings sharply into prominence in the cities, demanding of the speaker a rigorous training both in the law courts and in the Assem-

bly. To the Greeks of this period these could hardly have seemed widely separated; for the law courts had become increasingly the place where political disputes were decided, and political life itself presupposed a knowledge of the law. The new art is often recognizable by purely external aspects, especially by its careful choice of language. Words, sentences, and figurative ornament are calculated to satisfy the most fastidious requirements. Nevertheless, what we usually think of as the very essence of the new literary prose, namely, its function as a medium for sound and language in the narrow sense, is by no means the deciding factor.¹⁷ The point is rather that there has been a change in the mental and spiritual structure of the men of the time; and this change has led to a complete break with the homely simplicity of their ancestors' ways of speech, begetting an unprecedented refinement in the art of persuasion, which reaches its highest point not when it is used to beguile the audience with studied and striking sound effects, but when it apparently employs the most natural means alone. The new rhetoric gives rise to a psychagogic consciousness such as the ancient poets themselves had never known. Logical argument now becomes a tool of the finest differentiation; coupled with an art of narrative so highly developed that events can be made to appear just as the speaker desires, the technique of proof now comes to the fore in all its nuances—from the massive self-evidence of well-attested facts (though these, unfortunately, do not often count for much in court) to the slenderest plausibilities that sophistical subtlety and a highly confident power of suggestion can devise. This *logic* of proof is but the servant of a new and conscious art of *psychologically* influencing the listener, and controls all the stops of human emotion with masterly virtuosity.

The oldest specimens of the new style of oratory that we possess are mere school declamations, sportive display pieces calculated to exhibit the range of the art in fabrications

from the world of myth. Soon, however, these lead to an entirely new type of literature, the forensic oration published in book form. Though such a phenomenon may strike us as odd, especially when we consider the great number of these works produced, it must nevertheless have been an answer to some actual demand. Antiphon and Lysias, the most important older writers of these *plaidoyers*, did not themselves mount the platform as speakers. They were teachers of oratory, and looked upon publication as a way to broadcast samples of their art. They differed, however, from the sophists by engaging in the profession of logography. This meant that they wrote speeches for other people to deliver in court, charging a fee for their services; for as there were no attorneys in Athens, everyone, no matter how inexperienced, had to handle his own case in person. Here, then, the new rhetoric and the legal science of which we have spoken became fused in an entirely new profession combining the functions of the writer, the elocution teacher, and the attorney at law. But of course the logographer could not act as attorney except in an unofficial capacity; for contrary to present custom there were as yet no state regulations governing admittance to the bar, and anyone might offer his services as a writer of speeches. To get a large clientele, it was enough to make a name for oneself.¹⁸

No true-born Athenian could long be satisfied to remain in this profession, for it kept him confined to his study. Lysias, being a metic and not a full citizen, was in a different position, as is true also of Isaeus of Chalcis, Demosthenes' teacher, who practiced logography in Athens. But for a talented Athenian of good family this occupation was quite out of the question unless it could lead to something more highly respected. For Demosthenes it was a way station to politics; for Isocrates, a step to the teaching profession. Indeed, by the time Isocrates had become master of his own school of rhetoric and politics, he disliked to recall that

he had begun his career in a small corner office as a writer of forensic speeches, though, as Aristotle slyly remarks, whole bundles of his earlier works still lay on the book dealers' shelves as dead stock.¹⁹ Demosthenes, however, does not refer to his former occupation with such assiduous disparagement.

By the time Demosthenes was grown up, a good training in rhetoric was already taken for granted, and it was altogether unwise to go to court without such a preparation. So Demosthenes turned to the logographer Isaeus, who was particularly well versed in inheritance cases, and became his pupil.²⁰ There is a doubtful tradition connecting him with the school of Isocrates; but although Isocrates brags of his better-known pupils, he never mentions Demosthenes. Not only were their political views opposed, but it was much more in keeping with Demosthenes' character to attend the school of the specialist with unswerving concentration on a definite goal and there to prepare himself with stubborn energy for the coming fray, than to occupy himself with idle rhetorical-school declamations under Isocrates. For technical equipment beyond what the arts of the wily old Isaeus could give him, he had recourse to unpublished handbooks of the best-known masters, copies of which were then being handed round among the students. Local gossip has managed to report all sorts of details about this, probably without substantiation.²¹ But this very autodidacticism strikes me as characteristic of Demosthenes. With a sure instinct he knew how to find in everything something from which he could learn. Even if he was not tempted to spend good money for the privilege of attending Isocrates' longish lectures, the rhetor's published speeches were easily available; and from these he could learn both to admire and to imitate the great new art of constructing rounded periods, in which Isocrates had no peer. But while Isocrates' art moved almost exclusively within the confines of this style, it was fundamentally unsuited to the tussles of the law court. In his speeches the

sentences followed one another with solemn dignity as in a festival procession, every one of them a complete work of art to be enjoyed for itself. The great theorist had spent whole days in shaping each of them. To Isocrates the ideal sentence was an end in itself, absolute and final; and no subject-matter was ever sufficiently elevated to satisfy him as a vehicle for this art of harmoniously fitting together the intellectual currency of his time—an art in which the Greek ear has always discerned one of the supreme achievements of the Hellenic sense of form. Demosthenes' attitude to this new creation is interesting enough: he appreciates the ideal of pure art that refuses to be bound by the actual, and, as a practicing orator, is glad to take advantage of it as extending the instruments at his disposal; but he refuses to submit unconditionally to this new artistic taste which emanates from the heights of theory. In general the style of Demosthenes' speeches, both forensic and political, may be characterized as giving voice to the whole range of temperaments and manners of expression to be met with in actual life, in conscious reaction to the even monotony of Isocrates' academic platform rhetoric. But in certain particularly emphatic passages he uses the Isocratean periods with calculated effectiveness. In this respect his earliest speeches still show that he has not yet worked quite free of his model.²² However, though he soon masters the discriminating use of this medium, he can, when he wishes to adopt some special attitude, stylize whole speeches in the Isocratean manner.

It is still a remarkable paradox that physical defects should have handicapped the inborn talent for oratory that the greatest of Greek orators possessed. The fanatical zeal and iron consistency with which he overcame them accord well with what we know of Demosthenes' self-education. Pronunciation, voice training, delivery,—in short, all that technical equipment which no speaker can be without and which comes quite effortlessly to those who are favored by nature,

he acquired only with the greatest difficulty. Fortunately for him, there were already professional teachers of these arts at this time.²³ But the very fact of their existence shows that delivery, the essentially oratorical side of the speaker's art, was tending to be distinguished from composition and style; and the more attention these received as a special branch of literary art, the greater became the number of those rhetoricians who, like Isocrates, had no competence in public delivery, or, like Demosthenes, had to struggle against natural handicaps to achieve it. Nevertheless, it is extraordinary that to the end of his life Demosthenes, the most highly esteemed of all orators, had reason to envy any fluent extemporizer and was easily embarrassed by unforeseen attacks. This limitation caused him one of the most painful and mortifying situations of his whole career as a speaker when, at the height of his fame, he was a member of the embassy to Philip of Macedon, and, breaking down in a reply, had to cut short his speech in the presence of his hated rival Aeschines.²⁴ In Demosthenes, whom his enemies jeered at as a cantankerous water-drinker, explosive passion and dogged will struggled against the constraints of a disposition atrabilious to the point of ungainliness; and we can easily understand why he held that delivery was the principal factor in all oratory, if we recall that this talent was denied him at first.²⁵ Nevertheless, it takes more than a mere man of letters with an acquired art of delivery to rouse a timid and irresolute multitude in the moment of actual danger. Thus we must recognize in Demosthenes a born orator, drawing his power from inward depths far profounder than any technique of speech or of gesture. But even though he bore in his soul this native spirit of eloquence, there was still a long way to go before he could mount the public platform; and it was perhaps no accident that after he had begun his court career with the successful handling of his own case, he buried himself in the profession of speech-writing until

he took the great step toward politics to which his nature impelled him, though it cost the surmounting of so many obstacles.

We must now glance at the speeches in civil suits that Demosthenes wrote for others as a logographer, so that we may complete the picture of his social stratum and general environment that the speeches against the guardians have revealed, and observe at closer range the peculiar problems involved in this profession. As we have said, it was not considered an especially elegant pursuit. We may see this not only in Isocrates' disavowal of his own earlier work as a logographer, but also in the sneers of the orators Aeschines and Dinarchus that Demosthenes had accepted money for writing other men's speeches.²⁶ Yet even if Demosthenes did not need to earn his livelihood in this way in later years, he evidently pursued his occupation with ardor; for he also gave lessons in rhetoric to a private group,²⁷ just as the great Roman attorneys were still doing at the time of Tacitus. Since Attic law permitted only relatives or friends to appear personally as counsel, the cases in which Demosthenes himself acted as counsel were extremely rare. The only one of these that we know at all definitely occurred at a later period. While there is some evidence that Demosthenes may have appeared as advocate in the speech *Against Leptines*, this has not been proved. However, in Alexander's reign a relative of the orator, called Demon, brought a suit against Zenothemis and asked Demosthenes to represent him in court. Demosthenes explained to him, as Demon tells the judges, that he was willing to make this *one* exception, but that ever since entering the service of the state he had, for understandable reasons, made it a principle not to appear in court in private cases.²⁸ Of course not all politicians were so scrupulous, especially at this time, as is clear from the case of Hypereides; but Demosthenes knew how much a reputation for integrity meant to a statesman. Neverthe-

less, he did not hesitate to *write* forensic speeches for others until quite late in his political career, for this was looked upon as entirely a private matter. The name of the man who prepared the speech was never mentioned, and indeed played no part whatsoever. Thus the writer's authority could in no way influence the judges.

If we remember that the logographer did not have the stimulus of personal participation and public appearance to urge him on, we can see clearly how far he differed from our attorneys. In a profession so anonymous—if indeed we may call it a profession at all—it was hardly possible for a professional ethos to develop, for the writer's personality had no chance to assert itself. It was not as one man for another that the logographer took up the cause of a client who had put his case into his hands; on the contrary, he had to obliterate himself altogether and become merely the stylus of the man through whose mouth he spoke. This required a special technique of a sort that Lysias had already developed to the point of virtuosity, namely, that of *ethopoeia*, the art of sketching a man's character in the words given him to deliver. For, like all true Greeks, the judges were not content with requiring that such a speech should treat the case in the abstract; they also wanted to look beyond the case itself and see in it the whole man, if not for what he was, at least for what he pretended to be. We can easily imagine how stimulating a task this must have been for a highly artistic people like the Athenians at a time when dramatic poetry had made both poet and audience supremely able to put themselves in other men's shoes. At the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth, when the vigorous production of drama was beginning to wane, the published forensic speech provided a wholly new type of light dramatic literature, which kept close to life with the utmost realism. These speeches were not published simply because they were valuable advertisements for their authors; they

were also genuinely in demand as material for conversation. It is odd that this should have been so much overlooked in our own times when every day the columns of our newspapers are filled with endless reports of trials, and the courtroom is second only to the theater in the power of drawing an audience.

So then, if we are to understand this profession, we must remember that the motive of loving one's neighbor or helping other people in distress had nothing to do with it. It was simply a fact that, under the Athenian system of administering justice, everyone had to be his own representative before the court; and it was also a fact that there were people who could earn a living by putting their superior training at others' disposal for this purpose. The author did not have to identify himself exactly with the person who had ordered the speech; he needed only to make a sort of game of transforming himself into the most varied types of the *genus humanum*, speaking first as a distinguished personage of high society, then as an honest man from the country, then as a complaining disabled veteran, then as a peace-loving citizen whom some rowdy young boozers had beaten half to death. The gallery of types was inexhaustible, and anyone who examines it even superficially will lose all ambition to approach it with the yardstick of morals and to demand that the artists should not have been allowed to write speeches for any clients except those who had sure prospects of being found pure and stainless when they should appear naked before Aeacus at the future tribunal of the world below. This remarkable art form, so objective as to rob the author of all personality, must seem alien to us; but under the conditions that gave rise to it, the only thing possible was to make a virtue of necessity and provide the client with such a speech as would make him feel that never in all his life had he come quite so near to his better self. Athenian jurymen were bright enough not to be taken in by every

smooth maneuver, and they liked, moreover, to be entertained. So no good logographer needed to feel as if he had signed a pact with the devil when he wrote a masterpiece of innocence and virtue for a rascal in harassing circumstances.

As most of Demosthenes' forensic speeches were presumably lost (for we have comparatively few of them), we may conclude that they were considered ephemeral and thus in large part not worth preserving. Besides the five speeches in his own case against the guardians, only a very few speeches remain from the early period when he was as yet a mere logographer. The cases involved in these were not very important, and obviously his fame was still in its infancy. But a number of speeches have come down to us from the time of his first political activity which show that in the meanwhile he had already become very much in demand. His help was sought not only in public actions but also in private suits where huge sums were involved. I shall conclude this sketch by singling out one of these cases, as it throws a strong light on the times. I have in mind the speech *For Phormion* and the first speech *Against Stephanus*, which is closely connected with it.

Phormion was the business successor of the great Athenian banker Pasion, whom we know from a number of lawsuits. Pasion had enjoyed the confidence of many rich Athenians, including the general Timotheus. Moreover, Demosthenes' father had kept some of his funds in Pasion's bank, as we learn from the case against the guardians; and probably Phormion's acquaintance with Demosthenes went back to this old business connection. Phormion had once been a slave of Pasion, and upon manumission had entered his master's business; he had then been promoted until he became manager of the bank in his own right, as happened not rarely in Athens; and at last, when Pasion's health had begun to fail, Phormion had rented the bank from him, together with a shield factory which he had run on the side.

But Pasion's confidence in Phormion went even farther. In his will he made him the guardian of his younger son Pasicles, who was still a minor, and gave him the hand of his wife, thus providing for her in much the same way as the elder Demosthenes had provided for Cleobule.

The elder son Apollodorus, a rather problematical character, who was already of age, inherited only half of the ready cash to begin with; but of course he also received half the rent that Phormion paid for the bank and the shield factory until the contract ran out. When this happened, Apollodorus divided both bank and factory with his brother, himself taking over the factory and Pasicles becoming owner of the bank. After their mother's death they divided her property as well. Apollodorus now accused Phormion of having withheld from him large sums as his mother's second husband. But they agreed on a settlement by which Phormion paid Apollodorus an indemnity of 5000 drachmae, and Apollodorus declared himself satisfied for good and all. Apollodorus, however, carried on lawsuits so continually to collect the outstanding sums owed to his dead father that he got the habit, and eighteen years later approached Phormion again with new claims, asserting that his mother had destroyed his father's account books when she was under Phormion's influence.

Phormion, in his counteraccusation, raises technical objections to all the new claims in view of Apollodorus' definitive waiver, and proves that on the occasions when the property was distributed, the books obviously must still have been available. The possibility that another book might have been kept secret is not mentioned. Since, moreover, Apollodorus had also objected to the marriage of his mother, a free Athenian, to Phormion, his father's former slave, the speech *For Phormion* shows by numerous examples designated by name that in Athens no less than in other places a banker would often keep his business intact after his death

by giving his wife to the man whom he had chosen as his business successor, even if the latter had not always been a free citizen.²⁹ It is important to notice how many aliens worked their way up by their business ability and not only won their citizenship but even gained admittance to the leading social circles. Phormion shields himself deftly against Apollodorus' attack on his barbarian race. He has the prudence to avoid pleading in person, perhaps because he cannot speak Attic entirely without accent: he therefore has asked some of his friends to speak for him.³⁰ But he points out that Apollodorus has shot himself with his own bow, inasmuch as his father, the great financier Pasion, had worked up from the ranks and obtained citizenship in the very same way as Phormion himself.³¹ The speech closes with a none too flattering portrait of Apollodorus: he may very well have enjoyed Athenian citizenship for a whole generation longer than Phormion (who has only recently acquired it), but he has used it chiefly to run through his money and bring lawsuits against all prominent Athenians.

For the truth of this last allegation we have other evidence than the list of suits that Phormion's spokesman counts up.³² Among the speeches attributed to Demosthenes as many as seven are written for Apollodorus, each in a different legal action. To be sure, the critics have long since shown that of these seven only one is really Demosthenes' work. Obviously it is to this one alone that we owe the preservation of the other six.³³ They were presumably found together with the genuine speech among Apollodorus' private papers, which appear to have been ransacked after Demosthenes' death because it was known that he had once done work for Apollodorus. We must think of the Demosthenic corpus as comprising: first, those pieces which he published during his lifetime; secondly, those which were found unedited among his papers; and thirdly, those—some of doubtful origin—which the editors discovered in Athenian private archives.

It was remembered particularly that Demosthenes had once written for Apollodorus; for his adversaries had been loud in their censure when shortly after his successful defense of Phormion he had lent his services to his opponent Apollodorus in a case connected with the very same trial.

Soon after Apollodorus' case was dismissed, he brought an action against Phormion's defense witness Stephanus, and had Demosthenes draw up this speech for him. Surely it often happens that when a man has lost a suit at law, he thinks that the attorney on the opposite side is cleverer than his own, and turns to him at the next opportunity. There does not seem to have been any Athenian law against doing this even in the same case. We shall understand this if we keep clear in our minds the essential difference between the Athenian speech-writer and the present-day attorney. Probably such cases were frequent in the practice of the logographers. But even under these circumstances many persons were obviously incensed at such behavior; at any rate, Demosthenes' enemies got wind of it, and Aeschines made the most of it when he got a chance.³⁴ It is rather idle to seek Demosthenes' reasons. There is some plausibility in the conjecture that as he had long believed in turning over to the war chest the funds regularly distributed as admission fees for the theater, he had to keep more or less on the good side of Apollodorus, who was then proposing that this dole be abolished.³⁵ But whatever the circumstances, it jars our sensibility that the same author who drafted the portrait of Apollodorus at the end of the speech *For Phormion* should now caricature Phormion no less caustically at the end of the speech *Against Stephanus*.³⁶

It is clear, then, that the logographer was actually no more than a living instrument in the hand of the person for whom he wrote. Even if Demosthenes worked on both sides no more than once, the way in which the portraits of the two antagonists confront each other in this extreme instance

shows how thoroughly irresponsible an art the speech-maker practiced and how completely it failed to bind him. It is unlikely that Demosthenes underwent any change of opinion purely because of a professional visit from Apollodorus. Is it possible that he deliberately looked upon each of the two portraits as a mere means to an end—a caricature that would have to be allowed in court in the event of a fight—simply because this was the normal procedure, and anyone who set himself outside the rules of the game would be sure to come out the small end of the horn? Or did he perhaps consider both pictures fairly accurate in spite of their caricaturist exaggerations, while, like so many great portraitists, he inwardly made merry over his two victims without disturbing the gravity of his outward demeanor? Enough true artist's blood pulses through the ancient speech-writing to make such a caprice not incredible, even if one might find in the picture of the rich skinflint Phormion—which Demosthenes paints in his speech *Against Stephanus* with especial gusto—a trace of resentment at having received too small a fee for the big lawsuit he had won for him. Anybody who had to make the rounds of Athenian society every day and was thus able to look behind the scenes, like the intimate legal adviser of these distressed businessmen and ostentatious worthies, must eventually have come to look at middle-class morality and respectability as in a convex mirror and could hardly help exposing himself to a dangerous skepticism—doubly dangerous for a man with Demosthenes' strength of passion and of will. Demosthenes could find no permanent satisfaction in this sphere, to which he had been led merely by his great gift of oratory. But the very growth of his fame as a speech-writer was to help him on the road to politics, where an objective more worthy of his powers lay before him.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TURN TO POLITICS

LIKE THE ROMAN STATESMEN, Demosthenes began his political career not by appearing before the Council or the Assembly, but by taking part in important state trials. The time was one of profound depression in Athenian politics, and of general bewilderment. It is hard to realize this all at once, after we have traced the recovery of Athens in the postwar period and her rise to the headship of the second confederacy and have watched her reach the high point of the Peace of Sparta in 371, by which Callistratus sought to garner the harvest of the war while the time was ripe. But to understand how Demosthenes got his start in politics, we must now follow the descending curve of the confederacy's development; for the three cases in which he made his *début* were concerned exclusively with liquidating a hopeless governmental system, which had brought things to such a pass that the confederacy was quite dissolved and Athens once more isolated.

Even during the last years before the declaration of peace at Sparta, there had been traces of a growing coolness between Athens and Thebes, the two chief allies. Symptomatic of this was the speech that Isocrates wrote for the Plataeans, who had been oppressed by Thebes. Presumably this speech was written under official inspiration.^{1*} At any rate, Isocrates was then highly esteemed as representing intellectual Athens at its impartial best; and he expressed quite unreservedly the feeling that Athens was being exploited by the Thebans and ought to coöperate with them only so far as suited her own interests and those of the confederacy, for on the confederacy Thebes was dependent. Naturally there was also a pro-Theban party in Athens; indeed this seems to have been the strongest numerically, if we may judge by

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 218-223.

the make-up of the Athenian delegation to the Spartan peace conference. In this delegation, which as usual represented all the various currents of political thought in Athens, the friends of Thebes had decidedly the upper hand. But Callistratus, whose quite unsentimental balance-of-power policy is so admirably set forth in Xenophon's version of the great speech he made at the conference, carried his point most adroitly and succeeded in maneuvering his Theban allies into a position of complete isolation.² Politics knows no gratitude; and at this moment no one stopped to remember that Athens' rise would have been impossible without Thebes.

It now turned out that the Athenians had quite accurately and prudently gauged the strength of the new confederacy when, at its inception, they had systematically guaranteed the autonomy of their allies in every form. When they came to interpret this principle, it is obvious that they counted on eventually regaining their old position under the Peace of Antalcidas, even if the new alignment should succeed in maintaining itself; in this way they could face the Spartans with an accomplished fact. Moreover, quite against Sparta's original intention, their interpretation failed to exclude the possibility that an appreciable number of autonomous cities might band together of their own volition. But at any rate it did exclude coercive merging of a group of neighboring cities into a single state as the towns of Boeotia had been united by Thebes, even if this should seem entirely justified by economic and tribal considerations. Callistratus had offered to do the Spartans the service of driving Thebes into this blind alley and isolating her there, at the price of their recognizing the Athenian confederacy. As Sparta could not handle all her enemies at the same time, this price was not too high for her. The Thebans, unable to enforce their claim to sign the peace treaty as representing all the Boeotian states, had to withdraw from the conference under pro-

test. But Callistratus returned in triumph to Athens. He had put a damper on Theban arrogance, as it seemed, without bringing on Athens the odium of betraying her ally; and now Thebes and Sparta could be left to weaken each other while Athens consolidated her newly won position in peace.

But in politics nothing is certain. Thebes' desperate situation only served to multiply her powers; and under the brilliant leadership of Epaminondas—a man as yet almost unknown, who had first made an impression by his decidedly un-Boeotian eloquence at the Spartan peace conference³—the Thebans now proceeded to wipe out the "invincible" Spartan army at Leuctra. Step by step Sparta had descended from the height of her power, which, after the first revolt of her allies in the Corinthian War, had seemed to be reestablished by the Peace of Antalcidas. But in occupying Thebes she had overtaxed herself, and ever since the freeing of Thebes and the founding of the second Athenian confederacy she had been declining. Sparta had had no physical, spiritual, or economic strength to match her military prowess. The old Spartan system had been based on a comparatively small population, as is attested by a man as well versed in Spartan affairs as Xenophon;⁴ and after the destruction of her army at Leuctra she had no more reserves to fall back on. She never recovered from this blow, and would have been ruined altogether if Athens had subsequently joined Thebes in one final annihilating thrust at their old enemy as she lay defenseless. But Athens now felt that Thebes had stepped into Sparta's place. Hitherto Thebes had been her ally; but as she was now becoming more disaffected all the time, it followed logically from the principle of the balance of power that Athens should enter into an open military alliance with Sparta; and Callistratus drew this conclusion cold-bloodedly, however hard this might seem to the more sensitive of Athenian politicians.

Let us picture to ourselves the new situation in Greek

politics. The course of events was now determined by the mounting surge of Theban ambition and the new aggressive policy adopted under Epaminondas' leadership. On the one hand this policy aimed at further weakening Sparta, the traditional enemy; on the other, it was a systematic attempt to widen the Theban sphere of influence in central and northern Greece. During the Theban ascendancy the political center of gravity finally shifted from the Aegean Sea and the Peloponnesus, the two traditional fields of force, to the north, which was not ready for it either culturally or politically. When we come to the time of Demosthenes we find this shift taken for granted. It can be seen most clearly in the Thebans' repeated invasion of the southern peninsula of Greece, where hitherto not even the Persian army had set foot. Over and above the immediate military problem of keeping Sparta cowed, which even led to armed intervention by Athenian troops in Sparta's behalf, there were three constant factors with which Thebes' Peloponnesian policy had to deal in the following years. One was the democratic movement in those Peloponnesian states which had hitherto been governed aristocratically under Spartan influence. Hand in hand with this went a new movement that Thebes was supporting in the highlands of Arcadia—a region formerly split up into a number of small communities, but now aspiring to independence and unification. The third factor was the irredentism vigorously fostered by Thebes among the Messenians, whom Sparta had oppressed for centuries. Fourth-century politics had learned well the trick of employing old ideals as slogans. In later years, for instance, we find Isocrates advising King Philip to make use of the word *freedom*⁵ in his dealings with Asiatic peoples; for its insidious effect on the Greeks had proved this to be the best device for destroying mighty empires. This lesson had already been taught by the Spartans themselves in the Peloponnesian War;⁶ and Epaminondas now turned it effectively against

them by pointing out that once one begins to undo the work of history, there are no anterior time limits, whether the "accomplished facts" to which one appeals have been established for decades or for centuries. In the politics of Demosthenes' time we shall again meet the new Peloponnesian situation of this decade: a weak Sparta, an independent Messenia, and a unified Arcadia with its newly founded artificial capital Megalopolis. Each of these was peculiarly the achievement of Epaminondas, and each outlasted him. With his death in the battle of Mantinea in 362, when he had invaded the Peloponnesus for the last time and Thebes carried off the victory, her movement of outward expansion came to a standstill. The battle left a state of chaos in both the north and the south, where from now on the Theban influence gradually subsided. Obviously it had been much easier to disturb the unstable order of a political world than to replace it with a new one.

During Thebes' nine glorious years from Leuctra to Mantinea, Athens, under the steady and determined leadership of the eloquent Callistratus, maintained for some time the state of equilibrium that she had secured in the peace conference at Sparta. After the waning of the enthusiasm that had marked the first years of the confederacy, Callistratus had tried systematically to strengthen its position on all sides, and had even succeeded in extending its membership considerably soon after Leuctra. Formally, Athens' conduct was of the utmost logical consistency. Never before had diplomacy displayed such conscious art. It had now become an exciting game with fixed rules, demanding the highest virtuosity. Indeed, the development of the form and theory of diplomacy deserves a more precise exposition, for it has not as yet had all the attention that it needs. Though fourth-century Greek history may bewilder us at first by its complexity, it becomes highly interesting on closer examination—like a game of chess in which we are now in a position to

test the correctness of every move, not only by once more thinking it out, but also by knowing how the game ended. But mental elasticity in a nation's leaders need not imply a corresponding vitality in the nation itself, and when their skill is stimulated by the very lack of such national vitality it is at best a poor substitute.

This holds for the Attic confederacy after Leuctra. Its further growth after Sparta's defeat was only an appearance of health; for when Sparta was no longer to be feared, the chief motive that had held this loose-jointed union together lost its force. The other confederates did not share Athens' interest in turning the edge of the league against Thebes instead of Sparta, since most of them were insular or coastal cities having no cause for friction with the purely agrarian land power of Thebes. But the less their interest coincided with that of Athens, so much the more did her manipulations become a mere semblance of politics with no really definite course. The first sign that the position of the Athenian leaders at home was becoming precarious was the so-called Oropic trial of 366, in which the Boeotian party in Athens accused Callistratus and Chabrias of losing the important boundary town Oropus by their treatment of Thebes. As a matter of fact, once the neighboring island of Euboea had gone over from the confederacy to Thebes, Oropus could hardly have been held much longer; and probably the leaders were not to blame. Callistratus' brilliant defense was the first great political speech that the seventeen-year-old Demosthenes heard. It was a great day, and he had hidden himself behind his pedagogue so that he might be smuggled secretly into the hearing.⁷ The speech resulted in the exoneration and complete victory of the eminent statesman, whom Demosthenes admired as long as he lived, and whose example obviously had a decided influence upon him.⁸ Callistratus' final achievement was to win over to the Athenian side the newly united Arcadian state which Thebes had created in

the Peloponnesus in opposition to Sparta. In the embassy to Arcadia Callistratus had matched his powers of oratory against those of his great Theban rival Epaminondas, and had won the day. But it is hard to tell what would have happened if Epaminondas had lived longer and extended the Theban hegemony to the sea. He had once remarked that the Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis must be moved to the Cadmea at Thebes;⁹ and his first step toward putting this dictum into effect had been the assembling of a great fleet and the opening of negotiations with the Athenian allies Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which were particularly impressed by his sensational trial voyage to Byzantium. The falling away of these important commercial cities from Athens sealed the fate of the confederacy a few years later, as is well known; and Epaminondas seems to have perceived shrewdly the points at which it was vulnerable. After his death there was a let-up in the pressure that had kept his Athenian adversary Callistratus in office; and this remarkable man, whose political talents Athens now needed more than ever, fell from power and was sent into exile. He always believed, to be sure, that he would some day return; and he tried several times to serve Athens politically from abroad. But he chose the wrong moment for his homecoming, and when after many years he ventured the attempt, he was forced to drain the hemlock-cup.

In the later years of Callistratus' leadership there had been no lack of unsuccessful enterprises to give occasion for his downfall. Unfortunately we know next to nothing about the powerful group that brought this about and then seized control. One name that often comes to the fore is that of Aristophon, an elderly and respected politician who had been prominent as early as the first decade after the Peloponnesian War. In our tradition he appears as an unswerving supporter of coöperation with Thebes. This alone would have been enough to bring him into opposition to Callistratus; but the

new people extended their hostility to every aspect of Calistratus' administration. They felt that in everything a sharper tone was called for. They drew the administrative reins tighter, haled negligent or arbitrary generals into court, and called their political predecessors to account. It is not easy to give a report of them that really does them justice; from their successes we must conclude that they governed Athens from top to bottom. But we may look in vain for any firm line of procedure in their undertakings; instead we find them plunging recklessly and making unpardonable mistakes. Athens' presumptuous and haughty demeanor as head of the confederacy now dissolves into threatening gestures of brutal weakness; and the hard-won capital of confidence is quickly spent.

This is the time when Athens is constantly intervening in disputes abroad and dancing attendance on foreign princes—the period of tumultuous mercenary expeditions into Asia Minor, where the Persian empire is temporarily on the point of disintegrating into a number of independent states, and the Great King's viceroys fight among themselves until the new ruler Artaxerxes Ochus alters the state of affairs. Athens now makes repeated efforts to get a foothold in the Dardanelles; but one general after another tries his hand, and each is recalled for failure and condemned. On the Macedonian coast Athens loses Amphipolis at the mouth of the Strymon, the most important harbor for trade with the interior, when, after the death of King Perdiccas the Third in 360, Philip the Second, a man of energy amounting to genius, seizes the helm. There is a single bright moment when Euboea is won back to the Athenian side; but this hardly compensates for the loss of Corcyra, an island no less important for trade and naval strategy. A year later, in 357, the other members of the confederacy secede; and Chabrias dies in the unsuccessful naval battle at Chios. A new fleet, armed with the strength of despair, puts forth under Iphicrates,

Menestheus, Timotheus (men prominent in the years of the rising confederacy), and Chares—the *homme de confiance* of those now in power. But when Chares attacks the enemy despite the opposition of the other three, he is defeated, and his colleagues are brought to trial. After two years of fighting and exhaustion Athens now offers to make peace with her former allies, and finally sets her seal to the annulment of the old treaties with which the second confederacy was so hopefully launched. Once again Athens stands isolated; her finances are broken down; she has fallen out with Thebes, and can expect no further backing from the now impotent Sparta; her naval bases too are gone; she is on the worst of terms with the Persian empire. The heroes of her ascendancy—Callistratus, Timotheus, Chabrias—are dead; and the internal state of affairs may be well characterized by the words of Isocrates' plea for constitutional reform in the *Areopagiticus* some years before:¹⁰ "We sit around at the shops and rail at the state of affairs, and say that in all the time we have lived under the democracy, we have never been governed worse."

In this pamphlet Isocrates had counseled a reversion from the degenerate rule of the masses to an authoritarian state with a strong Areopagus at its center. To be sure, he did not say where the property-owning bourgeoisie, with which he was in sympathy,¹¹ could get the power necessary for backing up this authority. Indeed, he merely expressed pious wishes for a reaction, without ever intimating how the problem of the masses was to be solved. Nevertheless the *Areopagiticus* remains a historical document of the utmost importance for the development of Athens' internal politics in the declining years of the second confederacy; I believe, moreover, that its significance is decidedly enhanced if we abandon the general view which regards this memoir as a by-product of the collapse of Athens' power in the Social War, and assume it rather to have been written as early as

the period of peace preceding the outbreak of the Social War. It seems to me that there are cogent grounds for this assumption.¹² The *Areopagiticus* still presupposes a fair amount of Athenian power, the existence of a large fleet, and an alliance established firmly enough to give perfect confidence in the good will of the allies in the event of an emergency. But on the foreign horizon, ominous clouds are beginning to pile up. The Hellenic cities on the coast of northern Greece, which belonged to the Athenian confederacy in its heyday, have now seceded from Athens and are thus definitely lost. This is the very situation that precedes Timotheus' unsuccessful attempt to regain Amphipolis in 364-3. The loss of Amphipolis is not the sole issue; the Chalcidian cities on the Thracian peninsula are also involved. Not long afterward, but still before the general secession of the other allies in 357, Isocrates must have written and published the *Areopagiticus*. This memoir is avowedly a plea for turning back before it is too late. Like Isocrates' *Plataicus* and *Archidamus*, it is obviously a pamphlet written to promote the policies of a certain particular group. We cannot account for it by regarding it as a mere product of the rhetor's personal initiative. He demands more or less openly a decided strengthening of the conservative influence of the propertied class, and prompt liquidation of the present radical democracy, which must sooner or later lead to ruin. Isocrates' speech *On the Peace*, which comes at the end of the Social War, is directly in line with this. Obviously it would have been impossible to stab the ruling statesmen in the back during the war period by demanding a curb on the democratic régime; but it is quite clear that the speech *On the Peace* is only a new attack by the same rich Athenian circle. In the *Areopagiticus* these men had already voiced their claims to power in domestic politics; and they now make a public declaration of how they would have used that power if their ambitions for constitutional reform had been fulfilled. But the moment for such a

reform had not then arrived, and did not come until after the war was lost. The interesting thing is the fact that the reaction of 355, which at last brought the opposition into power, was prepared so long in advance. The opposition now had to get along without any constitutional reform; other business more urgent awaited it. We may see how the range of this was delimited if we examine Isocrates' speech *On the Peace* and the tract *On Revenues* that has come down to us under the name of Xenophon. In the speech *On the Peace*, which was written in the last phase of the Social War before peace was declared, Isocrates recommends a complete change of system in matters of foreign policy, abandoning all thought of hegemony and returning to the principle of autonomy which played such a part in the Peace of Antalcidas. He now urges Athens to reduce her territory to the very narrowest confines as a way of insuring outward security, and calls upon her to restore domestic peace, promote economy, and reëstablish her good name among the other states. Isocrates' speeches, spreading over several decades as they do, are the barometer of Athens' power. Not long before, he could still depict her as leader of the maritime cities, worthy not only to rule over her allies but even to dominate the entire world;¹³ and once, in the *Panegyricus*, he had envisioned his city standing side by side with Sparta at the head of all Hellas, commencing a national war against Persia which was to bring unity to the Greeks. But that was only a dream with no really constructive idea behind it; and his present proposal is no better, for what could be gained by returning to the formal principle of autonomy as in the Peace of Antalcidas, with no strong power like Sparta standing behind to guarantee maintenance of the new order? Isocrates' proposal is, in truth, merely an admission of the complete lack of system and principle in the world of the Greek states—the first outspoken suggestion that it really ought to disintegrate. Indeed, the only positive things in this program of renunciation are

the demands for economic reconstruction and moral stock-taking, which means that the immediate problems of the future lie outside the realm of practical politics.

We find equally dispassionate language in the tract *On Revenues* traditionally ascribed to Xenophon, which cannot have been written much later and presupposes the conditions after the Social War.¹⁴ This pamphlet likewise calls upon Athens, the ancient queen of the sea, to reduce herself to a peaceful commercial republic, politically unambitious, foregoing all aspirations for power. Criticism of imperialism and its *πλεονεξία* had first arisen after the Peloponnesian War. It now revives automatically and is here used to give a kind of moral support to the program of confining all ambition to economic affairs. The author gives particular attention to this problem at the beginning of his essay and discusses it even more carefully at the end. He is too irenic by nature to make violent charges against those who represent the diametrically opposite policy hitherto prevailing; Athens can no longer stand any quarrels of this sort. He starts rather with a defense of the very policy he opposes, for he is determined to give it a fair hearing. The Athenian leaders, he asserts, have known the difference between right and wrong quite as well as anyone else, but because of Athens' poverty they have been forced to the imperialistic policy leading to the downfall of the confederacy. He intends to prove, however, that Athens can exist even without this policy.¹⁵ And indeed this seems to be the only course still open to her, now that she has lost all her foreign possessions and no longer has any confederates to pay her tribute money.

The greater part of the pamphlet is filled with concrete proposals for putting the state back on its feet both economically and financially. In contrast to Isocrates we now hear the voice of a really experienced political economist who faces the new situation from a higher point of vantage. He gives us a dismal picture of the internal postwar crisis.

The population of the city has declined; business and trade are stagnant; no foreign shipping is in port; the state treasury needs new sources of revenue. Heretofore the chief taxpayers were the rich nonresidents with their vast capital, who used to come in large numbers from Lydia, Phrygia, Syria, and other countries, as the author reports, to enjoy the pleasures of the city or to carry on their business. Now, however, these men have left town in throngs, for during the war they have been pressed into military service, and in other ways too their lack of political rights has made residence in Athens more to their disadvantage than to their advantage.¹⁶ The author is confident that better treatment of these people will bring a revival both in immigration and in building, as well as an increase in tax receipts, without any cost to the state. He even recommends setting up a special welfare bureau for metics comparable to the one for orphans; and in view of the many building lots in Athens still unoccupied, he suggests that aliens who wish to build should be given the right to buy land and be made as much at home as possible, provided, of course, that they have first been found worthy on careful examination. He also urges construction of new lodging houses and business blocks at the port for those aliens who come to Athens merely as transients on business, as well as similar accommodations for retail tradesmen in both the port and the city.

Besides these proposals for increasing foreign trade and encouraging an influx of metics, the pamphlet gives an especially detailed account of Attica's metallic deposits, with very exact particulars concerning the history of the silver mines at Laurium and the possibilities of their being worked on a reasonable basis both privately and publicly.¹⁷ The juxtaposition of these two proposals for better treatment of foreigners and more intensive production of silver seems at first haphazard and rather odd; but they both spring from the reversal of Athenian financial policy that the break-up

of the confederacy had inevitably brought about. The idea of autarchy lay close to the economic theory of the period, and Athens seems to have been driven toward it by her new situation. But her people could not live on the agricultural produce of the lean Attic soil alone, and had to import on a large scale without any equivalent exportation. Thus, when Athens could no longer support herself by the money of her allies or the spoils of war, she had to offset the unfavorable balance of trade by more vigorous exploitation of the earth's nonagrarian resources and above all by getting hold of the money that foreigners would bring in. All this is entirely logical and shows how clearly the author has grasped the basic novelty of the difficult postwar situation. He sees how this must affect Athens' policy for dealing with residents of foreign extraction, and realizes that although this policy has been followed in the legislation of many patriotic statesmen since the end of the Peloponnesian War,¹⁸ it inevitably conflicts with fundamental needs, and results in a vicious circle. The only thing now left for Athens is to become a city with as large a foreign population as possible; otherwise she must gradually starve to death.

This pamphlet is a thrust at the leaders who have kept their hold on the helm of state up to now, persisting doggedly even after the declaration of peace. Demosthenes likewise is to be found on the side of the opposition in his first three speeches at public trials, which belong to this same period. Here too the sole issue is that of liquidating the desperate governmental system—a system whose representatives, having allowed things to reach this appalling state, are now using even more desperate methods to find their way out. Here again, the three speeches are directed particularly against the administration's financial policy, which for the moment is obviously the real center of the attack. Even now Demosthenes does not yet speak in his own person; at least the two speeches against Androtion and Timocrates

are written for others. What is new is that Demosthenes now writes speeches in suits of an avowedly political character. Only one more step is needed to bring him in person to the speaker's platform. In antiquity this step was supposed to have been taken in the third of these speeches, the one *Against Leptines*; but this is by no means certain, even if it cannot be disproved. At any rate, the fact that all three speeches have a common aim shows that Demosthenes is here devoting his energies to an offensive in which he is sincerely interested and which has a more ultimate goal. The three persons against whom this offensive is launched all belong to the circle of Aristophon: in striking at them, the invisible director of the attack hopes to aim a telling blow at the whole system. We have here a sample of how the opposition conducted its campaign in a case of this sort.

The question of the party background of Demosthenes' first political speeches is one that has hardly been raised by the earlier schools; but it is of decided importance in understanding Demosthenes' development as a statesman, especially when we come to judge his political position in the speech *On the Symmories*, his first state oration, which belongs to this same period.¹⁹ When all is said and done, the issue here, as there, is that of financial policy, or rather of measures taken by the state which are important in that connection. It is illuminating that the wealthier circles must have been particularly interested in this: we already know the radical way in which they had criticized the degenerate character of the democracy and its policies. It is unlikely that Demosthenes' attack, which occurs at the same time and has a similar import, should come from any other group than this, especially since he belonged to this stratum by right of birth. As our tradition here leaves us in the lurch, we must of course form our own surmises; but these surmises become increasingly probable the more we find Demosthenes' speeches all tending to point in one and the same direction at this time.

We know the leader of the opposition: he was the eminent financier-politician Eubulus, who exerted a decisive influence on the leadership of the Athenian state for many years after the fall of Aristophon and his friends, and subsequently became Demosthenes' opponent. This antagonism, now become classical, in which two irreconcilable principles of political thought are embodied, has long kept posterity from drawing from the well-known facts of Demosthenes' first speeches the unavoidable conclusion that he began his career, if not as an immediate partisan of Eubulus, at least as a fighter against the same opponents.

For an enthusiast of the strict moralistic stamp of Arnold Schaefer, it was inconceivable that his hero could have trod such a path. For Schaefer, Demosthenes was from the first the alert and ready savior of his country whom we meet in the *Philippics*—the inexorable fighter for principles, dedicated to the regeneration of the state and fully aware of his mission. Schaefer's Demosthenes stands entirely on his own feet even in his very first speech, with no dependence on anyone else. He has that same rigidity of countenance which marks the heroes of ancient biography. Even the modern historian Beloch still thinks in terms of these same inflexible types; the difference is merely that the classicistic ideal has now given way to its opposite. Beloch, with his solid matter-of-factness, sees in the shrewd businessman Eubulus the prototype of the true national leader; he accordingly finds it inconceivable that the curves of Demosthenes and Eubulus should ever have coincided for any length of time. This Demosthenes is an ideologue and a fanatic from the outset, a stranger to the actual, who stumbles into politics to his own misfortune and that of his native city, and is predestined to certain shipwreck. Both of these versions do violence to psychology and history alike. Even the ancient historians and biographers found it distressing not to regard Demosthenes' political leanings as essentially unchanging;

for as the idea of development was alien to them, any change in his political conduct suggested a weakness of character. Without committing ourselves to any conclusion of this sort, let us give careful attention to each bit of testimony relating to this change. Since we lack more intimate evidence of its nature and the reasons behind it, we must watch for the traces of it in Demosthenes' speeches. Only when we have demonstrated a shift in his course can we venture to seek behind the apparent contradiction a deeper unity in his conduct as a statesman, regarding his membership in one party or another as, relative to this, a matter of no more than secondary importance.

Androtion was a pupil of Isocrates²⁰ and the author of some of the Attic annals or *Atthides*, which are often cited later on. We can follow his political career from the earliest years of the confederacy. An inscription testifies to his having been commandant of the Attic garrison in Arcesine on Amorgus, probably during the Social War.²¹ In the speech *Against Timocrates* we meet him again as an ambassador. He must have been one of the most important of Aristophon's associates; at any rate, he played a rôle in Aristophon's taxation policy after the war. The unpopularity which he thus brought upon himself is used in Demosthenes' speech against him as a lever to get him out of the way. But the formal basis of the accusation is a quite different one. Before the Council had resigned, Androtion had made a motion in the Assembly that the Council members be crowned as usual in token of their administrative services. For obvious reasons this was not ordinarily done until the Council's term of office was up. Under normal procedure a motion in the Assembly was in order only when sanctioned by a previous decision of the Council; but as the Council could hardly propose to have itself decorated, Androtion had to put the motion without its endorsement. This looked like a pure matter of form; it was actually something more, for there

happened to be a special law by which the crowning of the Council was made contingent upon the building of a stipulated number of new ships. This had not been done, though not through any fault of the Council, for the treasurer of the ship-building funds had absconded with the money. But the law did not inquire into the reasons why no ships had been built; it cared only for the fact. It was a political law, not a moral one; and if the Council had had the misfortune of being unable to build the ships, the law had no intention of honoring it for that misfortune.²²

Demosthenes' speech explains this quite convincingly. But the whole indictment of Androtion on the grounds of the illegality of his motion is only the prelude to a great political attack on his honor and his conduct in office.²³ And here it first becomes evident why no well-known personality acts as plaintiff, but rather two people of simple origin—Euctemon, a subordinate official, and Diodorus, a plain citizen. Both have fared badly at the hands of Androtion, whether justly or unjustly we have no means of deciding; and they now wish to retaliate. Euctemon has spoken first. Demosthenes' speech is the second at the hearing; it is written for Diodorus. Diodorus admits at the outset that his motive is one of private revenge, a sentiment that the Greeks would have found quite understandable even if not exactly genteel. As a matter of fact, this is an adroit way of diverting attention to the puppets performing in the foreground while the politicians who pull the strings are kept out of sight; for that these plaintiffs are no better than puppets is clear from their having the very same function in the suit against Timocrates, when Demosthenes again writes the speech and Androtion is still the real object of the attack.²⁴ These two popular figures are chosen as plaintiffs not because of any lack of courage on the part of the men behind them, but because they are well qualified to create good feeling in the majority of the jurymen, who belong to the humbler classes. The only

way to make the *καλὸς κἀγαθὸς* Androtion²⁵ unpopular is to attack from below by appealing to mass instincts. The older interpreters of Demosthenes have often failed to pay enough attention to this; indeed they have sometimes quite forgotten that he did not write these speeches to deliver himself. As confessions of his own personal convictions they are only very indirectly of value. And even when he does deliver an oration in his own name or has it published, we must always ask whether the motives that he professes are really his own or have been selected with an eye to the crowd. One must not speak to the masses as one would to a more highly cultivated audience. A hundred and fifty years of experience had made the political speakers in democratic Athens well aware of this, particularly since they did not as a rule belong to the masses themselves but had to learn the art from the bottom up. Plato describes this phenomenon in the *Republic* with bitter humor and explains that the essence of all political rhetoric is to learn by long observation which tones of voice will make "the great beast's" reaction a friendly or an angry one.²⁶ In this respect a forensic speech before hundreds of jurymen is not different from a speech before the Assembly, particularly if it is expressly agitative.²⁷

Androtion must have made himself very unpopular in many circles by his methods of tax collecting. Money was scarce; and at first the administration had not known whether to have the golden utensils in the temples of the gods melted up, or to make a more vigorous attempt to collect the taxes of those who still owed money to the state. The latter plan had been decided upon, and Androtion had declared himself ready to take all the odium. Naturally this measure was hardest on the property-owning classes to which Demosthenes and his political friends belonged; and they could hardly expect any sympathy from the masses.

Therefore the honest Diodorus, with his robust tone of candor, tells a number of little stories about the way in which

the taxes are being collected, which are enough to make even the jurymen's hair stand on end. Naturally he agrees²⁸ that the money should be collected from those who still owe the state: "For it must. But how? In the way the law directs: for the sake of the rest. This is quite in line with the people's interests; for you will not gain so much, men of Athens, by having such sums of money collected in this way, as you will lose by letting such practices into the state. For if you will only consider why one would rather live in a democracy than in an oligarchy, you will find that the most obvious argument is the fact that in a democracy everything is more comfortable."

And now Diodorus describes how Androtion, this born oligarch who despises the people, has mustered his constables and forced his way into private homes, where even under the Thirty Tyrants' reign of terror a man was safe as long as he did not engage in any public activity.²⁹ "But what do you think, men of Athens, when a poor man, or even a rich one who has had big expenses and may somehow have been short of funds—when such a man, I say, has to climb over to the neighbors' by the roof or crawl under the bed to keep from being arrested and dragged off to jail, or finds himself in some other degrading situation more proper for slaves than for free men, all before the eyes of his wife, to whom he has betrothed himself as a free man and a citizen,—when the man responsible for all this is Androtion, whose past actions and ways of life do not give him the right to plead his own cause, let alone that of the city?"

How little the plaintiff's enthusiasm for the spirit of indulgence and his philosophy of the comforts of democracy have in common with Demosthenes' own attitude, is shown by the arraignment of Timocrates. Timocrates was a political friend and helper of Androtion, and the speeches against them are closely connected. But in the new speech the mildness and leniency hitherto extolled are this time assailed as

manifestations of cliquishness because they have now been used in favor of the wrong person—Androtion himself.³⁰ Nor are Demosthenes' own sentiments any better represented in the criticism of the Council's failure to build ships, which we have met in the speech *Against Androtion*, or even in the highly effective passage on the value of the fleet. Naturally no one doubts that Demosthenes was an ardent patriot at heart, already well convinced of the need of a navy. We could have taken that for granted even if we did not have his earlier speech *On the Crown of the Trierarchs*, which throws light on this very side of his political views. But we need not suppose that his real motive in urging a strong navy is quite the one with which he hopes to impress the jurymen when he bluntly reminds them of the time of the blockade when Athens was temporarily without ships, and her citizens had nothing better than cattle fodder to eat, and had to pay out precious money for that.³¹ No one who could remember those indigestible meals could approve of crowning a Council that had built no new ships! Here the tone is highly characteristic of Demosthenes' hero. But the author cannot keep this up all the time. Especially in those passages where the argumentation is closely knit, the schooled jurist may clearly be seen peering through the mask of the speaker; and in the peroration the language rises to a passionate intensity of patriotic pride calculated not so much to fit Diodorus as to contrast sharply with the character of Androtion, who has never felt a twinge of civic fervor.

The speech *Against Timocrates* subsequently throws a glaring light on this ruthless state tax collector, who would hound defaulting taxpayers for a few drachmae even though he and two of his political friends had together pocketed as much as nine and a half talents of the public funds. These three had gone aboard an Athenian warship as ambassadors to King Mausolus of Caria, probably about the time of the Social War.³² On the way an Egyptian merchant vessel was

captured; and as Egypt was then in revolt against the king of Persia and therefore no longer under Persian protection, the ambassadors took the prize money for themselves. When the foreigners complained before the Athenian court, their suit was turned down and Androtion and his friends kept the money. When Aristophon, in connection with the administration's stringent financial measures, passed a bill appointing an investigating committee to enforce payment from those who still owed the state, Euctemon proposed, by way of following up his case against Androtion, that the trierarchs give up the prize money with interest; and he made Androtion and his coambassadors liable, should the trierarchs be unable to pay.³³ But Androtion and his friends admitted voluntarily that they had the money. Their countercharge was nonsuited, and they were fined a lump sum of eighteen talents altogether. As this, however, was more than they could pay, they hit upon the following device to escape imprisonment for debt. The festival of the Lesser Panathenaea was approaching. But the festival treasury, like many others, was empty; and so a friend of the party proposed that a legislative commission be appointed the very next day to procure funds. Timocrates, likewise a friend of the party, had been Androtion's adjutant during his term of office as Treasurer of Athena. No sooner had the new commission been set up than Timocrates proposed³⁴ a money-raising scheme that suited this period of lasting depression rather well, for though it did not bring in any hard cash, it made credit available. The state's debtors were to be let off from a year's imprisonment if they would furnish bail. The state could thus run up bills for the financing of the festival and charge them to the account of the outstanding debts that these people owed as taxes. In this way Androtion and his associates tried to wriggle out of the net in which they had entangled themselves. The law was passed by the special commission on the very day of the festival,

and Androtion and his friends were free for the time being. But Diodorus and Euctemon, the tools of the opposition,³⁵ straightway protested against the law, asserting that it violated earlier ordinances; and the debtors were at last forced to devise some way of paying.

To the philologist it is interesting that twenty-four paragraphs of the speech *Against Timocrates* are taken verbatim from the speech *Against Androtion*, namely, the invective against Androtion's tax collecting. This section, therefore, is simply a stock passage like those used in election campaigns. Such repetitions are frequent with Demosthenes. To us, moreover, this glance into his workshop is of material importance; for it confirms our suspicion that these speeches are part of a systematic program of agitation.³⁶

The speech *Against Leptines*, which was written about the same time, also belongs to this campaign.³⁷ Leptines had introduced a bill to do away with the ancient privilege of tax exemption customarily granted to especially deserving citizens. This measure was likewise one of the many little schemes devised for providing the state treasury with new sources of revenue. Now, during the first year after a law was passed, the man who had proposed it was personally liable if it were challenged as violating some existing law. Against Leptines an action of this sort had, indeed, been brought already. But some of the complainants had either withdrawn their objections of their own accord or let themselves be won over by Leptines; another, a man called Bathippus, had died; and when his son Apsephion took up his father's cause, the year was already over. Thus the law itself was now put on trial, as was the Athenian custom; and a committee of five was appointed to defend it.³⁸ This committee was composed of the best-known and most respected members of the administration group, among them Aristophon himself, which shows that the fight against the bill was taken seriously. It is evident that the lessons of the Androtion affair had not

gone unheeded. As the defense of special privileges such as those which Leptines' bill curtailed, was never popular, we should like all the more to know whether Demosthenes really believed in this cause and therefore intended the speech for himself as the tradition reports. It is alleged that he conducted the case in person because he wished to marry the widow of a general, Chabrias, who had been one of the men most recently honored by exemption from taxes, and that accordingly Demosthenes appeared as spokesman for Chabrias' minor son Ctesippus.³⁹ If this information is as correct as it is definite, then the speech has the great significance of giving us a self-portrait of its author.

The man who speaks here belongs to the upper circles of Athens and makes this felt at every turn without expressing it directly. He has no connection with Apsephion, the man who is protesting against the bill; he merely wishes to look out for the interests of "Chabrias' boy." Naturally, others who had been affected by the bill could have seconded the complainant's speech with just as good a right. But perhaps the case of Chabrias was especially suited to impress the people. Every patriot cherished in his heart the glorious memory of this commander of the fleet who had fallen for Athens in a sea fight only a few years before; and the people certainly had a more vital concern for him and his family than for some obscure descendants of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the only persons of whom Leptines' bill made an exception.⁴⁰

With somewhat nonchalant grace the orator presents himself as spokesman for the son of Chabrias. This manner, to be sure, is not kept up; but it indicates nicely the speaker's ideal of the gentleman, a rôle that he never abandons. His arguments touch upon all the items of a protreptic speech; he throws light on the question as it relates to justice, to utility, to the state's obligation to give honor where honor is due, to the importance of living up to the "ethos of Athens."

He then discusses in detail a series of individual cases—among them those of Conon and Chabrias—which give him an especially good opportunity to stir the Athenians' love for their fatherland and gratitude to their great benefactors. In all this there is no stormy passion, but only dignified reserve. The speaker is well aware that here it is the state that has something to lose, not the families of those to whom Athens owes so much; for the state is in danger of losing something quite irreplaceable, namely, its good reputation.

The style of the polemic against Leptines is no less characteristic. It never becomes spiteful or vulgar, as often on such occasions, but keeps strictly within the bounds of the best social good form. It is suggested, for instance, that Leptines may indeed be a man of high respectability, but that it would be much better for him to adopt Athens' traditional ways of thinking than to require her to adjust herself to his own mental habits. In another place⁴¹ we read: "If Leptines should ever be found making a serious effort to get this law validated, then for my part I shall be unable to praise it; but I have no intention of decrying it."

Even the language of the speech is very carefully chosen; although it is spoken in court, the tone is almost entirely one of penetrating counsel, as if to show the Athenians the only course worthy of them. The force of the speech lies not so much in entreaties and adjurations as in the easy superiority of the orator's presence. Presumably he counts on impressing the people with this. He deliberately scorns a full-sounding close. At the end he expressly points up the contrast between his own manner and the loudness, violence, and impudence of other orators:⁴² "I am amazed that although you have made death the penalty for counterfeiters, you still listen to those who debase the metal of the state and destroy her credit. . . . I do not know what more there is to say. I think I have said nothing of which you are not yourselves aware."

The ethos that the artist composing this speech aims to express has perhaps left its mark most clearly on such a sentence as this: "We are all human beings, and therefore should make only such proposals and only such laws as will arouse the indignation of no one; we should expect the good, and beseech the gods to grant it us; but whatever may come, we should accept it as human."⁴³ We find here the same fine Attic humanity that Menander reveals in his comedies. The verse of Terence, *humani nil a me alienum puto*, which flows from this very source, is here anticipated.

Is this a picture of Demosthenes as he saw himself, or at least as he wanted others to see him at the time of his entry into politics? He is certainly very different from the Demosthenes who assails Philip with great storming speeches; but does that prove anything? We shall see that this picture agrees all the better with the style and attitude of Demosthenes' first speeches in public suits, which come from about the same time. There is as yet nothing very personal in the way the speech *Against Leptines* is handled. The author sees the speaker before him as a type, differing quite as much from the sturdy Diodorus in the speeches against Androtion and Timocrates as from the utilitarian Leptines and his associates, whom he finds uncouth and lacking in consideration despite their fundamental respectability. The speech was not especially effective at the time. If it nevertheless makes a strong impression today, that is because it is completely unified, dignified, and positive. We shall best understand it if we accept the tradition that here Demosthenes wished to give us himself; and we ought to be glad that we can enrich our picture of Athenian society with these gratifying features. As a matter of justice we should realize that the pessimism which seizes us when we look at humanity from the perspective of the judge's bench, is conditioned by our vantage point's being over at one side.

THE FIRST THREE SPEECHES ON
FOREIGN POLICY

DEMOSTHENES' TURN TO POLITICS, which was consummated by his participation in the three great suits on financial policy, was determined by more than the mere accident that as a writer of distinguished forensic speeches he had been called upon to help in political affairs; it also marked a conscious turning point in his life. This is strikingly proved by his first speeches on foreign policy, which were written about this time. With these Demosthenes made his *début* on the political stage both as speaker and as proposer of measures in the Assembly; and this new activity must have had an inner connection with the political trials. His progress from the writing desk to the orator's tribune was made easier by close contacts with a group of like-minded associates who, drawn together by the unanimity of their criticism, must soon have been forced to work out certain basic features of a common political program. Unfortunately we know too little about the Athenian parties to be able to visualize their typical structure. Certainly there were no organized parties such as those of the modern parliamentary system; nor was there any fixed ratio of majority to minority in the *ecclesia* on definite party lines. There were, however, clubs and similar groups in which the more active elements found themselves associated together. As the Assembly was not an elective body but included all free citizens, there could be no changes of administration in the modern sense; the most that could happen was for some preponderant influence in one direction or another to develop; it could then attain a degree of permanence in the person of the *prostates* of the demos,^{1*} who often kept the people's confidence for years

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 224-232.

at a time and naturally could depend on a steady following. The fight against Aristophon, the previous protagonist, the course of which we have traced in the forensic speeches, is continued in the systematic discussions on foreign policy. We cannot tell exactly what was then the status of the various currents of political ambition or at what time the group hitherto in power began to lose control. But in Demosthenes' speeches we may watch the gradual turn of affairs and the emergence of the opposition. The persistent financial scandals, the rejection of the administration's measures for bettering conditions, and the fiasco of its foreign policy, led finally to a change of system, which soon became evident. Among its symptoms belongs the public appearance of new men like Demosthenes and Hypereides who had hitherto worked anonymously for the opposition. Let us try to determine the aims of the new movement as far as we can judge from the mistakes of the previous administration, from Demosthenes' criticisms, and from the course afterwards pursued by the new leader Eubulus. Apparently the chief items in the opposition program were financial recovery, rebuilding of confidence both in politics and in business, and conservation of the various resources of the state; all efforts toward hegemony were to be abandoned and supplanted by a new policy making the interest of Athens alone paramount, encouraging peace in her foreign relations, and strengthening the influence of the conservative propertied classes at home.

To be sure, this program was susceptible of many different kinds of practical application—as programs generally are. But it marked a sharp break with the mismanagement of the previous years; and, for the moment, that was the main thing. Eubulus himself was a distinguished expert in the field of finance. He can hardly have been a stranger to the principles laid down in the memoir *On Revenues*; indeed, recent research has shown that during the following years

he actually put into effect a large number of the measures proposed by the author of that work.² At any rate, we may assume that Eubulus' way of thinking was similarly dominated by economic issues. We soon find Demosthenes fighting shoulder to shoulder with him against the deplorable financial situation. If they parted company afterwards, the reason lay in the fact that from the very first, Demosthenes' interests lay more in the realm of politics; for to him economic factors were invariably subordinate to the interests of the state as a whole—a relationship always in danger of reversal in times of protracted economic crisis. When we come to examine Demosthenes' first speeches on foreign policy, it is extremely hard to know just where he ceases to be a mere representative of Eubulus' line of thought and begins to strike out for himself.³ But we do see very clearly that in his first four great speeches he covers the whole range of problems in Athenian foreign politics. The speeches *On the Symmories*, *For the Megalopolitans*, *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, and *Against Aristocrates*, are no chance conglomeration; together they give us a masterly survey of the four chief critical areas with which Athenian foreign policy had to deal. The speech *On the Symmories* raises the problem of Asia versus Europe. It might better have borne the title "On a Policy with Respect to the Persian King," as Dionysius of Halicarnassus remarked.⁴ The speech *For the Megalopolitans* unreels the whole complexity of Peloponnesian affairs. The speech for the Rhodians broaches the question of what policy Athens ought to follow in dealing with the former members of the confederacy. Finally, the speech *Against Aristocrates* attacks the problem of northern Greece, which was to become far more important than all the rest. I shall try to reconstruct the world of ideas in which these four speeches move, and thus find a standard by which to judge Demosthenes' political thought; at the same time I shall also seek to show how matters stood in the critical areas.

The isolation and poverty of Athens made foreign politics an extremely difficult sphere of activity. It was a great mark of confidence when despite his youth Demosthenes was given a chance to speak on such questions. This was obviously because his political friends had recognized his special bent and aptitude for this kind of work. Indeed, no one can read these four addresses without feeling that the man who writes them is here in his element. It is a paradox that only scholars have had doubts about Demosthenes' statesmanship; the statesmen who have given this point their attention have been filled with downright admiration. I refer particularly to B. G. Niebuhr, Lord Brougham, and in more recent times Georges Clemenceau, the "Tiger," who began his own study of Demosthenes after the World War and wrote his own book about him, in order, as he puts it, to impregnate a race of artists and aesthetes with the true spirit of the state.⁵ Clemenceau's book, to be sure, contains all sorts of historical errors, which scholars smile at; but (and this is more to the point) he is entirely free from the blinders of the cloistered savant, and has an unfailing natural instinct for Demosthenes' type of politics, undulled by too exclusive study of books. Though Demosthenes' speech *On the Symmories* is the very first of his state orations, it is already a masterpiece, not so much in the fruitfulness of the foreign policy that it urges (for a really productive foreign policy was then altogether impossible), as in the adroit skill with which it finds uses in domestic politics for a by no means easy international situation, and safely circumnavigates the cliffs past which it leads.

Since 359, Artaxerxes the Third (Ochus) had reigned in Persia. He had made it his aim to reconsolidate the disintegrating realm of the Achaemenidae, to subdue the rebellious satraps, and to subject them once more to a strong central authority. The coast of Asia Minor had known no quiet since the times of Cyrus, Tissaphernes, and Pharnabazus. In

Egypt the insurgents, who had gone so far as to choose a king of their own, had been fighting with help from both Athens and Sparta, at first under Chabrias and later under Agesilaus. But there were also Greeks in Egypt who fought on the side of the Great King; thus we find the Athenians sending him Iphicrates as military adviser. The relations between Athens and Persia fluctuated correspondingly for years. The southern part of the west coast of Asia Minor had witnessed the rise of Caria, the kingdom of Mausolus, vassal of Persia,— a province outwardly loyal to the Persian King, but secretly teeming with dynastic ambitions. During the Social War, Chares, with his bands of Athenian mercenaries, had fought on the side of the rebellious satrap Artabazus; this had so irritated the Great King that he had sent Athens a threatening ultimatum, which resulted in the recall of Chares and led to the peace of 355. The dynasty of Caria had emerged from this war appreciably strengthened; and in Athens there was no doubt about his ambitious plans. Not long afterward, in the oration for the Rhodians, Demosthenes was to concern himself with Mausolus' aggrandizements in Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, which had been Athenian islands before the war. Meanwhile the tense relations with Persia continued even after the peace treaty, especially as Artabazus' revolt in the interior of the empire had not yet been put down.⁶

There was, however, a strong party in Athens that still had high hopes of these insurgents and planned to renew the war against Persia. This party was presumably made up of the adherents of Chares and Aristophon. They succeeded in taking advantage of the widespread fear of a Persian attack and urged a preventive war as the only way out. They appear to have made much of the Persian wars and the victories of the ten thousand Greeks under Cyrus, as well as those of all the Greek generals who had since fought against Persian armies in Asia Minor; and they evidently declared

that it would be easy to conquer the Persians, for the empire was decaying and no longer capable of resistance. Athens could then recoup her finances with Persian treasure and establish a new empire stronger than the old one that had collapsed. The less real power there was, the easier it was for these people to let their fancy run free. Thus the project that Isocrates had once recommended in the *Panegyricus* was now revived. He himself, to be sure, had abandoned it after the sad experience of the Social War.⁷ But for these dreamers even the ruin of the confederacy was no obstacle. It is against these and others like them that the polemic of the pamphlet *On Revenues*, which so fiercely combats all new plans for hegemony, is directed.⁸

Demosthenes likewise opposes these people in his speech *On the Symmories*, and in so doing seems to be voicing the ideas of Eubulus. The agitation for war had been especially intense ever since the rumor had spread that the Great King was making preparations such as the world had not seen since the days of Xerxes. In Athens everyone was talking about the twelve hundred camels that were bringing immense quantities of Persian gold for recruiting Artaxerxes' mercenaries. The military men declared that the war would be an easy game; that if ever there were a moment when vacillation would be fatal, that moment had now come; to lose time would be treason. These arguments so swept the mob off its feet that it would hear of nothing but revenge on the ancient foe; and Demosthenes' friends, who gauged the situation very sanely, found it no easy task to convince their fellow citizens that they had no faith in a new Xerxes. Demosthenes was well enough acquainted with the ways of the popular mind to see that it would take more than sober reflection to offset the oratory with which his opponents so effectively impressed the masses; and he met them halfway by proposing a new tax to raise money for the fleet.⁹ In this way he shielded himself from reproach in the event that he

should turn out to have been mistaken, and at the same time he took a step toward preparedness. Presumably the new fleet would never be used against the "Persian menace," but it would be useful, whatever happened; and the prevailing fear of Persia could thus be made to help bring about what otherwise the finest eloquence in the world could not then have accomplished. At the same time the proposal for new taxation served as a holdback. It was the honorary duty of the richer citizens to pay for the equipment of war vessels; and Demosthenes urged, as an essential point of his proposal, that the burden of this taxation be spread over a larger number of shoulders. His measure took into account the reduced circumstances of the formerly wealthy man whom the long years of war had ruined; for it provided for redistributing the *symmories*—the taxpayers' associations, each of which was responsible for the outfitting of a single vessel—by raising the total number of citizens in these groups from twelve hundred to two thousand. This lowering of the tax rate turns out, on sober consideration, to be the real kernel of the speech, which is tactically a *non plus ultra* of financial politics.

Demosthenes begins by joining in the loud outcry against the Great King.¹⁰ He agrees in regarding the Persian as the Greeks' common enemy. But unfortunately, he remarks, the Greeks are not "common friends"; and as long as they keep spying on one another and refusing to make concessions, it is best to avoid any open war of aggression and to wait for the Persian to make the first attack and thus put himself in the wrong. Then Athens will have the rest of the Greeks on her side; if instead she herself is the aggressor, the Great King will use his money to win over all her enemies in Hellas and stir them up against her. Accordingly, Athens must never once permit him to approach the other Greeks in the guise of a protector. But to those bold talkers who are so eager to make war, Demosthenes retorts that while it is

not hard to seem brave enough when one is giving advice, bravery in danger and prudence in advice-giving are both difficult and necessary. Presumably some military men had spoken of the war against Persia as a rather slight affair, a mere *ἀγών*. Demosthenes agrees that in an *ἀγών* it is enough to have brave men; but a "war" against the Great King is more arduous, requiring ships and money and land for military bases.¹¹ It is also an economic problem. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles had shown that Athens' financial preparedness was not inferior to her military preparedness. Demosthenes, however, must first bring it home emphatically to the Assembly and its advisers that the present condition of the state is a bad one indeed. To be sure, the city still has property; but if anyone should try to raise money for defense today by levying a direct tax, nobody would pay.¹² "At this moment there can be no talk of money."

It is very important for us to notice how the men of property in democratic Athens carry their point in the face of the masses and their leaders; for undoubtedly Demosthenes speaks here as the political representative of that class to which he himself belongs and with the help of which Eubulus hopes to rebuild the state. If we examine the speech *On the Symmories* point by point without any preconceived ideas, we shall find that it is extremely close to Eubulus and very likely reflects his politics exactly. The only reason why this has not been recognized long before is that Demosthenes has traditionally been looked upon as a set type, homogeneous and utterly unchangeable. But even the ancients knew better than this. Here we have explicit evidence in Plutarch, even though he preferred the rigid heroizing version. Plutarch reports the unfavorable verdict pronounced on Demosthenes both as man and as politician in Theopompus' history of Philip: that he was unstable in character, incapable of remaining true either to the same policies or to

the same people for long at a time.¹³ Against this verdict, Plutarch affirms his own: that whenever Demosthenes committed himself to any position in politics, he stood by it up to the end, even laying down his life for it. Thus Plutarch, no less than Theopompus, has made this a problem of character. They both were strict moralists; the difference is that while Plutarch idealized his heroes beyond all reality, Theopompus had in him enough of the spiteful satirist to enjoy pointing out ostensible blemishes in the great men of history, even when he recognized their achievements.¹⁴ He therefore took pains to retain the fact of Demosthenes' political change of front, with which, as a contemporary, he was familiar. Plutarch was no longer in a position to observe it. But the truth is that we can easily find traces of it in Demosthenes' speeches, quite apart from the express testimony of antiquity. Here we are in precisely the same situation as with regard to Aristotle. The rigid unity of the traditional representation of Aristotle prevalent ever since the later Peripatetic school, has been broken down only by recent research, although, just as with Demosthenes, traces of an inner change in the philosopher have by no means been entirely absent from his writings, and ancient testimonia expressly confirming it have not been wanting. But the urge to uniformity was stronger than the facts.¹⁵ And antiquity itself, by its very fondness for monumentalizing its heroes, was notably instrumental in obscuring their features whenever they failed to fit into the picture that was prepared to receive them; this was particularly true of the school-tradition in the later years of the ancient period.

The close connection between Demosthenes' first political ventures and the program of Eubulus has recently been brought back to light quite independently of the ancient tradition, simply by a reinterpretation of the speeches.¹⁶ As this new interpretation is of basic importance, it does not seem supererogatory to turn our attention to the outspoken

hostility that it has lately encountered.¹⁷ It has been objected that when Demosthenes recommends a more extensive naval armament in this oration, his proposal is entirely in accord with his later policy of active resistance, that there is no reason for doubting the seriousness with which it is made, and that it is incompatible with the program of peace and nonintervention represented by Eubulus. But it is incontestable that in the speech *On the Symmories* Demosthenes is against any bellicose entanglement with Persia. Furthermore, his connection with Eubulus becomes all the more probable if we recall (by the demonstration in Chap. III, above) that in Demosthenes' first forensic speeches of a political nature, which come from the same period, he has stood on the side of the propertied class and has expressly come out against Eubulus' opponents. The very fact that he and Eubulus have enemies in common permits us to infer that they are now presenting a common front; and this inference is confirmed by other aspects of the speech *On the Symmories*. We find here the same high degree of consideration for the rich and their taxpaying capacity,¹⁸ the same dislike of the bellicose phrase (for even in this respect Demosthenes expresses himself cautiously), the same condemnation of demagogues. It is well known that from time immemorial the rich men of Athens were the peace party, while the demos was always eager for war. Even if Demosthenes' proposal for larger armaments was intended seriously, it would have meant an easing of the burden for those who had hitherto been the chief taxpayers. That a redistribution of the burden over a larger number of shoulders was the chief aim of Demosthenes' project for the symmories is also indicated by the fact that at the same time he was making in his oration *Against Leptines* (23) a similar proposal for spreading the *choregiae* among a larger number of contributors in the form of a taxpayers' association (*συντελεια*), just as was done with respect to the *syntrierarchiae*, to

which he makes a direct reference by way of example. It thus cannot be denied that there must be an inner connection between these two simultaneous steps. They are symptomatic of a policy of systematic disburdenment of the wealthy class. As a matter of fact, the only effect of Demosthenes' proposal, in his speech *On the Symmories*, upon the war enthusiasm was to serve as a damper; it did not bring about the increase in the navy at which it professed to aim. Thus there is good reason for assuming that the proposal was calculated in advance to scare the people by its exalted demands. The same familiar tactics had been used by Nicias—that enemy of war—in his efforts to cool down the Athenian Assembly at the time of the Peloponnesian War, when the plunge into the Sicilian venture was imminent.¹⁹ That Demosthenes was well acquainted with this method is best shown by another great speech on rearmament delivered in later years, his *First Philippic*. He is there unmistakably in earnest; but for that very reason he deems it necessary to state explicitly²⁰ that he is not making his demands simply in order to prevent speedy and effective action. That this, on the contrary, is his actual intention in the speech *On the Symmories* is made even more probable by the fact that his new demands for armaments are here conjoined with the statement that at present no money at all is to be had.

We tend to look upon the tacticians of the Athenian Assembly as much too innocent, and we fail to realize that, as things then stood, they could not get along without such methods—least of all the leaders of the always unpopular propertied classes. This makes their speeches particularly stimulating reading. For they were all forced to practice that art of diplomatic concealment (κλέπτειν) which the ancient rhetoricians demand of the political orator. This is demonstrable of the speech *On the Symmories*.²¹ Modern interpreters have overlooked the significant fact that ancient

rhetorical theorists quote just this oration as the classical example and model of that sort of stratagem. They were on the right track.

On the surface Demosthenes' formulation is correct and courteous; but irony underlies it when he propounds a riddle²² to the Athenians—one that fits the facts, no matter how paradoxical it may seem. "We have, if need be, a large, fine, and legitimate source of revenue; but if we try to get at it now, it will not be available in the future, let alone giving us anything for the present. If, however, we leave it alone, it will be at our disposal later on. What manner of thing is this, which does not exist now but will later come into existence? . . . Let me tell you. Look at this whole city, fellow Athenians. There is money in it, almost as much as in all other cities put together; but the people who own this money think like this: even if all the speakers scare them with tales that the King is coming—that he is already here—that it cannot help being as they say,—and even if the speakers are accompanied by an equally large number of other people all prophesying the same thing, then in spite of everything they will not only refuse to pay their taxes; they will not even let it be known that they have any money at all. But if they should ever perceive that the dangers which now exist only in words were beginning to exist in fact, then no one would be so silly as not to give anything; indeed everyone would rush to get his taxes paid the first. For would anyone rather go down in ruin with all his possessions than give up one part as a tax for himself and the rest of his property? So then, I tell you, there is money to be had at the moment it is really needed, but not before. Therefore I advise you to make no attempt to get hold of it. What you will get if you try this now, will be nothing so much as a laugh. For, I ask you, what if someone proposes a tax of one per cent? That would bring in sixty talents. Well then, what if he proposes a two per cent tax—twice as much? That

would bring in a hundred and twenty talents. And what is that compared with the twelve hundred camels which they tell you are hauling in the money for the King?"

The quiet tone of superiority and the occasional biting irony with which Demosthenes here fortifies himself give us a perfect idea of his tactical skill. Later, in the speech for the Rhodians, he says himself that he had at this time stood pretty much alone with his arguments, but had nevertheless carried his point.²³ Undoubtedly the impression of moral courage without which such a style of speaking would have been unthinkable must have been no small contributing factor. But his oracular hinting was so impossible to misconstrue that he would hardly have ventured it at all, especially before an excited mob always distrustful of the propertied class, had he not been convinced that he was speaking in the name of hard facts and superior insight. Again and again in this speech, we find Demosthenes fighting against phrasemongering—even against patriotic phrasemongering—whenever it is simply an expression of smug self-satisfaction or covers a lack of independent thinking. In his very first words, for instance, he inveighs against blind adulation of the Athenian forefathers, calling it unworthy of the great deeds of the past, and declaring that it would be better for someone to propose a measure that could really help the state.²⁴ In the same way he dispatches those who have prated about the common foe and talked of the war as no more than a gallant encounter; and he deliberately emphasizes the attitude of sober realism, which is hardly popular at the moment and therefore is all the more necessary. These traits of Demosthenes' character are quite enough to exonerate him once and for all from the unfounded charge of empty phrasemaking and demagoguery; otherwise we should have to suppose—though we have no grounds for doing so—that in the few years before the great *Philippic* orations there was a change not only in his political mentality but even in his

whole nature, so that a clear-thinking political speaker became little better than a loud-mouthed ranter. It is to be noted, however, that this first speech shows a decided agitative power, even if it does not carry everything headlong before it by sheer force of will, but makes its effect rather by demolishing the opponent with criticism. Such passages as the description of war as no mere *ἀγών*, but something requiring ships, money, and land, and the amusing picture of the twelve hundred camels bearing the Great King's gold from Asia to the coast, are full of natural appeal to healthy human intelligence and must have taken the wind out of the sails of Demosthenes' more vehement adversaries.

Nevertheless the language of this speech with which he hopes to make his *début* as a counseling statesman, generally avoids this drastically popular way of speaking. The prevailing tone is dignified and matter-of-fact—different from the blunt straightforwardness of the forensic speeches against Androtion and Timocrates. The manner, instead, is reserved, instructive, quiet. This ethos puts the oration on a plane with the one *Against Leptines*, and doubtless Demosthenes chose it intentionally because he found that it suited his personality and his position. Even the style of the sentence structure fits him. It is still strongly Isocratean and shows a preference for the smooth-flowing period moving steadily to its close.²⁵ At that time this was just as important to Demosthenes as the dignified bearing for which he strove. But while there are parts of the speech *Against Leptines* where more lightness, grace, and easy elegance prevail, the speech *On the Symmories* cherishes a pregnant rounding of phrase and a gnomic way of voicing its thought, so that ancient critics felt that both in form and in spirit it reminded them of the speeches in Thucydides.²⁶ Demosthenes had to work out his own form of political oration gradually; and, compared with the supreme ease of movement in the forensic speeches, there is in this first political address an

unmistakable conventional restraint. He still lacks experience in ways of speaking to the people; the tone is too academic; his sense of contact with the listening multitude does not yet pervade the whole even to the niceties of sentence structure, as it does later. But this only makes the speech the more fascinating as evidence of the young orator's attempts to find himself both socially and intellectually. At any rate, his political friends had every reason to be satisfied with him and certainly must have admired his deliberate effort to avoid the usual tone of the popular orator.

Let us now turn to the second critical area of Greek politics, the problem of the Peloponnesus. Now that Sparta had been beaten in war and had witnessed the collapse of her hegemony, not only her Theban conquerors but also her enemies in the Peloponnesian interior, who had hitherto been suppressed, had seen that henceforth their chief problem would be that of maintaining their new-won advantage. As armed intervention was always possible, Thebes still had a means of establishing her authority in the south at any time. Under Epaminondas she compelled recognition of her continued protectorate over the Arcadian League and the newly created Messenian state. But at bottom these were both mere by-products of Thebes' determination to crush Sparta and were not especially dear to Epaminondas on their own account.²⁷ Thus the chief difficulty for the Arcadians and Messenians who so unexpectedly found themselves free was to keep as independent as possible of the benevolent tyranny of Thebes, the guarantor of their autonomy. Sparta gave them no trouble so long as she turned her attention to her own internal affairs and devoted herself to reorganizing her powers.²⁸ After her further defeat at Mantinea, her king, Agesilaus, had gone to Egypt to take part in the uprising against the Persians, and on returning had died at Cyrene in 360, an old, weather-beaten commander of mercenaries. His son and successor Archidamus had his eye on restoring

the Peloponnesian confederacy; so after 360 the Messenians and the Arcadians were once more in danger.²⁹ The Spartans, however, ventured no open aggression so long as peace lasted, but waited until Thebes should be at war again before trying to snatch back the Peloponnesian states now under her protection.

The Messenians foresaw this and stole a march on Sparta. When Thebes became involved in the war against Phocis, which kept her forces busy in central Greece for ten years, the Messenians made a defensive treaty with Athens to insure protection in the event of a Spartan attack. The Arcadians failed to take such a precaution and accordingly found themselves in difficulties when Thebes was repeatedly defeated by the Phocians under Onomarchus in 352.³⁰ Arcadia thus being left defenseless, Sparta now began to arm against her. Sparta and Athens had continued to be allies ever since Callistratus had effected their reconciliation; and Sparta now sent delegates to Athens to sound out her attitude toward a war between Sparta and Arcadia. But at the same time Arcadian delegates also appeared in Athens to urge the forming of a defensive alliance similar to the one that Athens had already concluded with the Messenians. In this dilemma how was Athens to act? This is the problem that Demosthenes propounds in his speech *For the Megalopolitans*, which is really a speech for the Arcadians.³¹

If it is true that nonintervention was one of the fundamentals of Eubulus' party program, we must conclude that even though Demosthenes had not yet broken with Eubulus, he nevertheless struck out a new course of his own in this speech. This would explain why he failed to carry his point. The decision that he urged seemed too grave, his logic too sharp; and the young man's authority did not yet have enough weight, even if his arguments were attentively heard. But this time failure to follow Demosthenes' advice was a serious mistake that could never be made good; for here

again he was the only one to see clearly what was needed. There is, however, a second reason for giving this speech a high place; we may have little interest in the actual historical processes then going on; but the intellectual achievement to which they roused him is of lasting worth because of the general political doctrines which he developed out of the matter before him. The speech has thus become for posterity a mine of political thinking and has had a decisive influence on European politics in recent times by application of its basic ideas to modern problems on a large scale. It would indeed be shortsighted to look down upon Greek history as a small-scale affair. Spatial and numerical dimensions are of no great moment. The important thing is the vigor with which life is lived and the depth of insight which events awaken in the mind of man. And from this standpoint there is little that is comparable to the history of the Greeks.

There were a number of things in Sparta's favor: she was allied with Athens and had received armed assistance from her since Epaminondas' invasions of the Peloponnesus; there was, moreover, some hatred of Thebes and fear of her further expansion, while Sparta was felt to be so badly weakened that she held no terrors. Furthermore, ever since the beginning of the affair between Thebes and Phocis, both Athens and Sparta had leaned toward the side of the Phocian temple-robbers.³² Of course the Sacred Council of Amphyctyons at Delphi had solemnly condemned the Phocians; but every child knew that as the Thebans controlled an assured majority of the votes, this Sacred Council was really nothing else than the organ of their predominance in Central Greece and thus stood for the maintenance of that very situation which the new coöperation of Athens and Sparta was intended to combat.

Yet it was not to be denied that those who advocated intervention in behalf of the Arcadians could support their arguments by both the sense and the wording of the treaties

in which Sparta, Athens, and their allies had once sworn to preserve the autonomy of single states. This was the very point that had ostensibly led Athens to break with Thebes at the peace conference in Sparta. But now Sparta was the one who wished to repudiate the paragraphs on autonomy. Moreover, it was easy to see that the sole reason why Sparta chose Arcadia as her target was the fact that any attack on Messenia would have brought her into conflict with Athens; for Messenia was protected against just such an attack by her defensive agreement with Athens. Thus it really was obvious that the Messenian and Arcadian problems were of the same sort; and even the defensive agreement with Messenia indicated that Athens was beginning to drift away from Sparta. It would therefore have been inconsistent to encourage Sparta's desire for Arcadia; moreover, if the Spartans once got Arcadia, would they shrink any longer from reannexing Messenia? Was not Athens forced, then, to commit herself against Sparta? If so, it was naturally more to her advantage to have the Arcadians also on her side.

In facing this dilemma Demosthenes tries to take a firm stand, as he points out emphatically in both his exordium and his peroration. The Athenian friends of Sparta and Arcadia have already spoken; now Demosthenes himself will take the floor, not merely as one who speaks the Attic dialect, but as one who expresses the Attic side of the question. Good reasons have been given for sympathizing either with Sparta or with Arcadia; but no one has stopped to ask himself, *What does the interest of Athens require?* The masses are impressed above all by the sentimental argument that they must not betray their brothers-in-arms of Mantinea but must keep faith with them. Demosthenes thinks this bad ethics. He too would have Athens keep faith as long as the brothers-in-arms abide by their treaty obligations; but the terms of the alliance with Sparta call for armed assistance only for defense against an aggressor. Athens has no moral

obligations whatsoever to support Sparta's unprovoked attacks. To be consistent, anyone who believes in continuing to act on the basis of the treaty must vote for intervening to keep the peace in the Peloponnesus. Notice that Demosthenes does not declare impetuously that he would rather break up the alliance than permit an increase in Sparta's power; instead, he sticks clearly to legality, just as he has done in the speech *On the Symmories* in dealing with the question of defense or attack.³³ He puts a very high value on correctness in matters of international law. One might compare Bismarck's attitude with regard to the Schleswig-Holstein question, when the politicians who represented the heart of Germany were all for an outright break with the London Protocol, while Bismarck, the statesman, preferred to leave it to the Danes to violate the treaty, so that he could avoid antagonizing the rest of Europe and preserve his good reputation. In the same way Demosthenes' respect for the political value of formal correctness exactly reverses the attitude of the ordinary citizen, which fails, in large measure, to appreciate the dead weight of purely political concepts and stipulations, and is inclined to look upon friendship with the people of another nation as something coming from the heart.

Demosthenes gives here an excellent example of what was considered well-trained political thinking at his time. We cannot but be reminded of the parallel intellectual development in philosophy during this period, when we find his argument beginning with the axiom: One must start with propositions universally admitted, if one is to draw the proper conclusions.³⁴ Naturally a politician's importance does not depend merely on the clarity of his principles and the formal neatness of his thought. He can even draw false conclusions from correct *hypotheses*—as Isocrates³⁵ once calls these universally admitted propositions of which Demosthenes speaks. But when we come to judge fourth-century

politics, it seems to me indispensable that we should first have an accurate knowledge of its intellectual structure and its conceptual apparatus if we are to follow its operation. I find nothing said about this in the technical literature; so we can hardly help suspecting that this whole realm of Greek thought has not always been treated with the understanding it deserves.

The axiom that Demosthenes chooses for his point of departure as needing no further proof, is the interest of Athens. Neither the letter of treaties, nor "loyalty," nor sympathy for "brothers-in-arms," is permitted to become a rigid norm for the statesman. The friendship with Sparta had begun with the idea of counterbalancing the rise of Thebes in the new triple division of Greece, which had been so effectively forced upon Athens by Callistratus' formula. But even this policy might turn out to be pernicious if the association with Sparta should become an established system. Demosthenes thinks that the time has come to reëxamine the principles underlying Athens' confederate politics. For him alliances and treaties are not arbitrary creatures of diplomatic skill. Only so long as they objectify real interests and the inertia of actual facts, can they have any value and cogency. A treaty is an expression of actual relationships in terms of international law, and if these relationships are altered it becomes intrinsically worthless—a sheer formality that will not stand the strain when matters become serious. It is not the letter of treaties but the dead weight of interests that brings about political friendships between peoples.³⁶ With this proposition Demosthenes confronts those politicians who advocate cleaving mechanically to the alliance with Sparta and question the reliability of the suppliant Arcadians because they are still bound by the letter of their treaties with Thebes. Demosthenes' principle is essentially incompatible with any permanent system of alliances. It becomes inevitably a principle for the protection of weaker

states—for Athens just as for England. It has no need of moral interpretation; at any rate this does not bother Demosthenes. For Athens as for England the principle is one that follows logically and cogently from her position as a sea power as against land powers: it is the Archimedean fulcrum from which she can try to control the rest of the world. An English politician, Lord Brougham,³⁷ a great admirer of Demosthenes' gift for politics, finds in this oration the earliest development of that supreme principle which England has consistently applied for centuries in her dealings with the states of continental Europe, and which has in large measure enabled her to build up her own great authority: the principle of the *balance of power*.

This idea was not absolutely new; as we have already shown,³⁸ Callistratus had made use of it. Demosthenes did no more than take it over, with clear awareness of what it involved for his present decision. On the one hand, the smaller states had long been oppressed by Sparta and Thebes, the two land powers; and Demosthenes hoped to turn their plight to advantage, acquiring in them new and loyal allies for Athens, and thus enabling her to emerge gradually from her helpless isolation. On the other hand, he believed that while further coöperation with Sparta might yield some momentary benefits, it would bring no permanent increase in Athens' power. Indeed it could result in nothing but a race between Athens and Sparta to regain their lost hegemony. If Sparta were allowed to become too strong, it would soon be necessary to rescue Thebes,³⁹ though in the blind hatred of these years, regardless of Athens' own advantage, there was a general feeling that Thebes ought to be weakened in every way possible. Thus Demosthenes was siding with the unpopular party. This was all the harder for him, because the formula proffered by the Spartans proposed a restoration of the *status quo ante* (ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν), and for Athens that involved a hope of regaining the boundary town Oropus,

which had been lost to Thebes. But in the first place the Spartans were in no position to give Oropus away, and it was not to be supposed that they would pull Athens' chestnuts out of the fire for her. Moreover, in return for this dubious prospect, they hoped to secure Athens' neutrality, not only if Sparta should attack the Arcadians, but also if she should retake Messenia—for the transparent generality of their formulation easily covered this eventuality. In other words, they demanded that Athens give them in advance a veiled guaranty that under certain circumstances she would be prepared to oblige Sparta even by breaking her treaty with Messenia. By showing as clearly as he can that this is what would happen if the Spartan offer should be accepted, Demosthenes tries to console the Athenians about Oropus. Here he reveals himself as one who has reached the heights of the art of diplomatic retouching. Wherever he is forced to contradict the prevailing opinion—and this falls to the lot of almost every genuine politician—he always knows how to humor the pet sentiments of the masses. Just as in the speech *On the Symmories* his watchword was "No war yet!" rather than the blunter "No war!" so here he does not say "Let Oropus go!" but "Under such conditions we would rather wait for Oropus even longer!"

The mission of the Arcadians, however, was rejected in spite of Demosthenes' efforts in their behalf. The result was that they sought alliance with Athens' enemy, King Philip of Macedon,⁴⁰ and stood by him ever afterward, thus making it possible for him to find opportunities for interfering in the internal affairs of Greece as often as he liked. This proves the soundness of Demosthenes' advice. It cannot seriously be maintained that Athens would have risked being drawn into war with Sparta if this advice had been followed; Sparta was too weak for that. If it was fear of Thebes that led to the abandonment of the Arcadians, that was a miscalculation. Arcadia's tender of an alliance was an opportunity

lost. Although Thebes was still greatly feared at the time of Demosthenes' speech *For the Megalopolitans*, her severe defeats in the war against the Phocians soon brought the moment nearer when a new orientation with respect to her, such as Demosthenes had foreseen, must have appeared in a different light.

In the speech *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes again braves the prevailing current. This oration not only is connected temporally⁴¹ with the speech *For the Megalopolitans*, but likewise urges the policy of overcoming Athens' isolation by a prudent and judicious proffer of aid to states seeking alliance. In the southeastern Aegean the dynasty of Mausolus of Caria had shown itself to be a dangerous enemy of Athens by the support that it gave her allies at the time of their secession in the Social War. Among the Great King's vassals there had long been a Carian dynasty; but during the fourth century, when the Persian empire was more or less in process of disintegration, it had become of more pronounced importance under Mausolus. This family of half-Hellenized princes resided in Halicarnassus in southwestern Asia Minor, and their tremendous activity as builders testifies to the high opinion they had of themselves. They may best be compared with some similar personalities of the same decade, such as Evagoras, king of Cyprus and patron of Isocrates, and Hermias, prince of Atarneus and friend of Aristotle. All of them sought to become as independent as possible of Persia's central authority, and tried to extend their spheres of influence to the neighboring Greek islands and coast. With true Machiavellian cunning, Mausolus had begun by enticing Athens' maritime allies Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to secede from the confederacy, so that he might overpower them the more easily once Athens should succumb to her isolation. This is the same procedure that Philip of Macedon was to use against Olynthus not long afterwards. The island of Rhodes, lying off the coast of Caria as it did,

seemed to Mausolus a particularly indispensable bulwark; and while he had at first thought it shrewder to exert an indirect influence by secret dealings with the Rhodian oligarchs, he finally let drop his mask and put an end to democracy in Rhodes, in Chios, and in Mytilene on Lesbos. If the exiled democrats had any ambition to return home and get into power, what else was now left for them than to seek refuge in that very Athens from which they had so shortly seceded?

At any rate, the situation that gives rise to our speech is that a deputation of the exiled Rhodian democrats has arrived in Athens, and the passions of the Assembly have been alternately swayed by malicious glee at the misfortunes of the traitors responsible for Athens' ill luck and the break-up of her confederacy, and by fear of further aggrandizement on the part of the Carian barbarians, who, now that they have acquired Cos and Rhodes, threaten to snatch the Attic trade in the eastern Mediterranean and south-eastern Aegean. Now as before, the most influential Athenian leaders have taken their stand firmly on the principle of nonintervention. Even in 354, when Demosthenes delivered his speech *On the Symmories*, the Persian king was a menace with his great preparations for war; and now Eubulus is still afraid of the complications with the Persian empire to which a conflict with Caria might lead. Once again Demosthenes fights it out with the noninterventionists, with unyielding tenacity. He tries to show that Athens now has a chance of escaping from the stagnation of foreign politics, and ought not to miss it. But just as Demosthenes unmistakably views the Arcadian and Rhodian questions from what is virtually a single standpoint, there is likewise an inner consistency in the rejection of this standpoint by the very persons whose opinions counted the most. Athens being so weakened, it must indeed have been hard to decide whether and when she could again contemplate gradually emerging

from her enforced passivity and increasing her influence without assuming the burden of too great a risk.

After so many centuries, we must keep our own opinions in abeyance at first; and yet we never really begin to understand history until we can somehow put ourselves back in the position of the man whose actions we are studying, and can feel the responsibility that his decision involves. We shall try to do this with respect to Demosthenes' speech.

If we make it a point to regard Demosthenes as a statesman primarily interested in foreign policy, as his appearing in person to deliver these first two speeches would indicate, we shall understand why he could not help seeing in the appeal of the Rhodian democrats whom Mausolus had deceived a unique opportunity to win back the most important island states and thus lay the foundation for a revival of the confederacy. The bond that brought the Rhodians to Athens was their common democratic form of government. This, indeed, had long since made Athens the staunch supporter of all democratic cities. For more than a century she had built up her alliances on this basis, and in many cities the form of government had depended in large part on their alliances. After the Peloponnesian War, for instance, Sparta had everywhere installed oligarchical decarchies to facilitate control of the great number of small states under her protection; but the traditional mission of Athens was to protect democracies. However decidedly the domestic politics of the social circles to which Demosthenes and Eubulus belonged tended to restrict the influence of the masses and the demagogues after the Social War, as we have shown, it was nevertheless impossible to carry on an Athenian foreign policy with any hope of success unless the democratic ideology were put to work in its service. This is precisely what is done in the speech *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*. In the speeches *Against Leptines*, *On the Symmories*, and *For the Megalopolitans*, we have seen Demosthenes as the thorough

gentleman, the born aristocrat; now, out of a clear sky, we find him appealing to democratic instincts as a "man of the people," employing all his inborn agitative power to test the popular effect of this much abused catchword in the hope of arousing enthusiasm for his foreign policy.⁴²

This altered behavior naturally requires explanation. But here there is no real inner break such as would be explicable only by a sudden change of party of the sort that scholars have recently thought it necessary to assume; nor does the decided manner in which democratic interests are stressed in this speech compel us to return to the view formerly current, which derived Demosthenes' politics from a set party doctrine *from the very first*, and made him the hero of a life-long battle for the democratic ideal of liberty. This latter view moralizes him in a quite unhistorical fashion and at the same time narrows him. It makes us unable either to see or to understand a fact that we have pointed out in connection with the speech *On the Symmories*, namely, that Demosthenes originally stood close to a group of politicians who were vigorously combating the radical democratic influence; indeed, it is only to this degree that he can be said to have come from any one party at all. It is true that in later years, when he is coming to grips with the danger of Macedonia's foreign yoke, he naturally appeals to the lofty ideal of Greek liberty; but it is a mistake to read this into his very earliest speeches, as used to be done universally and still is done pretty often. It is not until Demosthenes is fighting the "tyranny" of the Macedonian conquerors that the idea of liberty takes on its true color for him and becomes significant as a great national good. Then, indeed, he is constantly endeavoring to get the indifferent masses into such a frame of mind that they will be ready to resolve on war; and to achieve this he appeals to their love of liberty. Even then this watchword of "liberty" serves solely to promote his foreign policy; but by that time it has really become an es-

sential factor in his envisagement of the world about him, in which Greece and Macedonia are polar opposites, irreconcilable morally, spiritually, intellectually.

In the speech *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, however, the appeal to the common interests of democratic states is still far removed from this impassioned national feeling of the *Philippics*. It is here merely an instrument of a policy based quite coolly on the interest of Athens. The attitude of this speech with respect to party politics of any sort is nowhere better illustrated than in the fact that Demosthenes, by his unsentimental plea for the Rhodians (who have so recently betrayed their Athenian sister-democracy to the King of Caria), is expressly placing himself in opposition to the uncompromising Athenian democrats who feel nothing but vengeful delight at the woes of the Rhodians and will not hear of their being reannexed to Athens on any terms whatsoever. But for Demosthenes this is no matter of sentiment or of democratic principles, but only a matter of "politics"—which at present means nothing more to him than an occasion for clear-headed Machiavellian calculation. And in applying this calculation to foreign affairs he finds himself compelled to take this vigorous stand against the Athenian democrats and at the same time to work upon them with arguments aimed at their partisan instincts as directly and deliberately as if an orator of their own party were addressing them. The truth is that Demosthenes' sole intention is to prevent those who oppose his foreign policy, the unyielding noninterventionists, from utilizing the pernicious and shortsighted impulses of the mob, its malice and its vengefulness, to keep the Athenian people from taking an active part in foreign affairs. We cannot rightly understand the use that he here makes of democratic catchwords until we appreciate the skill with which Eubulus and his associates, following the old tried methods of the oligarchic opposition, will have used these same democratic catchwords to achieve

the opposite goal, namely, to prevent any action of the sort that Demosthenes desires. Here both sides have motives for their behavior quite different from those that we might be led to expect from the arguments with which they appeal to the masses. This has been so in the earlier speeches, and there is no reason to suppose that there has been any change in this respect in the speech for the Rhodians.

It seems to me indubitable that Demosthenes did not here suddenly change his color in his attitude toward the world in general. It would be a strangely puerile notion to suppose that a genuine statesman could suddenly fall from the sober heights of political understanding and begin to echo uncritically the general catchwords of the multitude; and, as we can see from the earlier speeches, any such interpretation of the facts is completely excluded by Demosthenes' astounding and almost uncanny knowledge of how to utilize the means at his disposal. He perceives that if the Rhodian democrats are sent home again in Athenian vessels with political and perhaps even military support, there will be a good chance of overthrowing the Rhodian oligarchs. For in the meantime King Mausolus of Caria has died, and a woman—his wife Artemisia—has recently succeeded him.⁴³ This lady will steer clear of war; and the king of Persia is too busy with the Egyptian revolt to keep Athens from repudiating the policy of partition to which he has subjected her in the last peace treaty. Athens' action will be a signal to the overthrown democracies in Mytilene and Chios, and she will then face the Persian with the accomplished fact of a new confederacy.

Demosthenes must have expected the countercharge that in the speech *On the Symmories* he had spoken quite differently and had warned against irritating the Persian colossus. That was unquestionably what he had done, even if the arguments that he had then urged were not so much his own as an extremely adroit presentation of Eubulus' ideas; and

Demosthenes now had to find some way of facing this criticism. He does so near the beginning of our speech, explaining that on that earlier occasion he had advised the Athenians not to make any new enemies, but to ward off those who were already a menace.⁴⁴ He therefore feels that he has been entirely consistent in making his present proposal; for his formula calls for action in behalf of the Rhodians "without annulling the treaty with Persia."⁴⁵ We can construe this either as his real conviction or as a mere tactical maneuver; but it is unmistakable that at the time of this speech Eubulus and the administration circles were more alarmed than Demosthenes at the danger of getting involved with Persia, while he felt that they were underestimating Philip of Macedon. In saying this, we cannot help thinking of Isocrates' remarks on Philip in his speech *On the Peace* a few years before, in which he very likely came rather close to the views of Eubulus' circle. Philip, he then stated, would no longer contest Amphipolis with the Athenians if they would abandon their imperialistic politics.⁴⁶ This illusionism is a proper background for understanding Demosthenes' fears in the speech for the Rhodians regarding the intentions of Philip. The idea flares up momentarily, only to vanish again.⁴⁷ But no one can doubt that it already underlies the arguments on the Rhodian question as a fundamental determining motive. A papyrus discovered a few decades ago, which has restored to us part of Didymus' commentary on the *Philippic* orations, includes a bit from a speech by the Athenian politician Philocrates, taken from Theopompus' lost history of this period. The speaker describes the unfavorable situation of Athens at a time obviously somewhat later than Demosthenes' oration: the Boeotians and Megarians are hostile to Athens; part of the Peloponnesus cleaves to Sparta, part to Thebes; but the Chians and the Rhodians and their allies are definitely Athens' enemies and are negotiating a friendly *entente* with Philip.⁴⁸ Here, then, the same thing has hap-

pened as to the Arcadians whom Athens turned away: they have either been left at the mercy of their oppressors, or been driven into the arms of Philip. In this way the problem of the north, which threatened to develop into a critical area of the greatest political importance, was bound up with the politics of the confederacy and the Peloponnesian question. This background, to which our speech refers but once, though with striking vigor, will be revealed in the next oration. We cannot see clearly what form Demosthenes' relations to his former associates under Eubulus have taken by the time of the speech for the Rhodians; but his criticism of the passiveness of the leaders here reaches the point of stern censure and bitter irony, and lets us surmise enough of the tension to make us expect the break, if, indeed, it has not occurred already. This latter hypothesis would make it particularly easy to understand the appeal to popular sentiment that breaks out so distinctly in this speech. As Demosthenes can no longer depend on the support of the leading men of his own social stratum, he is forced to find a new position for himself. He no longer speaks as their representative and spokesman; their ears are deaf to him. He must now turn directly to the people:

flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.

THE NORTH-GRECIAN PROBLEM AND
THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

THERE IS NO MORE THOROUGH introduction to the problems of Athenian politics during the five years immediately following the Social War and the collapse of the second confederacy, than the first state speeches of Demosthenes. These testify both to the systematic way in which he has mastered all the fields of Athenian foreign policy, and to the swiftness of insight with which he probes the decisive issues of the time. Of course they do not give us exhaustive material for a history of the Greek states in these years, for such a history ought not to take Athens as its sole point of departure; but if our aim is to understand the development of Demosthenes as a politician, then these speeches are a simply incomparable body of material such as we have for the study of no other Greek statesman, for they lead from one critical area of Athenian politics to another, making the interconnectedness of the whole increasingly more clear. Demosthenes first takes his stand with regard to Athens' Persian policy, then deals successively with the problems of the Peloponnesus and the confederacy. The next great speech that has come down to us brings us to the problem of northern Greece. In the speech for the Rhodians he has already touched on this—only in passing, to be sure, but with striking seriousness and emphasis.^{1*} Henceforth this is to be *the* problem of all Athenian and Grecian politics, the theme to which all his subsequent state speeches are dedicated. Therefore the first treatment of it in the speech *Against Aristocrates* is of historical importance and requires our special attention.

We have here, to be sure, not a state speech given over entirely to a single program, like those which we have last

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 233-238.

discussed, but a forensic speech for a great political trial of the type that we have come to know in the speeches against Androtion and Timocrates. Those earlier speeches, however, were concerned chiefly with internal politics, whereas this new bill of indictment is contrasted with them in that its subject-matter proclaims Demosthenes' turn to foreign politics, as in his state speeches of the same period. This time, as before, Demosthenes did not appear in person as plaintiff, obviously not caring to risk in vain his young renown as a politician. Evidently he had a definite ideal of how a statesman should conduct himself. It was now, however, quite impossible to get ahead without utilizing the political trials, for everyone else availed himself of this implement; accordingly Demosthenes left the part of the plaintiff to be played by an *homme de confiance*, and was glad enough to write the accusation for him. But the selection of this man was significant. For Demosthenes did not take any unscrupulous but dependable person whom the party provided, as at the time of his campaign against Androtion and his clique, but Euthycles of Thria, a highly estimable citizen of the best social position, who had been one of his military comrades when they were commanding as fellow trierarchs on the Hellespont. The man was therefore well qualified by his own experience to judge the Athenian interests at stake. Demosthenes himself brings out promptly and quite deliberately the contrast to the method of attack used in the speech *Against Androtion*. Diodorus—the man whom he had then put forward as plaintiff—had declared at the very beginning of the speech that he was acting purely out of personal revenge; but this urge for retaliation had been simply a tool with which the men behind him could further their aim of overthrowing the hated Androtion. Now, however, the adversary is of another caliber; the plaintiff wins confidence throughout with the assurance that his action is based exclusively on grounds of fact.² Undoubtedly the cleverest

thing for him to do was to express this openly and thus put his *plaidoyer* on a higher plane from the start. As a matter of fact, there was nothing to conceal. This time Demosthenes was dealing with a proposal in the Assembly which not only struck him as mistaken but also turned out to be illegal, thus presenting a number of vulnerable points; and he did not hesitate to use the weapon of a judicial complaint against it. For, unlike the usual private forensic speech, the speech written for Euthycles does not represent the views of the plaintiff alone;³ we should look on it rather as entirely a political move on Demosthenes' part, as is clear from the fact that in other, purely political, orations, where he is speaking in his own name, he has made use of extensive parts of this speech containing attacks on the administration.⁴ Aristocrates' proposal had already been quashed by the Council; and the whole affair might so far have been considered closed.⁵ When, in spite of this, Demosthenes carried through his complaint on grounds of illegality, he did so more as a matter of principle than because of personal reasons. He felt that it was his duty to bring this important question of foreign policy before the public court for arbitration, and he hoped that by his treatment of the affairs in northern Greece he would obtain a decision giving him solid ground to stand on in his further resistance to the official policies. A trial and a decision were more effective weapons for such agitation than another speech in the Assembly would have been; for that would have been passed over as a mere item in the order of the day, just as had happened on the occasion of his speeches for the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians—his two most recent attempts to go his own way independently.

Aristocrates' bill, against which Demosthenes was fighting, proposed a true *privilegium*⁶ for the protection of one man alone: "If anyone kills Charidemus, let him be deportable from all the territory of Athens' allies and brought to justice. If, on the other hand, any party, whether a state or

an individual, shall let the culprit go unpunished, that party shall be excluded from any treaty relations with Athens." Thus the murderer was virtually declared an outlaw. Charidemus was a former Athenian mercenary general who now was brother-in-law and minister of King Cersobleptes of Thrace. Why should influential circles in Athens wish to have him honored with such special measures and given state protection? Obviously the person of Charidemus here stood for a political program. The half-civilized Thracians on the north coast of the Aegean were useful to Athens as auxiliaries in her wars, and in time of peace their country was not to be despised as a trading area. The incessant struggles of the Thracian princes for the throne made it easy for Athens to maintain her strong position in the north by occasional intervention with only a slight expenditure of her powers. This tradition from the heyday of her maritime leadership continued even during the period of her decline in the fifties of the fourth century, when, after the death of Cotys,—the energetic and crafty king of the Odrysae, who had given Athens a good deal of trouble,—his sons Cersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus had divided the sovereignty of Thrace among themselves. They had soon begun to quarrel, however, and vied with each other in their efforts to get the favor of Athens. The Greek Charidemus had earlier left the Athenian service for that of King Cotys and had even become his son-in-law; he thus found himself the foreordained go-between for Athens and his three reigning brothers-in-law, and he advised them to restore to her the Thracian Chersonese, that narrow peninsula on the European shore of the Hellespont which King Cotys had successfully contested with Athens. From time immemorial the Greek cities in the Thracian Chersonese had served as the base from which Athens controlled this highly important key position at the entrance to the Sea of Marmora. On its possession depended her grain supplies and therewith all the sustenance

of her people. The temporary loss of this darling of all her overseas holdings had left her with the distressing realization that this point was endangered. What, for instance, was to happen if a Thracian king hostile to Athens should become strong enough to subdue the Greek cities of the Chersonese and lay his hand on this vital spot? Because of the adverse trade winds in the Archipelago, there were months at a time when it was impossible or at best very difficult to send transport ships so far north. In the meanwhile Athens could be starved out. Naturally the only real protection against this contingency was a strong navy; but as long as this was not to be had, it seemed best to keep on as close terms of friendship as possible with the most powerful Thracian neighbors of the Chersonese.

The circles in Athens that stood behind Aristocrates' proposal calculated that they could maintain their influence in Thrace if they could keep Charidemus on the Athenian side by conferring these extraordinary honors upon him. In this they were betting on King Cersobleptes, of whom Charidemus was a special friend and intimate and whose realm bordered immediately on the Chersonese. Moreover, Charidemus had promised them confidentially that he would retrieve for Athens the seaport town of Amphipolis at the mouth of the Strymon, which had been lost to King Philip of Macedon; probably Charidemus had named his own terms, and at that time it was still possible for Athenian politicians to delude themselves with the hope that this bone of contention between Athens and Philip could be regained at so low a cost. Thus the Thracian affair was very closely linked with Macedonian politics.

But just who were the members of these political circles in Athens, obviously so influential, whose plans for Macedonia and Thrace Demosthenes hoped to cut across with his indictment of Aristocrates' proposal? The speech leaves the names of Aristocrates' backers mercifully in the dark. This

deliberate silence has given modern scholars an excuse to vie with one another in riddle-guessing. According to the most recent paradoxical thesis, Demosthenes is here still working in the service of Eubulus' policies, just as in the speech *On the Symmories*.⁷ Demosthenes' proposal, it is now asserted, would lead to a bloodless solution of the problem of northern Greece, and is thus quite in accord with Eubulus' pacifistic principles. But inasmuch as the policy that Demosthenes is fighting—the policy that has led to Aristocrates' bill—can also hardly be designated as bellicose, the criterion of nonintervention, which is in general symptomatic of Eubulus' foreign policy, cannot be applied. The speech includes strikingly long tirades against the dominating influence of certain individual politicians, whose magnificent palaces and far-flung estates are depicted with stirring vigor,⁸ and this is the sort of thing that one would be most likely to connect with people of the type of the rich banker Eubulus; but it must also be added that this passage is repeated in the *Third Olynthiac* almost word for word. Since ancient times nobody has doubted that Eubulus is the person there attacked. The parallel instance of repeated use of a cliché of this type in the speeches against Androtion and Timocrates during the fight against Androtion, leaps to the mind. Obviously when Demosthenes was forced to break with Eubulus, he used against him the very methods that he had learned under his guidance at that time; and the prehistory of the *Third Olynthiac's* storm-attack on Eubulus' policies both in finance and in foreign affairs, thus reaches back to the speech *Against Aristocrates*. The purely factual discussion in the speeches for the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians never takes on a tone so sharp and aggressive. Anyone who holds that when Demosthenes wrote the speech *Against Aristocrates* he was still in the service of Eubulus, must first make believable the unbelievable, namely, that Demosthenes here forged the weapon of this

polemical passage for use against Eubulus' opponents, and then turned it against Eubulus himself in the *Olynthiacs*.

On the other hand, to maintain with another group of scholars⁹ that in the speech *Against Aristocrates* Demosthenes appears on the side of the radical democrats—that is, that he has undergone a genuine change of party—is something that I cannot admit here any more than when I was discussing the speech for the Rhodians. It is true enough that Demosthenes makes a vigorous attack on the adulation of individuals in this latest era of the Attic democracy, and does so ostensibly on democratic principles; it is also true that although he has had the highest praise for the political services of distinguished men like Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus as recently as the speech *Against Leptines*, his verdict in the speech *Against Aristocrates* is entirely different. But this by no means indicates a change of sentiment or even a shift in outward party allegiance; it merely follows with rhetorical consistency from the very purpose of the speech, namely, to fight against the honors planned for Charidemus.¹⁰ For quite apart from the man's personal unworthiness—which the orator paints very black indeed—Demosthenes tries to prove as a matter of principle that any exaggerated honor paid to an individual contradicts the spirit of the democratic state, and that unfortunately Athens has of late gone much too far in this direction. This startling concession to the attitude of the masses, which Demosthenes has censured in the speech *Against Leptines* as low and ignoble, has definite political grounds. As he cannot win over the powerful Eubulus, he tries to enlist the people against that gentleman's schemes, plying them with arguments borrowed from the psychology of envy and fear. He now follows the same fighting tactics that we have observed in the speech *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*—tactics that force him to lean more and more on the people as against Eubulus. It is not as if he were now going over to some actual historical

party; it is rather that, beginning in a position of complete isolation, he has been fighting a fight that must eventually lead to building up a following of his own, a Demosthenic party, so to speak. That such a group could not help including a large number of the supporters of the former radical party centering about Aristophon has been clear from the first, for in democratic Athens the radical group was always the spearhead of those who demanded an activist foreign policy. Demosthenes had to resume on a higher plane, as it were, the politics that had been shipwrecked in the last phase of the second confederacy. In this he had need of the people, and the *First Philippic* was soon to reveal him exerting his powers to the utmost to attain this goal. But in this there was one tragic exaction: in seeking—surely not with any selfish ambition, but with the very best intentions—to get the masses in his control, he was forced at the same time to humor their lower impulses and use them for his ends without scruple.

It might be supposed that Demosthenes, who in his speech for the Rhodians had referred so emphatically to the dangers imminent in Philip's headway, must have arrived at the notion of favoring a strong Thrace as a buffer between Macedonia and the Dardanelles. The immediate future was to show that the real danger for the Dardanelles lay in the king of Macedonia. Moreover, after the Peace of Philocrates, seven years later, Philip pushed on toward the straits just as might have been expected. He now had need of the Chersonese in connection with his Persian policies as a bridge-head for controlling the passage to Asia Minor; it was at the same time the best place from which to keep Athens in check. To one who looks at the question in retrospect as we do to-day it seems incomprehensible that at the time of the speech *Against Aristocrates* not only the Athenian administration but even Demosthenes himself should have failed to see that a strong and united Thrace allied with Athens was an

elementary requirement. Modern critics have found no better way to explain this oversight than by assuming that Athens was then allied with Persia by an entente.¹¹ Ten years later, Demosthenes actually did make some significant references to his hopes of an impending alliance between Athens and Persia; and it is conjectured that he had been relying on Persian support against Philip from the very beginning, though there is no trace of this in the speeches that have come down to us from this period. The supposition is that Athens had been exerting herself to obtain this support even before Demosthenes began to be influential as a leader. At the time of the speech *Against Aristocrates*, Persia would have needed quiet at the straits so that all her energies could be applied to the internal consolidation of her empire and suppression of the Egyptian revolt; and thus Demosthenes might well have taken his stand on the Thracian problem out of deference to Persian interests.

But on closer examination we see that Demosthenes did, as a matter of fact, think immediately of a danger to the straits, but that he did not think of it as coming from anywhere else than from that part of Thrace which borders right on the Hellespont, as in the preceding decades. Accordingly he wanted to keep the king of this region, Cersobleptes, as weak as possible, all the while strengthening his brother and rival, Amadocus. His policy was thus exactly opposed to that of Aristocrates' circle. His plan was to apply to the Thracian question the alert, flexible balance-of-power tactics that he had recently recommended in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* in dealing with Sparta and Thebes. This principle, which had been followed on a fairly large scale in the internal politics of Greece, was now really being applied quite consciously with respect to a non-Greek power; thus there was a certain system in Demosthenes' attitude in the two speeches, as he himself says outright.¹² Moreover, the territory of Amadocus bordered immediately on Macedonia

and was particularly in danger from that quarter. Amadocus had already offered armed resistance to Philip when he had attempted an invasion; Cersobleptes, however, had thrown in his lot with Philip. Demosthenes therefore saw in Amadocus the natural ally of Athens, not only against Cersobleptes' eventual encroachments at the straits, but also against Macedonia in particular.¹³ Demosthenes did not for an instant believe that Charidemus would wrest Amphipolis from the hands of Philip and return it to Athens, as the Athenian administration had imagined. Here his opinion that Philip was Athens' greatest enemy—an opinion reiterated even in the speech *Against Aristocrates*—proved to be thoroughly sound.¹⁴ But even Demosthenes had not yet conceived that some day Philip might simply overrun Thrace and march right on to the Dardanelles. Certainly he could not then have seen in Amadocus any adequate guaranty against this possibility. It now seems obvious that the only right course of action for Athens would have been to bring about the unification of the several Thracian kingdoms as a bulwark against Philip; but it is quite doubtful whether she would have had enough influence to accomplish this before it was too late. The one thing clear is that the policy of the administration circles in Athens was shortsighted and illusory; for not only was Charidemus unable to retrieve Amphipolis for them, but in dropping their previous protégé Amadocus to please Charidemus, they drove him into the arms of his enemy Philip and thus opened to Philip the way into Thrace. This was the consequence of the administration's policy, which Demosthenes was combating; and he foresaw it accurately.

After all, in the history of diplomacy there will never be an end to such appalling surprises as that which Philip of Macedon gave the world—perhaps in the autumn of the very year when these matters were being threshed out in Athens. With his sudden entry into Thrace, the disputes of the princely brothers for the throne, so zealously fostered by

Athens, were abruptly settled. This time he could not be stopped. He marched on to the Dardanelles, and in November the Athenians listened with bated breath to the alarming news that he was besieging the fortified coastal city of Heraeum Teichos at the entrance to the Propontis.¹⁵ How was it possible for even so keen an observer as Demosthenes to be mistaken about Philip's real intentions when he considered him so dangerous an adversary? For there is no doubt that in the speech *Against Aristocrates* he would by no means have spoken as he did, had this invasion taken place some months earlier. It is not unfair for us to base our criticism upon what we know of the further development of Philip's power. That there was a flaw in the official Athenian foreign policy could, of course, be seen quite definitely beforehand, and Demosthenes described it correctly. If there was an error in his own calculation as well, that is perhaps best explained by the fact that Philip, upon intervening in the Phocian War in Thessaly not long before, had suffered two defeats, and that even after he had beaten the Phocians his advance had been brought to a standstill at Thermopylae. Philip's fame was still too young to withstand the effect of these failures. What, indeed, had Macedonia amounted to as yet? Nevertheless, Philip succeeded in establishing himself permanently in Thessaly; and his swift conquest of Thrace cast a glaring and merciless light on his energy and his formidability as a foe. Three or four years later, in the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes speaks of this moment as the turning point in the Attic policy against Philip, when for the first time all roused themselves to action under the direct impact of the terror, even though they did not stick to their resolution.¹⁶ The moment must have been particularly decisive for Demosthenes himself, for from this time forth all his thinking and willing centered on resistance to the Macedonian danger, a single objective which put all others in the shade. That his prophecies had been more than

fulfilled by the reality, that the measures he urged had proved far from adequate, gave his anxious but stubborn will the tremendous impetus it needed for the full development of his powers.

How long was it since Macedonia had begun to be a factor in northern Greece? About the end of the fifth century, King Archelaus had won the admiration of Thucydides¹⁷ by his first successful attempts to force the advanced civilization of the Greeks upon their kinsmen in the valleys of the Strymon and the Haliacmon and on the northwest coast of the Aegean—a quarrelsome peasant folk still clinging to ancient patriarchal ways. Archelaus had begun by giving his country a stricter military and political organization, not only to protect it against the constant headway of the Illyrian and Paeonian tribes in the northwest and northeast of Macedonia, and the encroachments of the brigandlike Thracians in the east, but especially to save himself from the domination of the briskly thriving Greek colonial cities on the peninsula of Chalcidice, which lay in Macedonia's dooryard. Ever since 432, when Olynthus seceded from the Athenian confederacy at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, these cities, under the headship of Olynthus, had kept together and tended to form a center of power of their own; and they were always inclined to look upon their Macedonian hinterland with its primitive culture as a mere object for exploitation.¹⁸ Naturally the Hellenization that Archelaus—this typical enlightened despot of the turn of the century—had achieved was rather superficial. Good military highways now crossed the land in various directions without much altering the social structure of the people, widely scattered, as they were, on their farms. But in the event of war they would meet the latest technical requirements. That the people were at heart almost untouched by this civilization could only make them the more useful as soldiers. As always when intellectual culture is absorbed by a soul still comparatively

primitive, King Archelaus was a man of contradictions: unscrupulous by nature, he was looked upon by the Greeks as an inhuman tyrant; but at the same time, in his zeal for culture he had gathered at his court a number of Greek poets and artists, among them Euripides and Agathon, the greatest tragedians of the age.

After the death of Archelaus the country reverted to its old anarchy and remained for decades the scene of usurpations and bloody contentions for the throne. It is not surprising that at this time Macedonia constantly needed the support of stronger powers in matters of foreign politics. Thus under the thirteen-year reign of Amyntas the Third she had been forced to seek aid from her greatest enemy, Olynthus, for protection against the Illyrians. Olynthus, on the peninsula of Chalcidice, was the chief trading center in the north. Ever since the collapse of the maritime power of her old rival Athens after the Peloponnesian War, she had become steadily bolder and more self-confident. She had united most of the neighboring Greek states into a Chalcidic state with which no other power on the coast of northern Greece could compete on an even footing. In 381 this same Macedonian Amyntas had had to put himself under the protection of Sparta, which at that time still maintained undisputed ascendancy in Hellas; and war had broken out between Sparta and Olynthus, to be settled by the fall of Olynthus. The Olynthian confederacy was thus somewhat weakened. During the seventies its place was taken by a new north-Grecian power which had been rapidly gaining ground in the traditionally agrarian territory of Thessaly. This was the tyranny of the mighty Jason of Pherae, who rendered the old Thessalian nobility impotent by relying on the support of the revolutionary masses and thus bringing most of the country under his own control. When he at last encroached on Macedonia as well, Amyntas the Third was again forced to take refuge with the leading power of south-

ern Greece; this, however, was no longer Sparta but the newly rising Athens of the second confederacy.¹⁹ Athens succeeded in holding Jason in check and was only too glad to regain her supremacy in north-Grecian waters.

Since the time of the Attic confederacy, Athens had demanded the city of Amphipolis for herself, but the Macedonian kings had not recognized her claim. Although the city was an Attic settlement, it had, with its rather mixed population, been hostile to Athens for a long time. In the end it had submitted formally to King Perdiccas of Macedon, and from then on it was Macedonian. While possession of the harbor at the mouth of the Strymon was of the highest value to Athens, to Macedonia it was of life-and-death importance; and we can understand why even a Macedonian usurper like Ptolemaeus (the murderer of Amyntas' son, Alexander the Second), who could maintain his weak rule only with the help of the Athenian general Iphicrates, did not recognize the Athenian claims to Amphipolis. Indeed the problem of Amphipolis may be said to have been the determining factor in the relations between Athens and Macedonia. It must again have become acute at the moment when, after years of confusion, the whole situation was put on a more solid basis with the beginning of the administration of Philip the Second, and Macedonian politics was launched on a firm and independent course both at home and abroad.

At first Philip had had to make a number of promises to the Athenians, meeting them part way but keeping them more or less in suspense until he had so far clarified his position with respect to his own country and the barbarian tribes which had invaded Macedonia that he could act more positively. Then he helped himself to Amphipolis. From that time on, Athens was at war with him. Of course it was out of the question for Philip to attack Attica, as he had no fleet; moreover, he had no interest in doing so. He confined him-

self to holding onto Amphipolis and pushing the Athenians step by step away from the Macedonian coast. Furthermore, Athens was now no longer able to attack Macedonia by sea, as she had been in the time of her confederacy under Timotheus and Iphicrates; and a blockade was not a very effective weapon against an agrarian country raising all its own foodstuffs. So the war amounted to little more than occasional privateering and marauding expeditions. Naturally Philip's ultimate goal must have been the winning of the entire coast line; it was not Athens, however, that chiefly stood in the way of this, but the Greek coastal cities of Chalcidice. After the strongest of these, Olynthus, had recovered from the Spartan conquest of the year 379, and the Spartan hegemony had collapsed, a new and mighty confederacy of the Chalcidic cities had been built up under the leadership of Olynthus. It was therefore natural that Macedonia's old opposition to these uncomfortable neighbors revived; but in the light of their pronounced hostility to Athens, Philip sought their support for the time being and even formed an alliance with Olynthus. The American excavations on the site of this old and powerful mercantile city have, within recent years, brought the wording of this memorable treaty once more to light.²⁰

The outbreak of the so-called Amphictyonic or Sacred War between Thebes and Phocis gave Philip his first chance to take an active part in the internal affairs of Greece and to extend his own power to the south. In this war Athens and Sparta were driven to the side of the Phocian temple-robbers by their traditional hostility to Thebes, while Philip allied himself with the Theban party. He had, to be sure, no interest in devoting his energies to straightening out the situation in central Greece; still less was he concerned with the desperate struggle of the Boeotian confederacy to subdue the renegade Phocians once again as a means of bolstering up the Theban ascendancy in central Greece, which could

no longer be maintained now that Epaminondas was dead. Indeed, if Thebes had thus been reinstated, she would certainly have tried to extend her sphere of influence farther north and would have resumed her efforts to interfere in Thessaly, bringing herself precariously near to Macedonia. But Philip himself was directly interested in Thessaly; and as the war kept Thebes busy in central Greece, he felt that by allying himself with Thebes and Thessaly he could most easily steal a march on Thebes in Thessaly and secure a permanent foothold there. The internal disorganization of the country made it a good soil for the rise of new powers that might easily prove dangerous to the neighboring states; this had been shown by the reign of Jason of Pherae. Fortunately for Macedonia, Jason's successors had all been weak. So it seemed all the more as if the opportunity had come for a foreign power to intervene in Thessaly, appearing in the guise of a peacemaker and seizing control of the almost equally weak political parties of the country. The Thessalians had entered the war against Phocis almost to a man on the side of Thebes; but this unanimity did not last long, and the old Thessalian nobles soon called in Philip to deal with the tyrants of Pherae.

Philip knew exactly what he wanted; here was a task demanding all his fiery energy and shrewdness in diplomacy, and he set himself to it with dogged vigor. Finding themselves hard pressed, the tyrants of Pherae now sought to engage on their side of the fighting in Thessaly an armed force that would be a match for Philip—the Phocians, flushed with their victory in central Greece. In this way, the real scene of the Phocian drama was shifted to Thessaly for the second act, and Philip now assumed the leading rôle in it, replacing the exhausted Thebans. Though he lost his first battles to the bold and experienced Phocian mercenary leader Onomarchus in 354, he succeeded the next year in annihilating the bands of Phocian marauders at the Gulf of Pagasae

and overthrowing the tyrants of Pherae. Thereupon all Thessaly submitted to him of its own accord. He was acclaimed as a deliverer and named commander-in-chief of the Thessalian confederacy. He would have marched at once into central Greece as a conquering hero and would probably have brought the war to an end there with a single blow, had not the Athenians and Spartans bestirred themselves to send auxiliary troops to Thermopylae, thus shutting against him this gateway to Hellas. This compelled Philip to stop his advance. He was content with what he had already achieved, and truly that was enough. But he did not stand still for a moment. Now that Athens had taken an active part in blocking his way at Thermopylae²¹ without his being able to prevent it, he parried this blow, after making sure of Thessaly, by falling upon Thrace, making a dash for the straits, and forcing Cersobleptes to join him and dismiss his Athenian-minded minister Charidemus.

Philip's sudden march to the Hellespont upset not only all the calculations on which the official Athenian policy was based, but also those which Demosthenes—the severe critic of that policy—had expounded in his speech *Against Aristocrates*. In his *First Olynthiac*, written only a few years later, Demosthenes once more conjures up the whole stormy career of King Philip in all its dramatic irresistibility.²² Although Demosthenes had early recognized in him the most dangerous foe of Athens, there must nevertheless have been some definite moment when he was first struck with the impossibility of halting the enemy's onward march, as he so masterfully depicts it in words of breathless suspense: "Have any of you, Athenians, stopped to consider the way in which Philip, who in the beginning was weak, has become great? First he took Amphipolis, then Pydna, after that Potidaea, then again Methone; then he moved into Thessaly, and after getting Pherae, Pagasae, and Magnesia under his thumb exactly as he wished, he set off for Thrace. There he

deposed one group of kings and set up new ones; then he fell ill. . . ."

At this point we must interrupt this fascinating and still vivid recital so as not to get ahead of our story, for this is the moment at which we now stand. Philip had begun the siege of Heraeum Teichos; but his illness now forced him to call a halt, and gave the world a breathing spell before the play was resumed. At this moment the irresistible force with which Philip's power was developing must have brought Demosthenes all at once to full consciousness. Philip's advance into southern Thessaly had terrified the Athenian administration into sending a body of troops into Thermopylae, despite its passive foreign policy. But this terror was now far exceeded when, like a bolt of lightning, the Macedonians appeared at the Hellespont. The fear for the security of the straits that Demosthenes had expressed in the speech *Against Aristocrates* was now turned all of a sudden against Philip instead of the neighboring Thracians; and when the news of Philip's serious illness arrived, it must have seemed a saving act of Providence, giving the Athenians this respite in which to devise measures against any new surprises of the same sort.

We would gladly pay any price to learn some particulars of Demosthenes' attitude toward the disturbing events of this time, which must have made the deepest impression upon him. Are there any contemporary documents left that have bearing on this? According to the ancient tradition, the *First Philippic* was delivered in 352-1; if it were, it would provide us with just such a document. The rhetor Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to whom we owe this date, gets much of his chronological material from good sources; these, however, do not give him the dates of the speeches, but only the time of the events which he regards as having provoked them. Unfortunately he has gone too far in linking the speeches with the most definite historical situations. It is no longer

possible to ascertain exactly what prompted each individual speech; and so Dionysius' efforts to date them, which are the sole basis of our chronology, often leave us on uncertain ground. In particular his opinion with respect to the *First Philippic* has been almost universally rejected by the more recent research. It is now customary to put the speech much later, in the year 349-8, the time when Philip fell upon Olynthus. The reason for this later dating is the mention of a sudden attack that Philip made on Olynthus—an attack usually associated with the famous siege of the year 349.²³ Let us, however, leave the question of chronology open for the time being, so that we can give closer attention to the oration itself. At any rate, this is the first surviving speech of Demosthenes that deals directly with the relations between Athens and Philip after that decisive turn in affairs.

In this oration, Demosthenes gives warning; he calls for vigorous preparation for war against Philip, whose power is spreading like wildfire. The Macedonian question has already been discussed fairly often in the Assembly, and Demosthenes has long been content to leave the floor to the usual speakers. Even today he might have waited for what they would say, and not have made his proposal until after they had spoken; but as they have spoken so many times before without effecting anything, he now takes the floor himself as the first speaker.²⁴ This initiative is characteristic of the whole oration. The very proem strikes the keynote, and the listener pricks up his ears. The new element not found in the earlier speeches is the deliberate emphasis on the throwing off of reserve. That Demosthenes nevertheless thinks it necessary to ask indulgence for what he has to say, heightens the effect. He is aware of the hazard involved (these are the words of an orator whose fame as a political counselor is still young), but he takes the step with cool determination. And now he plunges into the heart of the matter. But at first we hear nothing about any specific facts, for these are

all too well known to the Athenians; only later on in the speech does Demosthenes go into them more fully.

He begins²⁵ by discussing the state of mind of his listeners. "First of all, Athenians, you must not lose courage over the way things are at present, even if it seems very bad. For that which is the worst as we look back on the past, is the best if we look forward to the future. And what, then, is this? The fact that you are badly off *because* you have been doing none of the things that ought to be done. For if you had done all that was needed and were then still badly off, there would be no hope of the situation's improving."

This is the language of a manly spirit, aware of what is at stake at this moment. We find here neither the cool irony and condescending banter of the speech *On the Symmories* with its brilliant way of fencing with concealed motives, nor the instructive tone of the speech *For the Megalopolitans*, which seeks to make the masses understand the logic of the professional politician's way of thinking. Anyone who recalls the speeches of the statesmen in Thucydides' history and their severely matter-of-fact way of plunging at once into their material and thinking it through, must be surprised at the amount of space that Demosthenes here gives over to matters of ethics.²⁶ But these ethical considerations do not float above the factual content as abstract appeals to duty or to sentiment; still less does Demosthenes try to make his demands more acceptable to his listeners by prettiness of phrase or by failure to state the bitter facts. He expects more of them: he pays them the honor of treating them as intellectually adult, and tells them the whole truth. No other pedagogic is so effective for a people made up entirely of individuals who think for themselves and form their own judgments in either one way or another. But, for Demosthenes, truth does not consist merely in communicating the bare facts—which would be quite depressing enough; he even goes so far as to show that these facts are the necessary

consequence of the passivity and levity with which Athens' policies are infected. He blames neither chance nor adverse destiny for the ill success, but seeks the reason solely in the Athenians' own behavior. Though he finds the cause not in an inevitable necessity of historical development but in a failure of moral stamina, he sees that the source of the previous mistakes is at the same time the source of all the hope there is left. He raises the problem of the will, and demands that all forces be concentrated on the task, which hitherto has been too lightly treated and indeed has not yet been truly recognized.²⁷

It is from this standpoint that he teaches the Athenians to consider Philip's new predominance in Greece, which is crushing them simply because it strikes them as so overwhelming. This is not the first time that Athens has been in such a predicament, for after losing the Peloponnesian War she found herself isolated in the face of the enormous superiority of Sparta and her allies; but she succeeded then in mastering her situation by straining all her energies.²⁸ Even Philip's power is the fruit of applying his whole strength untiringly, of being unremittingly vigilant in spying out immediately every weak spot in his enemy's defense and always striking at the point of least resistance, to better his own position. In this way he has gained control of all the Athenian towns on the coast of northern Greece—has compelled the allegiance of Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, as well as of those peoples who now supply him with troops (here Demosthenes is probably thinking not only of the Thessalians but also of the Thracians, whom Philip has only recently won over); but to whom else could they have attached themselves? Everyone else was asleep and Philip alone was ready and on the ground. Not to be present is always a mistake. That is how Philip has won his vassals. They have not all followed him out of pure enthusiasm; they simply submit because he is their sole refuge.²⁹ For this, however, the dilatoriness and

the levity of Athens are alone to blame. We must do as Philip has done.³⁰ Everyone who can be of use to the state must stop playing the slacker; some must give money; those who have reached the proper age must join the army; in short, everyone must put his shoulder to the wheel. The time will soon be past when we can all expect the other fellow to do everything for us without our doing anything ourselves. Already things have gone so far that we Athenians no longer have any free choice between staying in peace and making an attack. Our indolence spurs on the enemy to ever-increasing audacity; and while we sit here hesitating, he surrounds us on all sides. We are presumably waiting for some compelling force that shall make us put our hands to the plow. But what stronger incentive can there be than our sense of shame at our present condition? Everyone runs to and fro asking for the latest news. "Has Philip died?" "No, but he is ill." But what difference does that make, Athenians? For should anything actually happen to him, you will straightway create a second Philip if you are so lacking in interest.³¹ For the thing that has made him great is not his strength but your indifference. If he should really die, and if fate should continue to take better care of you than you do of yourselves, this would hardly help you to regain Amphipolis, as you are so far away. Only when you are near at hand, can you attack at will where the moment requires.

Clearly it is no specific outside event but simply this very grasp of the whole situation that has determined Demosthenes to make the practical proposals following the ethical section at the beginning of the speech. He demands a two-fold armament, not—as he expressly says—with an eye to any definite auxiliary expedition, which could now make no difference in what has already occurred, but for the sake of permanent preparedness. The whole plan of fighting must be changed. He suggests that the Athenians have two armies, one of which is to be available at any moment for immediate

embarkation if Philip should again make one of his surprise attacks. This army shall be composed of citizens, not of mercenaries. (Demosthenes' struggle to utilize the citizens themselves in the war service runs through all his speeches against Philip.) This first army, which is to be provided with fifty ships, is intended for attacking the enemy on his own territory as soon as he ventures upon any expedition that will force him to leave Macedonia undefended, as, for example, those against Thermopylae or the Hellespont.³² The second army is to stay permanently in the field wherever it is possible to harass the enemy and keep him on the move. Its size must be limited, to prevent any trouble about the pay. Athenian citizens are to be assigned to this secondary force as well as to the first, but here the mercenaries are to be in the majority. They will be expected to carry on a sort of marauding and privateering warfare in accordance with the long-standing custom among the mercenary leaders of the second confederacy.³³ Demosthenes himself appeals to this precedent, though not without sharply criticizing the abuse of this type of warfare, which often does more harm to the allies by simple depredation than it does to the enemy. A minimum quota for the pay of these flying troops is to be guaranteed by the state; in all other respects the war must be made to pay for itself. Unfortunately that part of the speech where Demosthenes indicates the sources from which the extra state funds for the maintenance of this corps are to be procured, has been omitted from the version intended for publication. We know of it only from the stock heading Πόρου Ἀπόδειξις³⁴—"Exposition of a Way to Raise Money." It is obvious that here the original speech suffered some editorial curtailment at the time of publication, probably because this section no longer satisfied Demosthenes and had in the meanwhile been outdistanced by more effective measures. In the *Olynthiac* orations we follow Demosthenes' own stubborn fight for taking over the theater money doled out

to the people according to Athenian law, and using it for war purposes. But in the *First Philippic* he certainly could not have ventured such drastic proposals, which might easily have become dangerous for him. He must, then, have expunged his original proposals when the war made more radical measures unavoidable.

Have we any other traces of this later editing³⁵ and of the situation that called it forth? Among Philip's unexpected sallies, Demosthenes mentions not only the attacks on Thermopylae and the Hellespont but also that on Olynthus, which we must discuss in the next chapter. Because of this, modern scholars have placed the speech in the time when Philip invaded Olynthian territory to besiege the city. But at that moment Demosthenes' proposals would have been ill timed. They would have had to take a much more definite form. He could not then have called for a reserve corps in Athens to be ready for such mishaps, but would have had to propose sending a relief expedition directly to Olynthus, as he did promptly in his *Olynthiac* orations later on. But neither can the speech have been delivered *after* the fall of Olynthus, for then Demosthenes would have had to use a different tone altogether. After delivering the *Olynthiacs* he could not have said: "Hitherto only the others have spoken; now, for once, I shall come forward with a proposal of my own." The tradition is certainly quite correct in numbering our speech as the *First Philippic*.³⁶ Recently, scholars have hit upon a way out by assuming that the expedition against Olynthus was not Philip's well-known attack of the year 349, but his attack on Stagira,—one of the members of the Olynthian confederacy,—which took place a year or two earlier, at the time of his invasion of Thessaly. But it seems to me that it would have been a little far-fetched for Demosthenes to refer to this as an expedition against Olynthus. The measures proposed in the *First Philippic* would have been appropriate only after the fearful surprise of the sudden Macedonian

attack on the Hellespont. In the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes himself tells us that Philip was then taken ill at the siege of Heraeum Teichos; and this, as we have seen, is just what has happened at the time of the *First Philippic*. For here Demosthenes sharply berates the Athenians for doing nothing themselves, but pinning all their hopes on Philip's illness. Furthermore, Demosthenes' proposal to them to be forehanded by arming against any new surprises is admirably suited to this time when Philip was hindered from venturing anything new. The reference to Olynthus must, then, have been added in the later revising of the speech, when Philip had in the meantime eclipsed all his previous exploits by the new assault. There are still other traces of this revision, which, however, does not seem to have gone very deep. Demosthenes cannot have succeeded with his proposal; for he resumes it later in the *Olynthiacs*, generally following the original version appearing in the *First Philippic* with remarkable closeness.

So, if our reckoning is correct, we have here in the *First Philippic* direct evidence of the prodigious effect that Philip's advance to the Hellespont, like his march to Thermopylae, has had upon Demosthenes' political views. The oration proves that Demosthenes has seen at once how erroneous was his way of estimating the importance of the various factors in his speech *Against Aristocrates* shortly before, and that he has immediately turned all his efforts to the fight against Philip. The *First Philippic* is an attempt to take a forceful initiative in the Macedonian policy; it is the direct continuation of Demosthenes' separate actions on the Megalopolitan and Rhodian questions, and like these it fails to achieve its purpose. Only after Philip's attack on Olynthus does Demosthenes' policy really begin to be understood. He is determined to jerk Athenian foreign politics out of its passivity, and to get things started before anything worse occurs.³⁷

"You are better supplied, Athenians, with triremes, hoplites, cavalry, and funds than anyone else, but right up to this very day you never make use of them when they are needed. And in fighting Philip you never stop acting as the barbarians do when they box: if you hit one of them, he grabs the place where you hit him; if you hit him somewhere else, he puts his hands there; but to strike out and look his adversary in the face—that is something for which he has neither the intelligence nor the will. So if you hear that Philip is at the Chersonese, you vote to send help there; if at Thermopylae, then there; if anywhere else, you run up and down tagging along behind him, and let him dictate the way your war is to be waged."

It is just this ability to look straight ahead and proceed to the attack that Demosthenes demands of the Athenians. He does not yet believe that the strength of his people is no longer capable of this. He sees them debating and making resolutions, but no one *acts*. If only there were approximately the same order and regularity in military ventures and the army service as in the annual preparations for the theatrical performances at the Dionysia—if his proposals for the war could be enforced legally in the same way as that in which the state provides for these or for the Panathenaic procession—all would be saved.³⁸ What bitter scorn! But who will understand it? On the contrary, will not everyone think that things are just as they should be, in a state where the people either live for material gains alone or are slaves to the excessive pleasures of nerves overrefined by the play of aesthetic fancy and philosophical sport? What amazing self-knowledge is revealed in this appeal to sheer will! "Perhaps it was once possible to act as you are now acting. But now things are coming to a crisis."³⁹

The thing that gives this speech its new force is the sense of imminent decision, which inspires the orator's fancy with images of an overpowering and stirring magnificence such

as no other eloquence has ever again brought forth. The style that we call Demosthenic in the strict sense—the style truly *passionate*, which comes from the soul and is no mere matter of words—here suddenly appears full grown. What has been circuitously and anxiously thought out in the first state speeches now breaks forth from the glowing depths of Demosthenes' soul like an elemental force, but controlled by an overwhelming firmness of will. There is nothing else comparable to this interplay of burning passion and cold reason. This spirit tolerates no go-as-you-please tactics. It is characterized, even to a supreme degree, by an intellectual grasp. And a kind of visionary frenzy is bridled and checked at the very highest moments of expression, where the limitations of mere "political thought" are transcended and this man's passion is transmuted, ripened, to a new, unheard-of artistry. How it could happen that in Demosthenes the true artist's power over form came to be fused with the sobriety of knowledge, the strength of ethical volition, and the prophetic awareness of a menacing fate—this will remain an eternal secret of the Greek soul.

CHAPTER SIX

THE STRUGGLE FOR OLYNTHUS

THERE ARE CERTAIN PERIODS of history that may be rather well known to us as far as their outward events are concerned, and yet remain closed to us because we no longer can obtain any insight into the inner motives of the men who were then active. With Demosthenes we are often in the opposite situation. Even today his speeches show us how the political problems of his time looked to him, and bring them directly before our eyes. But there are so many gaps in our knowledge of the outside events that we frequently lack the factual background, which would have given us an important yardstick for judging his speeches. Thus we see the development of things only piecemeal, or in large part as reflected in the development of Demosthenes' own political thought. This is extremely annoying to anyone whose chief interest is in getting at the facts; but the speeches themselves are historical documents of the first importance, and we should be unappreciative of fortune's favors in providing us with them if we were to choose to look for facts alone and fling aside the wealth of material on contemporary political life and ideas that they give us, as most of the history books have done. This applies to Demosthenes' three *Olynthiac* orations, delivered midway between the warning signal of the *First Philippic* and the abject resignation that forced Athens to seek peace with Philip in 346.

If the *First Philippic* was delivered in the unexpected breathing spell that Philip's illness gave the Athenians after he had begun his attack on the Hellespont,^{1*} then in the three speeches for Olynthus Demosthenes must have continued his north-Grecian politics from the moment when Philip left his sickbed and once more gave way to his fiery

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 239-246.

zeal for achievement. After Philip had seized Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, and Pagasae,—all of them cities in the region of the Aegean coast,—his aim was clear to everyone. He was bent on changing Macedonia from a third-rate inland agrarian state to a great power reaching even to the sea. This could not help increasing the alarm of Olynthus, the only large Greek commercial state in the north that bordered on Macedonian territory. Ever since the beginning of Philip's activities, Olynthus had depended upon him for support against the old north-Grecian claims of Athens without suspecting how her own liberty was jeopardized by her Macedonian neighbor. In the first stage of this new grouping in the north, Olynthus had gone so far as to join Philip in an alliance² against Athens; but repentance soon followed this overhasty step, which had been taken purely out of petty commercial jealousy and traditional fear of any strengthening of Athens' position on the sea. Philip's rapid expansion had already forced Athens to be on the defensive,³ and Olynthus soon saw herself isolated with no protection against her inscrutable ally. It is clear from Demosthenes' words in the speech *Against Aristocrates* that despite the fact that the two allies had promised each other to conclude no separate peace, Olynthus had already made peace with Athens and would have liked nothing better than to form an alliance with her at once.⁴ Now that this separate peace had become a fact, it was in the air that Philip would attack the Olynthian confederacy; and probably the reason why Olynthus did not form her alliance with Athens more promptly was that she had no wish to hasten this attack. In the year 349-8 Philip marched into Olynthian territory and started besieging the cities.⁵

This was the moment for Demosthenes to renew his efforts after the depressing failure of the *First Philippic*. What he had then hoped to prevent by his proposals had now occurred. As he had foretold, a new Macedonian surprise attack had

found Athens still defenseless and unprepared at a time when prompt action was the prime requisite of success. Demosthenes' former arguments had been rebutted by calling attention to the isolation of Athens and declaring that there was no use in talking seriously of any such policy as his unless one had first involved Olynthus in a war with Philip.⁶ This had now come about automatically. Even the members of the peace party in Athens proposed immediate action in support of Olynthus. Athens had now found an ally⁷ with a reliability as great as its distress was severe, and no effort could be spared to keep it on her side. She thus had a rare opportunity to give an active turn to the course of the war with Philip, which was dragging along listlessly. To be sure, it was no great victory for Demosthenes in his fight against the previous administration when the official statesmen swung into line with what he had been urging.⁸ They saw that this was a way to strengthen their own position; and if anyone had ventured the obvious taunt that Demosthenes had predicted everything and had advised them to act while the opportunity was at hand, they would have insisted that the right moment had only now arrived. However incorrect this may have been, Demosthenes' chief concern was with the situation in hand, not with his own person. He was still young, only in the first half of the thirties; in spite of all his criticizing he felt as yet no right to leadership, and he was glad that at any rate the ban of inactivity was broken. Whatever might happen, his opponents' unexpressed admission meant a great increase in his moral authority. But naturally he now had to leave it to them to make the decisive proposals.

Whether the *First Olynthiac* and its successors were ever delivered before the Assembly in something like their present form or were mere brochures from the beginning, will probably never be determined. For, either way, the occasions that they each presuppose can well have been very

real indeed, even if we do not have a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the history of this period and its stages to establish the dates of the three speeches. This, in fact, was tried without success even in antiquity, when Dionysius of Halicarnassus assigned them severally to the expeditions which the Athenians sent to the beleaguered Olynthians.⁹ But this does not add very much to our understanding of the speeches; for the real occasion is quite definite, and its significance in the development of Demosthenes' policies after the *First Philippic* is immediately clear.

In the speeches against Philip, as in the earlier ones on foreign policy, the thing that strikes us first of all is their firmness of line. The events find Demosthenes thoroughly prepared. In his mind's eye he has already anticipated the situation with all its political logic. Thus he is able to give at once that advice which under the circumstances is the best. For a maritime state like Athens, Philip, whose power centered in the interior of Macedonia, was an adversary hard to attack. It was impossible to strike him at the root. One could harass him, tire him, and try to cut him off from the sea whenever a chance should present itself. And by constant martial engagements one could show Philip's more or less involuntary allies that they were not entirely at his mercy, since the Athenians were always lurking near by with their ships, ready to spy out any situation unfavorable to him and any vulnerable point momentarily laid bare. As a matter of fact, the only proposal really suited to this type of warfare (the necessity of which was evident to anyone who realized what possibilities lay open to Athens and Philip, respectively) was the one that Demosthenes had made in the *First Philippic*. Two separate sets of operations were needed so that simultaneous counterattacks could be made against Philip, both on his own territory and at any point against which he might make a sudden onslaught. So at the very moment when the Athenian leaders were proposing

that a relief expedition be sent to Olynthus, Demosthenes put his earlier proposal up for debate once again. It provided a framework for carrying on the war as actively as possible, and because it in no way anticipated the actual military leadership, it was elastic enough to fit any situation. That is how Demosthenes could simply resume his program, even when the war situation had changed so decidedly.¹⁰

But the *First Olynthiac* does more than repeat the practical recommendations of the *First Philippic*. Like the earlier speech, it is preëminently a work of political insight applied to the Athenian populace—the insight, namely, that what the moment demands is action, simple, swift, compelling. Demosthenes accordingly makes short work of his political proposal in the middle section of the speech, which is the more effective for its brevity. By far the most space is taken up in preparing the audience for making its decision and in paving the way for a correct estimate of the moment's significance. Here too Demosthenes harks back to his basic earlier oration. Though his variation is skillful, the constancy of the fundamental ideas can be observed at every step. In the *First Philippic* he could argue that a change was needed in the way the war was being conducted, and that the Athenians would have to adjust themselves to this even if at the moment there seemed no immediate reason for further preparedness; now, in the *First Olynthiac*, he accordingly puts all the emphasis on a single thesis: *the opportunity is here*, giving us again a chance for decisive intervention in the events of which we all are witnesses.¹¹ If our situation is growing steadily worse, that is because of the way we have let things go. And if it is true that we shall not succeed in pulling ourselves out of this passivity until especially favorable circumstances encourage us to act, then the moment for decision has come irrevocably. This knowledge must give us the will to decide. . . . Any statesman who wishes to guide a people like the Athenians at such a moment—a people in-

dependent in their thinking but basing their judgments on the most varied personal motives—is always confronted with one primary task: to impregnate these human beings with the strength of his own deeper discernment and to evoke such a unity of purpose as will transform a congeries of aimless, vacillating individuals into a united body of followers. Demosthenes knows from his own experience that this cannot be accomplished merely by setting before them a problem in diplomatic arithmetic for which neither their intelligence nor their knowledge is adequate. He must try to reach the very depths of their souls; he therefore handles the Athenians as the Greek tragedians handle their characters, making them enter upon their destiny with the fullest cognizance to which the lethargy of their Philistine everyday existence will bestir itself, but forcing them to realize over and above everything else, that the moment of destiny has now arrived.

This is what gives rise to Demosthenes' almost surprisingly extensive observations on the gods and the part they play in the present situation. Nothing could be more false than to see in these remarks a mere concession to popular beliefs, which, in fact, are of small account to him as a politician. We have already encountered this religious motif in the *First Philippic*; but now it is developed at greater length and is peculiarly interwoven with the idea of the *Kairos*,—the favorable opportunity,—which plays such a large rôle in the politics of the time.¹² In general, the *Kairos* meant to the Greeks nothing else than our present-day concept of opportunity. With this notion in mind, whole books on politics were written in casuistic form—giving rules of procedure for every conceivable situation.¹³ But on deeper consideration, opportunity was seen to be an especially visible form of providential dispensation—the *Tyche*; and just as *Tyche* was the greatest power in the contemporary religious thought and came at last, in the Hellenistic period, to push all the

Olympian deities from their thrones, in the same way the *Kairos* was also made a god and represented as such by the artists. For Demosthenes "the gods" and "*Tyche*" are almost synonymous. The *Kairos* too is a religious reality. It is pre-eminently an expression of the sway of a higher power. The old problem of the rationality or irrationality, the justice or injustice, of man's destiny now again becomes acute. For Demosthenes this is connected not so much with what man undergoes—since man himself is often responsible for that—as with the chance that Fate has given him. In the problem of *Tyche*, as Demosthenes sees it, there is more at issue than considering in retrospect whether one should put the blame for one's misfortunes on destiny or on one's own actions. In this form the problem is already old; we can follow it steadily in political speeches from Solon to Thucydides.¹⁴ For Demosthenes the problem is more complicated: not only the things a man *does* but even those which he *leaves undone* have their consequences. The recognition of the right moment is of the very greatest importance; for here divinity stretches out its hand to man, and everything depends on his grasping it.

This is a very active, alert faith, utterly different from the fatalism and passivity to which the more usual belief in *Tyche* seems to condemn mankind. What Demosthenes really does is to round out anew the old idea of man's joint responsibility in his own fate, which had been impressed on the Athenian people ever since the time of Solon. In this way he gives it a stirring ethical effectiveness, and thereby carries on his war against the weakness of his age by striking at its religious roots. The Greek wishes to be *just* in his thinking, no matter what happens. Well then, is it just, cries Demosthenes, to blame the powers above if our luck has of late been deserting us more and more? The man who thinks justly cannot refuse thanks to *Tyche*, who has given us ample opportunity, though in our indifference we have not seized it.

Evidently we have forgotten our gratitude in our failure, for man always judges previous events by the way they have turned out.¹⁵ Demosthenes effectively contrasts this attitude with the activity of Philip, who is never for an instant content with his achievements but gives himself no peace, dashing from one enterprise to another. And Demosthenes foresees that the king will invade the Athenians' territory if they do not take vigorous measures to stop him. The peace that at present they still enjoy is deceptive. It is as if a man were to invest his money insecurely at too high a rate of interest and live in temporary luxury until that early moment when his entire capital is lost.¹⁶

Hitherto this general attitude of Demosthenes toward life and destiny has never been properly appreciated. That is a mistake, for what we call politics the Greeks would in no way disjoin from ethics and religion. The greater Greek statesmen think of it always as embracing the whole of human existence and human fate; only for lesser spirits is it a mere craft in which one can be more or less out in one's reckoning. When we see Demosthenes developing his idea of the balance of power in the speech *For the Megalopolitans*, it might appear, for all that, as if the task of the statesman had been transformed into a mere technique, though one of masterly refinement. But this rational aspect is only one side of the matter. This is shown by the speeches against Philip, where the element of irrational conditioning in political activity, and even in the historical process itself, is expressed with pronounced religious feeling in the forms of *Tyche* and *Kairos*. That this should happen on precisely this occasion was of course no accident. For here it was a question of to be or not to be; at any rate, Demosthenes had been convinced of that from the first. But the more clearly he perceived the inner consistency with which things developed, all the more did he need a strong bulwark against the discouragement to which this insight inevitably led. Like a true

Greek, he did not find this bulwark in any blind, subjective, mystical faith in action,—a faith shutting its eyes to every real impediment; he found it rather in that he saw the importance of letting human alertness and preparedness work hand in hand with the favors that Fate had bestowed in ordaining a right moment for action.

We need not ask ourselves whether we can still find in these thoughts of Demosthenes a satisfactory explanation of the great historical processes that presented themselves to him in these terms. It should suffice to point out briefly that even among the Greek historians *Tyche* plays a similarly important rôle; and in the *Epistles* of Plato, where he records the events of his own life, we reëncounter a divine *Tyche* as an active force. Even if the Greeks had no philosophy of history in our sense, perhaps we may say that this very idea of *Tyche* took its place in the pre-Christian world.¹⁷ For Demosthenes, at any rate, it is an important factor in political willing and doing, and it deserves our full attention. Thus, for example, closer examination shows us that the entire *First Olynthiac* is built up on the motif of *Kairos*. The first part of the speech develops this idea at length,¹⁸ and uses the opportunity offered by *Tyche* herself as an occasion for sharply criticizing the inactivity and remissness of the Athenians. Demosthenes' practical proposals are then dispatched very briefly, as we have said. In the third part, which, like the first, is worked out in much greater detail, comes the contrasting section on the *akairia*—the unfavorableness—of the moment for Philip:¹⁹ probably Philip would never have undertaken this war against Olynthus if he had thought that the people would refuse to yield to his threats and that there would really be war in earnest. Moreover, his Thessalian allies have proved undependable, quite in accord with their traditionally faithless character. Demosthenes cites as a symptom of their discontent the fact that they have voted to ask Philip to give back Pagasae and

have prevented him from fortifying Magnesia. And there have recently been reports that they are no longer willing to give him the use of their harbors and markets. The neighboring barbarian tribes of Illyrians, Paeonians, and so forth, are liberty-loving people and would rather throw off their unaccustomed yoke today than tomorrow. Philip himself is the very personification of *Hybris*. His unexpected good luck has gone to his head, and he will find that the keeping of it is harder than the winning. All this is as favorable for the Athenians as it is unfavorable for him. The opportunity is theirs. What use would Philip make of it, if he were in their place? He would straightway bring the war to the borders of the enemy's country. The Athenians must now decide whether they prefer to do this themselves or to wait for Philip to bring the war on Attic soil; for if he should take Olynthus, nothing could stop him from marching on to Attica.²⁰

Demosthenes' attitude in the speeches against Philip is not that of the politician who sits at a green table and talks to his peers; nor is it that of the parliamentarian. It is the attitude of a man who has perceived that it is indispensable for him to win the confidence of the people. His first attempts at this are to be seen in the speech for the Rhodians.²¹ In the speeches against Philip he becomes altogether the *educator* of the people.²² He has no alternative. He sees that the masses live an irresponsible, carefree, day-to-day existence, and that the orators always speak in such a way as to please the masses. That is only human. It cannot really be said that the orators corrupt the populace; they merely *are* what the populace wants them to be. He who would check their pernicious influence must not be content with fighting their opinions but must change the souls of the people themselves, raising them to a higher conception of their duty and their task, however difficult or even impossible this may seem. Once this has been accomplished, the orators will have to think up a dif-

ferent way of speaking, or the people will stop listening to them. Thus speaks Demosthenes, or whoever the author may have been, at the end of the speech *On the New Order*.²³ As this speech is in large part a pastiche of show passages from other Demosthenic orations, it was generally considered spurious during the nineteenth century. Recently there has been a reaction against this verdict, and at present the victory has been virtually conceded to the new interpretation. This question is one that I cannot go into very closely here, but it is perhaps a more difficult one than is realized by most of those who feel complete confidence in proclaiming the genuineness of the speech.²⁴ At all events, the closing passage of this oration indicates altogether correctly Demosthenes' position on the great problem of revolutionizing public sentiment altogether. This is also, in fact, the real aim of the *Philippic* orations in the coming years; and if this agreement of purpose has not as yet been brought forward as evidence of genuineness, that can be explained entirely by the fact that this educative side of the *Philippics* as distinct from their political details (which have generally been the topics chiefly subjected to close study) is no longer clearly perceived, so that the real essence of these orations has been overlooked.

At the beginning of the *Second Olynthiac* we can again see how consciously Demosthenes goes about his task of educating the Athenian public. Evidently the leading politicians had tried to prove the urgency of their proposals by depicting Philip's might in all its paradoxical magnitude. Demosthenes considers this kind of teaching thoroughly false. After the *First Philippic* this is what we should expect. In the *First Olynthiac* he has denounced the administration's practical measures as inadequate; now in the second he takes issue with the administration for its fallacious way of appealing to the people, which strikes him as better suited to discourage them than to spur them to vigorous action.²⁵ In the

speeches of the leaders he misses the enkindling ethical incentive so decidedly prominent in his own *First Philippic* and *First Olynthiac*, where he has sought above all to fire the will of the Athenians, making it almost seem as if it were only their irresolution that has made Philip great.²⁶ In the *Second Olynthiac* he gives us the positive side of this picture by showing the part that Philip himself has played in his own ascent. But naturally we shall not expect to find here any objective appraisal of Philip's great qualities, such as a contemporary historian like Theopompus would perhaps have given.²⁷ Here too Demosthenes applies an ethical standard. He tries to prove that so far as Philip does not owe his power to the easygoing policies of Athens, he has obtained it by treachery and deceit. This is its inner weakness, and by this it must inevitably be destroyed. On such a foundation it is impossible to build a solid edifice, at least not a permanent one.²⁸ Therefore Demosthenes proposes that ambassadors be sent without delay to the Thessalians to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on them, and he promises that this pressure will be the more successful the more it is strengthened by action in the theater of war.²⁹ He feels that the power of Macedonia which Philip has inherited would not be dangerous without alliances to give it support, as he tries to show from its history. But he also counts on the presumption that the Macedonian people do not altogether share their king's unremitting zeal for action, since they do not get the same advantages from his martial enterprises.³⁰ The sketch that Demosthenes gives us of Philip's entourage is not flattering; and here he agrees with the historian Theopompus, who, though he considers Philip the greatest man Europe has ever produced, lays bare the character of the king and his companions in a way that is morally unsparing. They are predominantly of a masterful, ambitious, military type; no one will brook any rivalry or approve anyone else's deserts; there is here no place for righteous and ra-

tional people who cannot stand the daily round of drunkenness, obscenity, and general unrestraint, nor is there any respect for them. The king is surrounded by flatterers, robbers, and a shameless rabble (Theopompus calls them wild beasts); and everything that the so-called artists of Athens produced under Philip's encouragement bears the stamp of the cheap variety show. Demosthenes believes that all this has been temporarily lost sight of in the light of Philip's success. But even if these seem to be rather trivial matters, they are nevertheless symptoms of his character; and a war on the border of his own country would, thinks Demosthenes, promptly reveal all these weaknesses.³¹

We must consider this moral criticism of the enemy, I repeat, as exactly what it professes to be: an attempt to free the will of the people from the paralyzing impression that Philip is invincible, not only by making them perceive their own sins of omission, but also by giving them an insight into the human weaknesses of their foe. That Demosthenes by no means sees Philip merely as he here depicts him, that he also has a sharp eye for the element of the extraordinary in the king's character, is plain from numerous admiring utterances. He must nevertheless have believed what he here asserts as his convictions: that the moral structure of any political power is an essential determining factor in its permanence.³² This point is therefore one upon which he cannot help laying stress. The only question is whether this moral structure does, after all, actually reveal itself in the symptoms that Demosthenes adduces, or whether it has still other, healthier roots that the Athenian cannot have recognized. It is doubtful whether the conception of the decent (*πρέπον*) that was part and parcel of the bourgeois morality of a modern big-city man like Demosthenes, or even of a small-city man like Theopompus, was a proper standard of comparison for a race of men on a disparate level of culture, retaining, still untamed, the roughness of a more primitive

natural force. At any rate, Demosthenes' conviction must have made Philip's successes only the more mysterious to him. And so he adduces as the strongest point that can be brought up against his own arguments, that incontrovertible and incalculable factor which we call the genius of Philip, but which the Greek of the fourth century calls Philip's *Tyche*. It is hard to say just what Demosthenes means by this word when he applies it to this great personage of history. The Greek conception goes beyond our own psychological concept of genius in that it suggests some connection with the superhuman, the demonic.³³ "Anyone who regards Philip as a fearful opponent is, of course, a man of intelligence. For in human affairs it is *Tyche* who turns the scales; indeed she is everything. And yet, if someone were to give me a choice, I would rather have the *Tyche* of our city than that of Philip, if you will only resolve to do even a few of the things that you ought. For I can see that you have many more chances of obtaining the gods' good will than he has." Here Demosthenes touches the deepest roots of confidence in the good genius of Athens. To the irrational element in Philip, demonic and terrifying, he opposes the irrationality of this faith—a faith that is all the stronger because it fuses the immemorial existence of Athens and the glory of her past history with the elemental moral being of each individual citizen. This faith has lain almost buried, deep in the soul of the people; and Demosthenes now brings it again to light. In this way he carries out the task that he described at the outset as that of the true national leader, breaking the spell of the enemy's might, only to end by lashing the Athenians' inaction once again in the sharpest accents of bitter reproach, enjoining them all to make sacrifices and even to take the field.

The *Olynthiacs* must have followed each other in quick succession. Demosthenes fanned the flame as long as it would burn. In the first speech he had urged that instead of a mere

relief force, a twofold expedition be sent to the field so that Philip could be attacked both in his own territory and at Olynthus; in the second he had proposed to alienate the Thessalians from their alliance with Philip. He now believed that the Athenians were stirred to such a pitch of fervor that he could venture the most serious attack on the foundations of their domestic politics that had been made since the Social War. Favorable tidings had arrived from Olynthus; and though these soon proved premature, they gave him an occasion to take the floor against those visionaries who were now talking wildly of revenge on Philip, when the one thing for Athens to do was to bend all her energies toward helping Olynthus; for with Thebes hostile to Athens, and the Phocians no longer able to continue the war, who was now left to prevent Philip from shifting the war to central Greece if Olynthus, this last northern bulwark, should be overthrown? The will to help Olynthus was there.³⁴ The only question was how to make it effectual. Everyone felt that the usual small relief expeditions were useless. Something extraordinary had to happen; new sources of revenue needed to be opened up. The measure that Demosthenes proposed was extremely bold and revolutionary; but undoubtedly the soil had long been prepared for it. A very unpopular law had to be put through, which affected everybody, the humbler citizens most of all. It disturbed a sacred prerogative of the people dating from the time of Pericles, a prerogative that seemed to them almost a symbol of democracy itself. This was the right of the *theorica*, the money that every citizen received from the state treasury to enable him to attend theatrical performances at the great state festivals.³⁵ Of course it was not merely a wish to keep the crowd pleasantly entertained that had led Pericles to devise this arrangement: in this way the state had enlisted that educative spirit by which the great poets of Attic tragedy were animated; and as the theater was thus open free to every Athenian, it had

become a genuine training school for the whole people. But quite aside from the fact that by this time the spirit of Attic drama had changed profoundly, it was a huge extravagance to spend the very resources of the state treasury so unproductively in a period of want.

Demosthenes had alluded to the *theorica* in the *First Olynthiac* to show that even if the people were unwilling to pay new taxes, there was still money enough to carry on the war in accordance with his plan. But he had taken care not to make a direct proposal for abolishing the privilege.³⁶ At that stage such a project not only would have vexed the masses and made them refractory, but also would have disturbed the unity of leadership, which was needed more than anything else. For that was the other side of the matter: anyone who attacked the *theorica* struck simultaneously at Eubulus, the present head of the administration, who owed his immense prestige as a financier primarily to his four-year term as comptroller of the *theoric* treasury.³⁷ Eubulus had done unquestionable service in putting the Attic government on a sound basis after the disruptions of the Social War. But Demosthenes had long been combating his halfway measures in foreign policy. That Eubulus had now at last pulled himself together and really tried to do something was, of course, a small step forward; but it soon seemed to Demosthenes no better than a hindrance, for none of the administration measures remotely satisfied his ardor. What he demanded was that all energies be strained to the utmost. He felt that the people were now ready to make sacrifices if only they could be approached in the right way and made to see clearly the seriousness of the situation. Evidently his two-fold proposal in the *First Olynthiac* had again been rejected; it had been thought preferable to send relief in small expeditions, a drop at a time. The reason must always have been a matter of expense. So Demosthenes at last took the bull by the horns, demanding that the theater money be used for

the war. In this way the fight against Eubulus' leadership was brought out into the open.³⁸

But did not this mean that he was directing his attack at precisely the point where resistance was greatest? Was not this a matter in which Eubulus would be sure to have the people on his side? By ordinary reckoning, this was almost certain. But Demosthenes had so much confidence in being able to impress the people with his own educative authority that he hoped to snatch the victory from the two all-powerful foes of his policy, comfort and selfishness. Thus we find him trying to show the people that distribution of the theater money is only a bait to make the Athenian demos follow the will of a small plutocratic minority. He protests that he speaks in this way not from any desire to get himself hated as much as possible, but because he genuinely hopes to accomplish something worth while and is therefore setting the safety of the whole above his own personal popularity, just as the true statesmen of former times would have done; for they never let themselves be guided by the people's moods and whims, but only by that which they saw to be best.³⁹ And now Demosthenes draws a contrast between Athens' great period, when the state was still strong and wealthy but its leaders lived simply and modestly in unpretentious houses, and the present, when the state is weak and helpless but the men who guide it live in palaces more splendid and magnificent than the public buildings themselves. These gentry have grown rich at the state's expense, but the most they have done for the welfare of Athens is to improve the streets, repair the conduits for the fountains, and whitewash the parapets of the walls.⁴⁰ The reason is that in earlier times the people themselves took an active part and went to war in person; this made them masters of the state and everything it possessed. Now, however, the political leaders have divided up the state property to suit themselves, while the people have lost their nerve: robbed of both their money

and their allies, they have become mere menials and hangers-on, glad when someone gives them money for the theater and only too ready to express gratitude for what is really their own by right. They are rendered tame and manageable by being pent up in the city; they are vouchsafed no higher flights of thinking; they are kept busy with minor affairs and thus given a deliberate training in the ways of pettiness.⁴¹ The oration reaches its climax in the renewed demand that the people themselves go to war, that they be worthy of Athens, and that they use every means at hand to safeguard their interests abroad. Anyone who wants to get money from the state must also do something for the state. He must earn it in war instead of wasting it as a loafer. In conclusion Demosthenes urges his listeners not to abandon the position that their forefathers have won with hardships and danger, not to sit back waiting for others to do something for them, but above all to stand up for themselves.⁴²

It was not the first time that such censure of Eubulus had been heard in Athens. In the speech *Against Aristocrates* Demosthenes had made Euthycles, the plaintiff, voice this very same critique of the prevailing system; the *Third Olynthiac* merely takes it over.⁴³ But at this moment, when uttered with all the fire of Demosthenes' passionate temperament and linked with his demands for doing away with the theater money, a circumstance dangerously heightening its appeal, it must have had a totally different effect. This will impress us even more if we recollect Demosthenes' language in the speech *On the Symmories*, his first political oration; for he was then the spokesman for the same rich politicians of the peace party whom he is now attacking, and his attack is all the more effective because he knows their mentality from his own earlier membership in their circle. As we have already pointed out, it was not by any conversion to the democratic attitude that Demosthenes was led further and further away from these people.⁴⁴ He was no narrow parti-

san doctrinaire. But experience had taught him that long habituation had inclined the well-to-do classes in democratic Athens to stand for peace at any price, for all the material sacrifices of war fell exclusively to their lot; while ever since the wars had been fought by armies of mercenaries, the masses had risked little in the event of defeat but always received their share in the spoils of victory. After the loss of the Social War, the Athenian property owners had made their watchword: "No more war, no new acquisitions or efforts for expansion, but reversion to a sound peacetime basis as a purely commercial city." This program had found in Eubulus its consistent exponent. But Philip's political encroachments at Athens' expense had shown that when a state like Athens needed to have things quiet down, it would not do for her to retire from the ranks of the active nations and take up a place in the reserve; that would have meant losing all the rest of her power. Athens was thus faced with a problem: was she willing to obliterate herself altogether despite her political past, or should she venture her last stake? The latter alternative was not, of course, to be measured by the principle of the least expenditure of energy, which characterized Eubulus' politics. On this issue Demosthenes had to take a definite stand, and for him there could be no other course than an appeal to the people as the highest tribunal. While he might thus incidentally stir up democratic instincts, his real purpose was much deeper: he hoped that by calling forth the highest powers of the people, he could enable them to wrest the final decision out of the hands of the administration, though they could never have done this of their own accord. If any real sacrifice was to be made, the people would have to make it. But on the question whether the people still possessed the moral force that once had raised them so high, or whether they were actually ready to be retired on pension, as it were, accepting the position which the rich men and the intellectuals had assigned to

them in their need of a breathing spell,⁴⁵ Demosthenes and his political opponents had diametrically opposite views. To be sure, the state no longer had any claim to the great name it had once enjoyed; and the memory of the Athenian forefathers, which the orators were so fond of conjuring up, had perforce become a silent one, since it could now serve only as a sad reminder of what was irrevocably lost. But at this very moment Demosthenes deliberately dared to conjure up this memory once again, planting himself squarely in the way of those who wished to reduce Athens to a peaceful bureaucracy. Once he had made this decision, he naturally had to sever connections with the educated property-owning classes to whom Athens' future was a problem for cool reasoning and not a question of will or of character. In this way, Demosthenes became a man of the people—not, however, as attorney for the appetites of the masses, like the demagogue described by Plato, but as the challenging teacher and leader of the people who is revealed to us in the *Olynthiacs*. For even if, in choosing from his bag of rhetorical tricks, he did not boggle at any sensational methods of imbuing the masses with some sense of their own worth, his purpose was not to flatter them but to pave the way for confronting them with inexorable demands such as no one else had dared to propose for all too long a time.

If there was any way left to save the situation, it was surely the one that Demosthenes pointed out. Fate willed, however, that it should *not* succeed. The proposal to turn over the theater money to the war chest met with no better favor than the proposal to carry on war simultaneously on two fronts;⁴⁶ and even when it was resolved that the citizens themselves should go to war, there was not enough money to make any such resolution really effective. Everything remained in just the condition with which Demosthenes again and again so vehemently found fault; resolutions were not lacking, but nothing was being accomplished.

The opposition of Eubulus' circle to this annoying self-made man was too great, and it was becoming steadily stronger. Unfortunately we have no clear image of the opposing party. It must have long hated and feared Demosthenes. We can get some idea of the weapons used against him from the lawsuit against Meidias, a friend of Eubulus, which took place about this time. Meidias was one of the wealthiest Athenians, an arrogant man, who never showed himself on the street without a troop of servants. Demosthenes describes him as insolent, even brutal, and so wealthy that the laws had no deterrent effect upon his conduct.

Demosthenes' enmity with him was personal in origin and went back to the time of the case against the guardians, in which Meidias had been involved even though he happened to be a perfect stranger.⁴⁷ From then on, Demosthenes had been forced to defend himself for years against an endless series of insults of the worst sort, obviously due to some pathological condition in the offender. This petty warfare reached its height at a time when Demosthenes had volunteered to outfit the chorus of his phyle for the Dionysia and was exerting himself to the utmost to win first prize with his chorus. Meidias, all the while, kept trying to discredit him publicly and to injure him in every conceivable manner.⁴⁸ He forced his way by night into the workshop of the goldsmith engaged in preparing Demosthenes' festival robe and the gold crowns for the chorus, and destroyed them. He bribed the leader of the chorus to neglect its training, until this was discovered and the man was dismissed. He bribed the judges who were to award the prizes, and on the day of the festival heaped ignominy on the whole chorus at the theater. He tore off Demosthenes' sacred robe and boxed his ears in the presence of the audience, who indignantly hissed the culprit off the stage. The affair became a huge scandal. On the next day the people passed a preliminary vote against Meidias for unbecoming conduct at the festival

of the god, and Demosthenes prosecuted him. But Meidias had great influence and succeeded by intrigues in getting the case postponed for years.⁴⁹

Demosthenes complains in the unfinished draft of his speech that rich men's cases grow stale before they come up for trial. He emphasizes sharply that he is making his accusation purely in self-defense and not for any political reasons. Such a statement was needed; for among the friends of Meidias who were to appear in his behalf was Eubulus himself. At the time of the preliminary vote after the affair at the Dionysia years ago, Eubulus had not lifted a finger; but he was now at enmity with Demosthenes and therefore ready to intercede for Meidias. Nor would Eubulus be the only politician to take his part. Demosthenes again stood alone just as he had stood alone in his political struggles hitherto.⁵⁰ But he says that he has no fear; for he has always advised the people only as seemed to him for the best, and he has never received any recompense for this but has used up almost all his own property for the benefit of the state. If, then, anyone now chooses to call him a rhetor, he will gladly accept the title in the sense in which he can be said to have practiced this vocation.⁵¹ It is evident that the case did not originally have any political character;⁵² it had acquired it in the eyes of Demosthenes' opponents because of what had occurred in the meantime. They felt that they must try to bring about his downfall or at least maintain a solid front against him. The quarrel with Meidias had a close inner connection with the lawsuit that Stephanus—again at the instigation of Eubulus' circle—was simultaneously bringing against Apollodorus with the aim of rendering him innocuous, all because of his collusion with Demosthenes in an effort to remove the legal obstacles to using the theater money as a war fund. The chronological allusions in the speech *Against Meidias* lead us to believe that it was written about the time of the Olynthian War.⁵³ As a matter of fact,

Demosthenes never delivered it, eventually agreeing to a settlement. There very likely were political motives for this, though that is a matter of conjecture.

In the year 348 the fall of Olynthus and the barbarous revenge of Philip, who caused all the cities of the Olynthian confederacy to be destroyed, put a sudden end to any hopes which their entering the war had encouraged in Athens. The attitudes of the two Athenian political camps at this moment were significant. Eubulus and his friends now began to tremble for their positions and proposed embassies to all the Greeks calling them to war against Philip; but naturally these efforts were unsuccessful.⁵⁴ Demosthenes was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of making peace if Athens could manage to do so honorably. This was quite logical and consistent. It is inconceivable that anyone can seriously consider Demosthenes' opponents the better politicians; for this time, as before, they misunderstood the situation. Demosthenes always saw farther than they did. He had watched the steep curve in which the drama moved to its close, and he had no illusion that the fight could be continued. Even if he did allow himself to be chosen as the tenth and youngest member of the peace delegation to Philip, it is probable that he did so despite his distrust of Eubulus' *hommes de confiance*, being actuated rather by the hope that if the enemy should show any readiness to meet Athens half-way, he could take advantage of it. Philip was eager to have the peace buttressed with an alliance; and it was, perhaps, still possible to think of granting him this as a concession by which to obtain the fulfillment of certain demands which even a vanquished Athens still felt it a point of honor not to renounce, such as the restitution of Amphipolis. But on this point Philip remained unshakably firm; and he brought the negotiators so much under his spell with his sagacity, his assurance, and his personal charm, that when they made their report in Athens they could not speak highly enough

of the way he had received them, and Demosthenes had to call them back to the real matter under discussion. And yet they had all done their work well, and had delivered long and careful speeches before the king, who, to their astonishment, had replied with natural eloquence and great presence of mind.

Only one of them—so his enemy Aeschines tells us as an eyewitness—had found himself at a loss for words after delivering a small part of his speech, and appeared to be stuck; this was Demosthenes himself, the last to take the floor.⁵⁵ Is it possible that those who had spoken before him had anticipated all his essential arguments, and that he, the great orator, was momentarily incapable of extemporization, always his weak point? His eloquent rival Aeschines, who, in his earlier career as an actor, had himself known the anguish of getting stuck in a rôle already learned by heart, gives this explanation of Demosthenes' failure, and proceeds to describe his own success in the most glowing colors, pointing out that the king had several times gone so far as to speak of him by name in the course of his reply. Demosthenes' admirers have exerted themselves to prove this report untrue; but that, at any rate, is beyond the range of our knowledge. Did Philip's personality make so strong an impression on Demosthenes as to take his breath away? Or was he, perhaps, this time as at others, the only one who saw through the whole theatrical display at once? Must not his sense of his own tremendous historical responsibility and of the overwhelmingly small prospects for the Athenian cause, have far outweighed the vain satisfaction of dazzling his dread enemy with the Attic eloquence of which Philip had heard so much from afar and on which he was certainly quite ready to bestow his gracious applause if the Athenians would only recognize his inexorable terms and submit unconditionally?

Demosthenes refused to assent to the peace that Philip finally dictated, though he realized clearly how badly peace

was needed by Athens. The treaty tied her hands by the forced alliance. It gave Amphipolis to Philip. And while it offered terms of peace to all the other Athenian allies, it failed to do so for the Phocians, who were still fighting desperately with Thebes; it thus explicitly left them at Philip's mercy, and indirectly gave him full authority to intervene in the affairs of central Greece—a privilege which, as anyone might have foreseen, could not but lead to his extending his military dominion and moral influence to the very borders of Attica. Demosthenes had not brought about this war or even driven Athens into it; he simply had found it confronting him.⁵⁶ He had endeavored to have it carried through with greater firmness and was not responsible for the outcome when it failed. Of course it is unlikely that he saw any other way out than to accept the enemy's terms; but it is quite understandable that he felt it was for others to put the motion which he as a true patriot had had to fight to the last. At any rate, he left it to Eubulus and his coterie to ratify the peace with Philip; for he held them essentially responsible for the sorry turn of events.

WAR OR PEACE?

ATHENS' TREATY OF PEACE with Philip gave everyone a much needed pause for breath. But to no one involved did it mean a relapse into idle daydreaming; on the contrary, it brought home to them all in deadly earnest the question of what was to become of Greece. Despite all the antipolitical tendencies of the times, the problem of the state and the form it would take in the future had yet to be finally solved. But there was evident a growing perplexity over the usual political assumptions and methods. Every thoughtful person in Greece was deeply concerned about the health of the state; but no one any longer had confidence in the old doctors, however indispensable they had been after the fifth-century collapse, when a new cosmos had had to be built up among the Greek city-states. But now this too had broken down; and those persons who stood outside professional politics and felt impelled to look deeper than the men of the day to whom they had relinquished the hubbub of the political arena, now felt that they must again raise their voices. It was as spokesman for these that the ninety-year-old Isocrates addressed an open letter to Philip, buttressed with all the dignity of his years and all the celebrity of his name (which was certain to re-echo to the farthest reaches of the Greek world), entreating the king to appear as a friend in need.

In a similar situation after the Social War, Isocrates had, in his pamphlet *On the Peace*, already tried to convince the Athenians that the welfare of their weakened state lay not in continuing the imperialistic politics of the now dismembered confederacy, but rather in abandoning all attempts to control other states by force. He had then promised that as a result of this negative policy the other Greeks would be so delighted at finding the interrelationships of their several

states put on a sound basis in this ethical manner that they would be glad to confer upon Athens a sort of hegemony *honoris causa*.¹* But Isocrates must have learned better from the years that intervened; for Athens' passivity in foreign politics had merely led most of the Greek states—even those in the remoter Peloponnesus—to ally themselves with the newly aspiring Macedonia and to seek their advantage there. Athens was more isolated than ever. Even the greatest of ideologists could not blink the fact that in Philip there had arisen a star of a new magnitude quite beyond the calculation of those who had agreed with Isocrates that relations between the Greek states could be improved by simply carrying over into foreign politics the ordinary middle-class standards of decency and morality.² And Isocrates himself stated frankly in his new oration for King Philip that the actions of states are determined by their interests alone.³ We have already found this principle expressed as a general axiom once before, in Demosthenes' speech *For the Megalopolitans*. It was there a cold-blooded formulation of the *suprema lex* of Greek particularism and the politics that went with it. In the *Panegyricus* Isocrates had tried to replace it by a higher principle—that of Greek unity (*ὁμόνοια*). So when he now proceeded to advocate the very principle that had led to all the disunion of the Greek states, this sounds like a confession of final resignation. But, to tell the truth, he felt that these two principles, originally so much opposed, had been brought so close together by the course of events that there was some hope of reconciling them. He felt that the formation of an entente between the quarreling states of Hellas was at last in accord with their deepest interests; for all the leading states—Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Argos—were so weakened that they needed peace more than anything else, and no one of them was capable of getting any decided ascendancy over the others.⁴

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 247-256.

In the *Panegyricus* he had urged an understanding between Sparta and Athens, so that the Greeks might unite in a common expedition against the Persian empire. Nothing of that sort was any longer thinkable. But the policy of which he now had such high hopes offered a surprisingly simple solution for the distressing problem that lay heavy on all minds—the problem of what was to be the ultimate relationship between Greece and the new power in the north. No sane man could help fearing a renewal of the war after a short interim; but Isocrates was resolved to prevent this, whatever might happen. If Philip was not to remain a permanent menace to the Greek world from outside, it was necessary to get him positively involved in the fate of Hellas; for he could not be eluded. Of course in the view of any of the Greek states of this period, this problem was comparable to that of squaring the circle. But the ideologist had long since learned to put himself outside the confining walls of political reality, against which the aspirations of so many Greek hearts had been beating in vain. It was in the world of the spirit, not that of politics, that Panhellenic thinking had first taken root; and no one embodied more effectively than Isocrates that Panhellenic cultural unity which rose above all the jealousies and selfish struggles of the city-states. Ever since the shattering of his hope that Greece might be consolidated politically under the peaceful dual leadership of Athens and Sparta, he had been looking for some other power that would be able to unite Hellas in a federation of states. Dionysius of Syracuse was perhaps the first to whom Isocrates had sent a letter with the offer of such a rôle.⁵ It was now easy to return to the old scheme once again, inviting Philip of Macedon to put it into effect.

The idea of unifying the various kindred tribes then struggling for the mastery of Hellas, by diverting them into a joint expedition against Persia, had been from the first a decidedly romantic notion. And if we must really assume

that the aim of Isocrates' letter to Dionysius (most of which is now lost) was to induce him to undertake this task—Dionysius, who ruled over the western outpost of Greece and was resolutely championing Sicily against the ever-increasing pressure of Carthaginian invasion!—the project must have lost whatever remnant of factual basis it had originally possessed for the Greeks of the mother country.⁶ Nevertheless, now that this old dream was revived in connection with Philip, it acquired all at once a new closeness to reality that must have startled even Isocrates himself. For if Philip was resolved and even destined to raise himself to the leadership of the Greek states, as it now seemed, was it not his natural heritage to become a party to the age-old traditional antagonism of the peoples on either side of the Aegean? This seemed all the more inevitable because his empire would soon come into contact with that of Persia at the Dardanelles and must then become a direct menace to it. To be sure, Athens still stood guard at the straits, having kept this last and most important bulwark of her naval prestige intact under the terms of the peace. But for Isocrates that was no obstacle. He had long since come to recognize the impossibility of resisting Macedonia, and he was only trying to find the least humiliating way to express the unavoidable submission of all the Greeks to the will of Philip. Here again he found the solution in a scheme for Macedonian hegemony over Greece. For it seemed as if Philip's appearance in this rôle would be the most effective way to mitigate his becoming so dominant a factor in Greek history; moreover, it ought to silence all Greek prejudices against the culturally and ethnically alien character of the Macedonians.⁷ Isocrates tried to make this acceptable both to Philip and to the Greeks by employing the mythical symbol of Heracles as the first to carry Greek civilization in triumph to Asia. As Heracles' successor, Philip, scion of the Heraclidae, was now to lead Greece to victory over the barbarians of the Orient.

It is the privilege of the visionary who does not have to act with responsibility to any actual government, to let his thoughts leap over one or more of the stages of reality that are often insuperable obstacles for the practicing statesman. Isocrates had the right intuition about the future, and that is by no means to be despised. The dissemination of his program throughout the Greek world must have been important in preparing the soil for Philip's "Corinthian League"⁸ and Alexander's Asiatic expedition, even though it was not the immediate stimulus. But granting the undeniable importance of Isocrates' conception as pointing the way to the actual historical achievement, have we any right to think of him not merely as the herald of national consciousness but as a true politician as well? To be sure, this is how he pictures himself in his epistle to Philip.⁹ He there contrasts himself with those who make a loud outcry from the speakers' tribune, stirring up the distrust of the people and slandering the king, as if Philip's enormous efforts to extend his power were directed against Greece and were not rather for her benefit.¹⁰ Indeed these persons, Isocrates informs the king, have already made bold to assert that as soon as Philip has put the affairs of the Phocians in order, he will intervene in the Peloponnesus backed up by his alliance with the Messenians, and that once he has obtained a foothold in southern Greece, he will easily become master of the rest of the country—above all, of Athens. It is obvious that since the peace this suspicion has been gaining ground rapidly; and Isocrates is very emphatic in admonishing Philip to dispel it by letting himself appear as a benefactor of all the Greeks alike, not favoring some while treating others badly. For Isocrates no longer looks upon Philip as an enemy or even as an opponent, but as one who stands above the antagonisms of all particular powers, the guardian of the coming new order, appointed by *Tyche* herself.¹¹

It is not hard to see how important a factor the ideology

of Isocrates' *Philip* could be for the Macedonian king in winning over Greek public sentiment. It enabled him to utilize for his own advantage the growing Panhellenic tendency. With the help of the rôle that Isocrates had assigned to him, he had the astuteness to let his cold-blooded policy for the extension of Macedonian power take on in the eyes of the Greeks the appearance of a work of liberation for Hellas. What he most needed at this moment was not force but shrewd propaganda; and nobody lent himself to this purpose so effectively as the old Isocrates, venerable and disinterested, who offered his services of his own free will.

But let us for the time being put aside the difficult question of national consciousness and trace briefly the further course of events. No sooner had peace been declared than great concern was felt in Athens for the fate of the Phocians, as Philip had stipulated that they be excluded from the treaty. They were now left utterly at his mercy; and in spite of all his professed assurances, with which the Athenian negotiators had tried to set the minds of the people at rest, the subjugation of the Phocians could no longer be prevented, and no one could doubt that it would give Philip his long-awaited occasion to get central Greece under his control. The news soon arrived that he had passed on into Phocis by way of Thermopylae, and that the Phocian mercenary leader Phalaecus had capitulated without fighting, on condition that he be granted permission to depart. Philip now staged a solemn convocation of the Sacred Council of Amphictyons at Delphi to sit in judgment upon the Phocians for having seized the treasures of the Delphic temple and used them for the war at the time when Phocis was hard pressed by Thebes. The Phocians were now deprived of their votes in the Amphictyony, which were turned over to Philip; and thus he acquired the deciding influence in this venerable congress of the Greek states, as he and his allies now controlled the majority of the votes. This gave him power to pass a resolu-

tion to destroy the twenty-two fortified towns in Phocis, to disarm the people, and to settle them anew in scattered communities. The Phocians were required to pay a sum of fifty talents annually until the total debt to the Delphic sanctuary should be amortized. The Spartans and Corinthians were ejected from the Amphictyony for supporting the Phocians, while Philip's Theban, Locrian, and Thessalian allies were granted the fulfillment of their chief desires. Athens retained her seat in the Sacred Council and could there be a witness to the resolutions so deeply humiliating to her and yet so impossible for her to prevent.

At the negotiations Athens was represented by Aeschines, Eubulus' trusted associate, who had already taken a leading part in the peace delegation, and was now becoming more and more prominent in the liquidation of the peace treaty. It was therefore inevitable that he should become Demosthenes' chief opponent. Aeschines is Demosthenes' foil, and thus inseparable from him. In recent years he has been placed far above Demosthenes as a statesman; but this is an error of judgment that supplies its own corrective. Aeschines lacked neither the charm nor the persuasiveness of a born orator. After beginning as an actor he had turned to a political career; as a clerk he had won the esteem of Eubulus—a fact that betokens the respectability of his sentiments as well as his talent for business; and he at last found on the orator's platform his true field of activity. But those of his speeches which have been preserved are far behind those of Demosthenes in elemental power and formative art.¹² Like his conduct in politics, they reveal a lack of character not counterbalanced by his evident merits. Although we can perceive the winning grace that stands him in good stead as a negotiator, we also see that there is nothing firm and inflexible underneath. He has the humor and the harmony of character that the atrabilious Demosthenes utterly lacks. Whereas Demosthenes' thoughts seem to be forced

out from within by the most intense pressure, those of Aeschines unfold themselves with the ease of unconstraint. He has a natural eye for men and things; and as he is always cool and matter-of-fact, he sees them in their right proportion, while Demosthenes' fanatical hatred is such that when he comes to describe an opponent like Aeschines, he makes him a very bugaboo.¹³ He sees in him the deliberate traitor, bought up by Philip and accordingly compelled to put the best light possible on all Philip's enterprises against Athens; and there is no doubt that Demosthenes believes firmly in this caricature. The scorn of Aeschines is subtler and consequently more telling. And yet, Demosthenes' insight into Philip's nature and the Athenian situation penetrates deeper than that of his rival, whose intellect is not hemmed in by any passionate sentiments but nevertheless misses the most important thing when he nears the critical point, simply because he is too dispassionate in his reckoning. Of course Aeschines is not entirely incapable of loftier flights; but he has not Demosthenes' ability to stick tenaciously to that which he sees to be right; indeed he always manages to adapt himself to the facts as soon as reaction sets in. Beside Demosthenes he seems colorless; for Demosthenes is truly a man of destiny, while nature did not select Aeschines for so noble a rôle.

Philip now had the problem of compelling the Athenians to recognize the Delphic resolutions aimed against Phocis; and he sent ambassadors to Athens, where strong opposition prevailed. However, with the Macedonian army only a few days' march from the Attic border and in good fighting trim, Athens was quite defenseless, and even Demosthenes advised submission. Demosthenes' speech *On the Peace* is the most important document as to his political position at this difficult time. He here calls to mind everything which Aeschines and his friends have promised that Philip will be so obliging as to bring about: the resettlement

of the friendly Boeotian cities Thespieae and Plataea, which Thebes had destroyed; the saving of the Phocians; restitution of Oropus by Thebes; restoration of Euboea as a substitute for Amphipolis; even the *dioikismos* of the hated Thebes itself.¹⁴ He refers to the speeches that he has already made against these fantastic notions; for he has put no faith in all this, and has kept none of his doubts to himself; but has predicted that everything would turn out just as it has done. He goes still farther back and reminds his audience how he was nearly torn to pieces when he was the only one to warn the Athenians against the costly and inglorious expedition to Euboea, with which they had intended to assist the tyrant Plutarch of Eretria; but Plutarch had shown his gratitude by betraying them. From time immemorial, correct prediction has been considered a fair indication of ability in a political counselor. Demosthenes now has need of such credentials in confronting those who advocate absolute rejection of the decrees of the Amphictyonic Council and cannot understand why he, of all people, should fail to agree with them.¹⁵

In truth these persons did not know their man if they thought of him as no more than an ordinary hotspur like themselves.¹⁶ Nor has he been any better understood by those philological critics both ancient and modern who have raised doubts of the genuineness of this oration, or at least have been reluctant to believe that Demosthenes published it himself, simply because they have not recognized him in it. Such an interpretation really does him no honor. It makes him a ranter and completely misses in him the politician who thinks consistently. Demosthenes differs profoundly from those who have so often applauded his earlier speeches without in the least grasping his seriousness and his sense of actuality; and this difference lies not in his feelings but in his judgment. Just as he has assailed the administration in the *Olynthiacs* for overlooking the dangers implicit in the

situation and failing to seize its opportunity, he now points out the senselessness of resisting when the time is unfavorable. Of course he could fairly leave to others the responsibility for what has happened; but he declares that the cheap glory of denouncing their mistakes means nothing to him, now that it is really too late. He wishes only to tell those who have at other times given some heed to his words why it is that he now seems to be siding with his opponents. Accordingly the tone of his speech is quite different from the onward rush of the great public orations three years before. It is close akin to the quietly instructive, superior manner of the speeches *On the Symmories* and *For the Megalopolitans*; and we can now understand that like Pericles¹⁷ before him this orator sees the task of the true statesman as that of raising the people's spirits and spurring them on when they are lackadaisical and irresolute, but pulling the reins tight when they kick over the traces.

Demosthenes did not expect the peace to last. His words show beyond a doubt that he considered a final decisive conflict with Philip unavoidable. He was still, as always, one of those skeptical persons who looked upon Philip as Athens' greatest enemy; and while Isocrates had disparaged such an attitude in his oration, the brutal events in Phocis and in Delphi shortly afterwards were to show that Demosthenes was right. But Athens now found herself in an embarrassing situation from which she could extricate herself only gradually. Politics is the art of the possible; and since opinions often differ at critical points concerning what is possible and what is impossible, it is all the more necessary for the politician to transfer the seemingly impossible into the realm of possibility. Demosthenes counseled that, whatever might happen, this was no time for Athens to plunge into a war in which every Greek state subscribing to the Delphic resolutions would be against her.¹⁸ For the time being she had no business to do anything that might jeopardize the

peace. The peace treaty gave her the needed platform for raising herself out of her present situation. To offend Philip's allies deliberately in the very point in which they all agreed would have been to violate the most elementary rule of politics. It was necessary, rather, to start from the fact that they had each originally been led into the alliance with Philip by very different interests. The alliance had then forced them all to make sacrifices far exceeding those which their own advantage required. So the one way to get hold of them was to appeal to these special interests, and that was possible only with a farsighted policy working systematically toward the isolating of Philip.

As a prospectus of just such a policy, Demosthenes' speech *On the Peace* gives a program for his whole political activity during the following years. In the speech *For the Megalopolitans* he had already urged the advisability of attracting to the Athenian cause those Peloponnesian states that were at odds with Sparta—namely, Arcadia, Messenia, and, we may add, Argos; for each of these was of more practical importance than Sparta in her impotence. He now harks back to this policy, as will be shown by the *Second Philippic*. This is the logical consequence of the course sketched out in the oration *On the Peace*. Even in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* the ultimate motive for this Peloponnesian policy was, as I have shown, the thought of a radical change of course in the future with respect to Thebes.¹⁹ At that time this was still too daring a notion to express point-blank; but it would perhaps have been a more or less necessary consequence of an alliance with Arcadia. When Demosthenes says afterwards that he has always considered the alliance between Athens and Phocis absurd, this is surely more than a reflection of a later stage in his politics. It is not surprising then that in the oration *On the Peace*, which gives the first hints of his contemplated reorientation of the Athenian scheme of alliances, we find a suggestion that Athens settle her differ-

ence with Thebes outright—a suggestion at the moment still paradoxical. Here Demosthenes is openly striking a blow at the traditional Athenian chauvinism; for the same classes of society in which he has found support in his fight against the Macedonian menace are at heart bitterly opposed to Thebes. In particular, they have been extremely incensed by the reaffirmation of Thebes' possession of Oropus. Demosthenes now has the courage to advise openly that Oropus be left in the hands of Thebes,²⁰ just as Chios, Rhodes, and Cos have been relinquished to the king of Caria; this means that the Athenians must give up all intention of continuing to assert these claims.²¹ What Demosthenes is doing is making a beeline toward separating Philip from his most important allies. If, indeed, the Athenians have made these sacrifices in order to improve their own future situation, then it would be silly—as Demosthenes says in closing his speech—to start a war against the whole of Greece at this moment “because of the shadow at Delphi.”

Thus in this oration for peace Demosthenes' decision for the future war has implicitly been made; what he now had to do was simply to begin all over again under much more unfavorable circumstances than at the outset of his career in politics. One thing alone was to his advantage: he no longer had to deal with several problems of equal importance; a single objective possessed him—the fight against Philip. In Philip Demosthenes had for the first time found an adversary who stimulated his powers to the utmost and led him on to the summit of his achievement. But unfortunately he had to carry on his campaign against this adversary as a war on two fronts—at home as well as abroad. He entered upon the new era with all the dismal heritage of the struggles that had been going on in domestic politics during the last five years before peace was declared; and it was clear from the first that these struggles were only now reaching their critical stage. Eubulus and Aeschines could not look upon the

peace as a preparation for the coming conflict, as Demosthenes did; for them it was something final. One could foresee that they would repeatedly find themselves compelled to defend Philip's measures against Athens, representing them as harmless, while branding the opposite diagnosis as criminal war propaganda. At Delphi, after the framing of the Amphiptyonic resolutions which were so humiliating to Athens, Philip had celebrated the divine festival in the presence of the delegates from all the states, and at the ceremonial banquet the paean had been sung. On this occasion Aeschines had joined in the chorus with the rest, probably because he felt it unseemly to be the only one to keep silent when all the others were singing thanks and praise to the god. To Demosthenes this seemed symbolic of Aeschines' entire conduct; even more so did Aeschines' excuse that he had not thought anyone would notice his voice in particular.²² Demosthenes must have taken up the fight against him in dead earnest from the time of the peace treaty on. In the oration *On the Peace* he had abstained from personal attacks, as custom demanded; but soon after Aeschines had returned from the embassy, Demosthenes brought action against him, accusing him of treason and bribery.

This trial was postponed for three years by the intrigues of Demosthenes' opponents. In the meanwhile he continued to go his own way politically. Had there been a responsible administration in Athens, it would already have had to decide what foreign policy to pursue. But in ancient democracy this was not the way things were done; the Assembly merely considered each situation as it came up, following the man who seemed to give the best advice. Athenian politics thus remained very much the football of opposing tendencies. So it was impossible for Demosthenes to give himself freely to a single course of action; the most he could do was to seize any opportunity to ward off the new dangers which the carrying out of Philip's policies in the Greek interior

made imminent. Thus Demosthenes was sent as an ambassador to Messenia and Argos at a time when these states, which were allied with Philip, were becoming so much more deeply dependent upon him by reason of their old hostility to Sparta that the danger of Macedonian intervention in the Peloponnesus was mounting steadily. But Demosthenes' mission was doomed to failure simply because Athens still persisted in keeping up her friendship with Sparta. Sparta's enemies had always complained strenuously about this, declaring that it was this very conduct of Athens that was driving them to join Philip. At any rate, the Athenians now paid the penalty for not having listened to Demosthenes when the Arcadians and Messenians were still ready to seek their support. In the *Second Philippic*, written two years after the peace, Demosthenes gives a detailed account of his speeches to the Messenians and the Argives, in which he had tried to arouse their distrust of Philip.²³ To be sure, they had loudly applauded him and the other ambassadors when he warned them against Philip and reminded them of what had happened to Olynthus and Thessaly; but, in spite of that, they had clung fast to Philip, just like those Athenian optimists who deliberately shut their eyes to the fact that he had already surrounded Athens on all sides.²⁴

This oration also throws light on the inner struggles preceding the declaration of peace, and the part that Demosthenes had played in them. He now recalls the day of his return from the second embassy to Philip, when he had predicted every subsequent development, and adjured the Athenians not to abandon Thermopylae and the Phocians.²⁵ He suggests that it would now be well to summon those persons who talked the Athenians into concluding the peace. At that time they had called Demosthenes a water-drinker and an ill-tempered hypochondriac, and had promised the people fulfillment of all their desires; now, however, they themselves stand convicted.²⁶ "I do not say this in order to

be abusive . . . or to make words. But I believe that what Philip is doing will hurt you more seriously than anything we have as yet experienced. For I see how the thing is progressing and though I do not wish that my suspicion be justified, I am afraid that it is already all too near."

Unfortunately it is no longer possible to know exactly what were the concrete circumstances under which the speech was delivered. Demosthenes has obviously revised it for publication, and in this way a passage giving the formulation of his proposal has been removed. This passage consisted in the reading of a response to be made to a certain foreign power.²⁷ Demosthenes intimates that the Athenians in the Assembly, which he is addressing, are not by themselves and therefore will have to wait for a second meeting before they discuss how they ought to act.²⁸ It is easy to suppose that the non-Athenians present are the envoys of the foreign power to which the answer is to be made; but we do not learn just which one this is, and the problem has given rise to very contradictory hypotheses. The one thing clear is that this speech is not given over merely to malicious general tirades against Philip's politics since the peace (as many unfavorable critics believe), but that a definite situation is forcing the Athenians to take a stand—a situation that must somehow be connected with Philip's impending intervention in the Peloponnesus.²⁹ Demosthenes finds it hard to formulate the Athenian response; obviously this is why, after reading the answer that he recommends, he cries out that those politicians who have misled the people by their false representations and are thus to blame for the present difficulties, ought to be summoned.³⁰ In conclusion he singles out one man alone, as responsible for everything; and the oration winds up with a mighty invective against Aeschines. Although every Athenian knows the whole story, Demosthenes is bent on making each and every one of them remember who it was that had persuaded them to abandon Phocis and

Thermopylae; for now that Philip has become master of these, he has obtained control over the route into Attica and the Peloponnesus.³¹ At that time he would no more have been able to force the pass and come to Attica by land than he would have been able to come by sea. The speech closes with an allusion to the pending trial of Aeschines. Now that Demosthenes' opponents have delayed the settlement for so long, he chooses this way to prepare forgetful public opinion for the final battle in the courts, as well as to exert sufficient pressure to prevent a further postponement.³²

The speech affords us a glimpse into Demosthenes' struggles in domestic politics, where matters are at last coming to a head. The spiritual disruption of Greece is thrown into sharp relief by yet another letter from Isocrates to Philip, which has come down to us. At the very time that Demosthenes is making desperate efforts to rouse the people and to open their eyes to Philip's politics, Isocrates asks the king to continue to be patient with Athens; and he speaks contemptuously of certain persons who are unable to do anything good for their city but can only sow seeds of distrust in Philip's magnanimous intentions.³³ He begs him not to be angry, but to bring Athens round by meeting her halfway. And indeed Philip did actually suggest a revision of the peace treaty—at least formally—in the year 343, accompanying his offer with a sharp protest against agitators. He was, however, decidedly uncordial to the intransigent demands of Demosthenes' adherents. They had demanded nothing less than the restitution of Athens' possessions.³⁴ Of course they knew that Philip would be far from assenting to that. But if he believed that he could silence an adversary like Demosthenes by granting him a little personal success at the expense of Athens' claims, he was deceiving himself. The lawsuit against Aeschines, from which the speeches of both sides have been preserved, stirred up the wildest of passions. There are no more appalling documents evidenc-

ing the wildness of justice in the fourth-century Athenian democracy than these two speeches with the same title: *On the False Embassy*. The judicial procedure is merely a demagogic instrument of attack in a political struggle quite lacking in chivalry, a struggle in which the end is felt to justify any means whatsoever. Here is nothing that can be glozed over. But it would show an unpardonable lack of historical judgment to put the moral responsibility for this development of public life on the individuals who are carried along with it and use it to their advantage. Here in court, before the excited masses of jurymen, the real personal battle is fought out—a fight between the representatives of the principles struggling for the decision,—a fight of a sort systematically prohibited in the Assembly. Immediately after the embassy's return, Demosthenes had begun his attack on Aeschines, using the very method that the opposite party had recently used so successfully against him in preventing a change in the theoric law: he sent a person called Timarchus to make the judicial complaint. But in selecting this tool, or perhaps rather in relying on those who put the man at his disposal, he made a bad mistake; for Aeschines counterattacked neatly by staging the huge scandal of a suit against Timarchus on grounds of moral turpitude, which made him perfectly impossible as a political accuser. The next time, Demosthenes had to play the plaintiff himself, averse as he obviously was to such an action; and the result is interesting enough: Aeschines was acquitted. But the scant majority he obtained showed that Demosthenes was steadily gaining ground; and Aeschines' authority must have been seriously shaken now that the memory of the all too human events leading up to the peace had been again brought to light. Shortly before, his associate Philocrates, for whom the peace was named, had been impeached by Hypereides and had fled the country. The court condemned him to death. It would be foolish for us to spend our time

today in trying to decide once again whether these men were guilty or innocent, trusting ourselves to examine the arguments for and against. In these battles Demosthenes is bent on ruthlessly stamping out any resistance to the idea of war, using all the resources of an overwhelming passion with such a volley of epithets that everyone who steps in the path of the raging avalanche is called traitor and swept away. It is inconceivable that Demosthenes could have fashioned these epithets against his adversaries in cold blood. He has forged his weapons in the glow of the mighty obsession that inspired him; and if the passion of the conflict drives him to violent, even terrorizing utterance, he is nevertheless far above all his contemporaries in the unselfishness of his motives and the strength of his devotion to the one goal of saving his country.

In judging Demosthenes' politics we are always coming up against the critical problem of whether he may not have deceived himself. Was it really true, as he tried to convince the Athenians in the *Second Philippic*, that Philip could not help being hostile to Athens because Athens was his only serious antagonist in Greece?³⁵ Was he not here overestimating the importance that Athens could have for Philip as a factor in politics? Is it not possible that Philip's will for peace was quite sincere? Were not Demosthenes and the anti-Macedonian party in Athens the ones who proceeded to act aggressively whenever an opportunity presented itself? At all events this was what his opponents believed; and only this could justify their loyal attitude to the conqueror, who persistently and insidiously strengthened his moral influence over the Athenian leaders by the bonds of personal friendship, employing his amiability and his qualities of mind to corrupt those whom he could not buy with money. These people could not see that Athens' relationship to Philip was in any respect different from that of the rest of the Greek states, which still felt more or less well off, though they had

been his allies and vassals for a long time. And indeed when Demosthenes' opponents could no more than retort "What, then, is one to do?" it is clear that a feeling of complete hopelessness was the basic reason for their acquiescing in the dependence to which the peace had doomed them, apparently forever. Such dependence, it seemed to them, was more endurable in the form of an alliance between equals than in that of coercive subjection.

Demosthenes feels that this capitulation is as hasty as the former inactivity and remissness was inept. For a state to hold its own is, in his opinion, primarily a matter of will; and he feels that Philip's conduct is evidence that he regards Athens as somewhat different from the others. Philip rightly puts a higher value on her subservience than on that of all his allies, and would be content if she would reconcile herself permanently to her new position. Why, indeed, is he trying so hard to get Athens' neighbors firmly in hand, if not for security against her? He already has central and southern Greece overwhelmingly in his power, but his undertakings since the peace are incontestable proof that he has resolved to extend his dominion over the whole of Greece. His financial and military preparations have been resumed—the little Macedonian fleet enlarged, the fortifications at Thermopylae strengthened, and troops sent into the Peloponnesus to insure that the states allied with him shall preponderate. Since 343 he has laid hands on the island of Euboea, which by its position off the coast of Attica controls the Athenian trade; and he has tried to win over the Euboean cities one after another by stirring up internal unrest and sending troops to back up the pro-Macedonian agents. He next invades Epirus, where he ousts the king, setting his own brother-in-law Alexander in his place. From there he presses on through Acarnania as far south as the Ambracian Gulf, and thus makes connection with the Peloponnesus from the west without going through Attica. He

will soon invade Thrace again, and finally subdue that country, which borders on the Athenian Dardanelles. He is already on friendly terms—perhaps even secretly allied—with the tyrant Hermias of Atarneus on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont.³⁶ It seems inevitable that he will invade the Chersonese, where the old enmity between Athens and the city of Cardia will always give him an excuse for intervening. The Chersonese, however, is the last strategic position on the sea that Athens has left to lose.

At this time there were two tasks that any positive Athenian foreign policy had to accomplish: in the first place, those Greeks who were not as yet allied with Philip had to be prevailed upon to ally themselves with Athens in order to check the enemy's advance on the Adriatic in the west, and on Euboea in the east; in the second place, Athens had to steal a march on Philip at the Hellespont, protecting the Chersonese as far as possible. The moment seemed most favorable for dealing with the states directly menaced by Philip's most recent attacks; and Demosthenes went to Corinth and Achaea and a number of other states at the head of an embassy. In this way the ground was broken for the alliances concluded later. A movement against Macedonian expansion on Euboea had begun somewhat earlier, starting in Chalcis, the principal city of the island, where from now on the leading politician Callias kept closely in touch with Demosthenes. At this time Demosthenes had also succeeded in obtaining an alliance with Megara. Athens sent another group of settlers to the Chersonese as a reënforcement, with a squadron under the command of Diopeithes to give them military protection. The newcomers got into a quarrel with the city of Cardia about the land for their colony; and while Philip was fighting in Thrace, Diopeithes suddenly fell upon Macedonian territory on the coast of the Propontis, using the Chersonese as his base. When Philip, as was to be expected, sent a threatening note to Athens,

the situation there became tense to the breaking point, and the Macedonian party demanded that Diopeithes be recalled immediately. We have Demosthenes' speech on this affair. In his speech on the situation in the Chersonese he vigorously opposes the recall, on the ground that disbandment of the corps at the Hellespont would leave Athens no more troops with which to aid Byzantium or to protect the Chersonese should Philip venture an attack after subjugating Thrace. Thus military expediency already quite outweighs diplomatic scruples. Soon afterwards Demosthenes delivers his *Third Philippic*, the most powerful of these speeches, a work much wider in its import than the occasion that calls it forth, bringing the whole significance of this moment of history before us in one vast spectacle.³⁷

This time Demosthenes' hardest task is to make the people see clearly that they no longer are called upon to make a final decision of almost intolerable gravity, that they no longer need wait for any specific attack or declaration of war, but that the war is already in full swing. Philip will never take the trouble to announce this, if his victims cannot see it for themselves.³⁸ Demosthenes gives a survey of all Philip's encroachments from the time of the peace up to his recent intrusion in the Chersonese, his occupation of Euboea, his conquest of Thrace, and his intervention in the Peloponnesus. In this sense, strictly speaking, there has been war ever since Philip's brutal advance on the Phocians immediately after the declaration of peace. Now, however, the problem is no longer the simple one of finding a way to assist the Chersonese or Byzantium, which at present are menaced by Philip. The problem is rather that of facing the fact that all Greece is in extreme peril.³⁹

This knowledge necessitates measures for self-protection even if the interests of others must be neglected. Philip's power has been spreading year after year, while the Greeks have done nothing about it. During the Attic, Spartan, and

Theban hegemonies the Greek states used all the means at their command to keep any one among them from extending its power at the cost of the others; but now that the time has come for resistance to Philip, their will seems to be paralyzed. When Demosthenes draws up his list of Philip's transgressions, it includes his offenses against the whole of Greece, not merely those against Athens; and Demosthenes' charge of unbecoming remissness is aimed at all the Greeks equally—their irresolution, and their failure to perceive their common cause. They look upon what is happening as if it were some disease that must be permitted to run its course, or some natural phenomenon like a hailstorm, praying that it will strike their neighbor's house and not their own. He shows how Philip's money has systematically undermined all power of moral resistance in every town; he reveals the underground campaign against the few upright men who have stood out against corruption; and he conjures up the memory of the old independence and incorruptibility of the time when all the Greeks were fighting against Persia in a common war for freedom. Now, as before, the Athenians must take the lead; this is the duty which their place in history lays on their shoulders: they must rouse the whole nation to one final effort to break its bonds, and reveal its own true nature in an outburst of heroism and self-sacrifice. Therefore he urges them to send embassies everywhere to call the Greeks together—to assemble them, teach them, and exhort them; but the paramount need is to take the necessary steps themselves and thus perform their duty.⁴⁰

In this appeal to the whole Greek world Demosthenes reached a decisive turning point in his political thought. In his first speeches he had been purely the practical politician, the cool and calculating spokesman for the interests of his state. He was still thoroughly rooted in Athens' governmental traditions, never overstepping the bounds of her classical balance-of-power policy for the interior of Greece.⁴¹

But the appearance of the mighty new enemy from beyond the Greek frontier now forced him to take a different tack. The new situation made the old formulae of Greek internal politics inadequate. It was at this critical moment that Isocrates again came forward with his ideal of Panhellenism, as I have shown at the beginning of this chapter. Looking far beyond the actualities of the Greek world, hopelessly split asunder as it was, he had envisaged a united nation led by the Macedonian king. This idea has not failed to impress modern-minded historians; indeed the history of the nineteenth century has been so much concerned with the national unification of peoples who have suffered for centuries from the helplessness of disruption that it is not surprising that many scholars have looked upon Isocrates as herald of a better future and standard-bearer of the idea of nationalism, while Demosthenes has seemed rather to typify the egoism of the small state—narrow-minded and behind the times.

Quite apart, however, from any theoretical doubts whether the nationalistic movement of modern times, which seeks to combine in a single state all the individuals of a single folk, can properly be compared with the Greek idea of Panhellenism,⁴² scholars have failed to notice that after the unfortunate Peace of Philocrates Demosthenes' whole policy was an unparalleled fight for national unification. In this period he deliberately threw off the constraints of the politician concerned exclusively with Athenian interests, and devoted himself to a task more lofty than any Greek statesman before him had ever projected or indeed could have projected.⁴³ In this respect he is quite comparable to Isocrates; but an important point of contrast still remains. The difference is simply that Demosthenes did not think of this "unification" as a more or less voluntary submission to the will of the conqueror; on the contrary, he demanded a unanimous uprising of all the Greeks against the Macedonian foe. *His* Panhellenism was the outgrowth of a resolute will for

national self-assertiveness, deliberately opposed to the national self-surrender called for by Isocrates—for that was what Isocrates' program had really meant, despite its being expressed romantically as a plan for a Persian war under Macedonian leadership. The strongest antagonist arrayed against Demosthenes in his fight for the loyalty of Greece was defeatism clothed in the emotional garb of a higher patriotism; and in this way he struck a blow at its very heart, boldly seizing its own spiritual weapons. As the success of his appeal was to show, he was correct in his estimate of the actual political prospects of a really national uprising now that direct hostile pressure was felt. Since the days of the Persian wars Hellas had at no time been seriously endangered from without. Her cities, thus left to themselves, had had plenty of leisure for ravaging one another. At any rate this is how the previous history of Greece must have looked at this moment. Under such mutual friction no common national sentiment could prosper. The only soil on which it could develop was that of a common emergency and common opposition to a strong outside foe. The foe and the emergency had now appeared; and if the Greeks still had a spark of their fathers' sense of independence, the fate that was now overtaking them could not but bring them together. The *Third Philippic* is one mighty avowal of *this* brand of Panhellenism;⁴⁴ and this is entirely Demosthenes' achievement.

It is no accident that in this elemental outburst of national consciousness at the hour of supreme danger, the artistic high-water mark of Greek oratory is reached. In the symphony of the *Third Philippic* the motifs of the other *Philippic* orations are organically interwoven and subordinated to the new leading theme. The new and amazing power of its eloquence is fed by two springs that here converge: the passionate natural feeling of consanguinity, the very existence of which was imperiled; and the ethos of a moral right

so unshakable that no other political demand had ever been more firmly backed up. It was these two ideas that made Demosthenes' position so strong. To a politician who is merely the representative of certain special interests, language is nothing but a medium for matter-of-fact elucidation; but in the mouth of the champion of liberty it becomes a unique and irresistible instrument for giving form to the awakening sense of Panhellenic solidarity. In all history there is no comparable situation until the time of the Napoleonic wars, when all the nations of Europe were battling for their freedom. The task that confronted Demosthenes demanded utterly gigantic powers of improvisation; for the Greek people had not been making preparedness an end in itself for years as the enemy had done; and they also found it hard to adjust themselves spiritually to their new situation. In the *Third Philippic* Demosthenes' prime effort was to break down this spiritual resistance, and everything hinged on his success. Exposition of the technical means and possibilities of building up an armament belonged to a different stage of preparation; there was no place for it in a manifesto appealing exclusively to national will. Thus we may validly hold, as others have done, that in this speech Demosthenes' power as a politician reaches its peak. Like his earlier speeches against Philip, the oration is primarily a spiritual and moral achievement. In Demosthenes' soul *ethos* and *pathos* now join in a mighty alliance, marking the onset of a new era of spiritual and artistic expression in the history of the Greek spirit, an era that culminates, symbolically speaking, in the style of the Pergamene altar. The powerful and highly passionate expression that we find there bears the stamp of the violent struggle. It is in the sculptures of Scopas and, simultaneously, in the *Philippics* of Demosthenes that its deep shadows first appear. In the *Third Philippic* the soul of the Greek nation, which is at last beginning to find itself in the common will, though it has never heretofore taken on any

form politically, is here mirrored in language—not in the phrases of a patriotic holiday speaker, glamorous with the glory of a great past, but in the imperious call of destiny, leading the people once again out of the aimless clash of interests into a fellowship of action and of suffering.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE END

DEMOSTHENES' CHALLENGE to the whole of Greece in the *Third Philippic* preludes the final decision. The tremendous power of will that glows in it is irresistible, magical. Even today it stirs the reader in the quiet of his study and fires his blood. We feel that when these words were living speech they must have gripped the masses with their spell and made the cool skeptic and the intellectual feel a power in their effectiveness that intelligence could perhaps withstand, but which it would have been as vain to oppose as to fight against tempest and lightning. The real strength of the orator's words lies not in his temperament but in the *idea* that inspires him. The hurricane that this idea invokes *must* come to pass; and this hallowed *must* leaves no room for any political thinking confined to the accustomed grooves of safeguards and expedencies. While we may assume that the forces of opposition were now no less present than before and were even quietly effective, the extraordinary fact remains that they all had to slink into the background. Even in the Athenian democracy there was no longer any such freedom of speech as would encourage opposition to Demosthenes. The purely professional politicians had to efface themselves; while he, who had so often shown his superiority to them on their own ground, now revealed a greatness of an altogether higher dimension, rendering him uniquely fitted to lead the people at this moment of their history and to make their decisions for them. None of those who have felt compelled to criticize him after the event would have dared contradict him *then*; no one could have persisted in such criticism without putting himself quite outside the community of the Athenian state—out of all contact with that mighty will which, in the hour of destiny, again united it.

But even in other places than Athens neutral skepticism could not get a foothold. For, like every true storm, the movement that Demosthenes had started swept on through all the surrounding country, beginning in the immediate neighborhood with Megara and the island of Euboea, where the cities of Oreus and Eretria were under Philip's control. First an alliance was struck between Athens and Chalcis; then in the summer and autumn of 341 the Euboean tyrants, who had been ruling with Philip's support, were overthrown.^{1*} The *Third Philippic* had voiced a complaint that the rest of Greece had failed to do its part. In the expanded version of this speech, which has come down to us along with a shorter one (I think both are genuine), Demosthenes speaks of embassies to be sent to the Peloponnesus, to Rhodes and Chios, and even to the king of Persia, to call for resistance against the conqueror.² The states that had seceded in the Social War—Chios, Rhodes, and eventually Byzantium (which was mostly seriously threatened by Philip's progress in Thrace)—were now won back to the Athenian cause, partly through the services of Hyperides.³ These efforts were made in the autumn and winter of 341. Demosthenes himself went from city to city in the Peloponnesus, and his eloquence now succeeded where his embassy after the Peace of Philocrates had failed.⁴ Not only Corinth and Achaea went over to the Athenian side, but even Philip's vassals Messenia, Arcadia, and Argos. In March of the year 340 the treaty was formally concluded at Athens. It was a long time since Sparta had counted for much; accordingly Thebes, which, next to Thessaly, had so far been the most loyal of Philip's allies, was considered all the more important.⁵ In these matters progress was possible only a step at a time; but Demosthenes must have worked hard to effect his cherished ambition of making the irreconcilables, Athens and Thebes, join in his national program. He did not succeed

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 257-260.

until the very last; but once Thebes' Peloponnesian allies Messenia and Arcadia had been won over, the goal had become less remote, and its eventual achievement was inevitable.

The barriers of jealousy and selfishness dividing the Greek states now fell away one after another; and the nationalistic movement, kindled by the menace of the enemy and Demosthenes' rousing eloquence, accomplished things that for centuries had been inconceivable. The true greatness of these achievements—achievements for which the citizens of Athens honored Demosthenes with a golden crown at the Dionysia of 340—was rightly appreciated by the ancient historians.⁶ We cannot help making comparisons between this long and arduous struggle and the situation at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, when at the nod of Pericles the tremendous military and financial machinery of Athens and her allies was set in motion. How poor in contrast is the united Hellas of Demosthenes, how inadequate its material equipment for the war! And yet, how stirring is the moment when for the last time it raises itself from its weakness and vacillation in a finely heroic show of courage, and the tragic culmination of its consciousness of political unity, never any too strong, is at last attained. The moment of the Greeks' national awakening is also that of their national downfall. But can this prevent our recognizing that the man who was sent to the people in this hour and who led them onward to their fate, brought to pass, with a swift intuition of the absolute necessity of his act, an almost superhuman achievement, which in a period of rise would have lifted any other statesman to the stars?

While these things were going on in Greece, Philip was still in Thrace, where the war kept him fully occupied. To gain time, he sent threatening notes to Athens, setting forth his grievances and avowing that he was merely acting in defense of his own rights, though he branded his opponents as aggressors violating the rights of others. But if we consider

the rate at which the movement in Greece was gaining ground, these matters were of little consequence; and everyone knew that it was ridiculous to parley about incidentals when a state of war already existed. Philip could hardly have expected to find the Greek will for independence victorious in all the cities, and he was too good a politician to under-rate this new intangible adversary. He could see that it would not be hard for the Greek allies to send out an armed force quite as large as his own, or at best only slightly inferior; he could also see that in having the idea of liberty before them they would have an imponderable but mighty ally.⁷ Philip had the advantage of being unassailable as long as he stayed in Macedonia; this enabled him to choose his own moment for the decisive battle. Until then, of course, he was exposed to privateering and blockade by the hostile sea power; but his nerves were good enough to stand this test of his patience without getting ruffled. It was harder for him to determine just where the decisive encounter should take place. On the sea he was not the equal of the Greeks; and the attitude of his central Grecian allies was so obscure that it was extremely doubtful whether he could move his land army into Attica at once. It was not likely that he could induce the Thebans to join him in a campaign against all the other Greek states purely for Macedonia's advantage, or even that they would permit him to march through Boeotia.⁸

Demosthenes expected that Philip would attack one of those points outside of Attica where Athens could be most easily distressed, namely, either the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, to which Philip was just on the point of making his way with the Thracian expedition.⁹ The Chersonese was fairly well protected by the Athenian settlers and a body of troops under Chares; so it was easy to foresee that Philip would avoid this region on the Hellespont and make a direct attack on the Greek cities at the Bosphorus, particularly

Byzantium. By seizing these cities, he would get control of the outlet of the Black Sea, cutting off Athens' grain supply and crippling her trade. Demosthenes had to prevent this from becoming another Olynthus; and although Byzantium had hitherto been her own mistress and had always directed her policies against her Athenian competitors, she now threw herself into the arms of Athens out of sheer desperation, and Athens could do nothing else than give her support unreservedly. At the same time Demosthenes now hoped that if Philip should lay hands on the entire European shore of the Sea of Marmora, the Persian empire on the Asiatic side would be so alarmed as to give active assistance; for while it had hitherto taken no interest in these affairs, it was now definitely menaced by Philip's new front. Demosthenes' spies had informed him of a secret military agreement between Philip and Hermias of Atarneus, who had his residence on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont as the reigning vassal of Persia. In the *Fourth Philippic*, in 341, Demosthenes had already intimated a hope that the Persians might get wind of this conspiracy and thus be led shortly to join in the war against Philip.¹⁰ But he had overestimated the political farsightedness of the Persian government, no matter how easy it was to see what its interests demanded. For years Persia had had problems enough of her own to keep her occupied, and she had left the Greeks to themselves as long as no direct harm threatened her borders. But this very danger now became imminent when Philip surrounded the fortress of Perinthus on the Sea of Marmora and started laying siege to it. As this was the last station on the way to Byzantium, the Byzantines and the Persian satrap Arsites helped out by sending troops and provisions to Perinthus. Philip's assaults were vain. He at last saw his mistake and, leaving a garrison behind, proceeded to attack Byzantium itself.¹¹ On his way he succeeded in capturing a flotilla of Athenian merchant vessels; and as Byzantium could on no

account be left in the lurch, Athens now declared war openly and sent an auxiliary corps to Byzantium under Phocion. The defense was heroic. Though Philip exerted himself to the utmost, he was unable to take the city and was at last forced to abandon his straits campaign as fruitless.¹²

The conclusion of this first stage of the war was a great triumph for Demosthenes' policies, especially in comparison with the Greeks' shortcomings at the time of Philip's attack on Olynthus; for there had been no more need for the fall of Olynthus then than for that of Byzantium at present. Nevertheless, as soon as Philip's attack was parried at the Bosphorus, Persia lost all interest in the Greeks' war; this was a great misfortune, which must have brought a farsighted statesman like Demosthenes to the very brink of despair. Immediately afterward Philip went off to fight his barbarian neighbors over the border in the Balkans to the north. This was perhaps the cleverest thing he could have done to make his enemies feel secure. It kept him occupied; and if there was really going to be war in earnest between the Macedonians and the Greeks, then from the Persian point of view it would seem better to let them wear each other down than to attempt any further intervention in these affairs. Five years later the Persian empire paid the penalty for this attitude with its downfall. We need not conjecture what the course of history would have been if Persia had now followed her old tradition and, as in the times of Alcibiades and Conon, put herself resolutely on the side of Athens and her confederates. Had she fully seen the danger, she would always have been able to make serious difficulties for Philip by an alliance with the Greeks. The danger was one that Demosthenes had noticed in the *Fourth Philippic*:¹³ "If the Persian leaves us in the lurch and anything should happen to us, nothing will hinder Philip from attacking the Persian king." But the Persian did not have the intelligence to realize this, and therefore failed to take advantage of whatever real op-

portunities he may have had. Hellas had to carry on the fight for liberty quite alone, and went about it fully aware of the significance and the inner necessity of this decision, while the barbarians mooned on, torpidly inert, toward their approaching fate.

Philip's northern campaign gave Demosthenes time to complete the arming of Athens. He was appointed dictator of armaments with extraordinary powers—a new office, by virtue of which he put through a reorganization of the *symmories* for the outfitting of warships. In this way the real burden was made to fall on the three hundred wealthiest taxpayers. Their financial resources were stretched to the utmost, and even the surplus from the state treasury and the funds budgeted for public buildings were utilized for war purposes.¹⁴ It is hard for us to imagine the difficulties that had to be surmounted in domestic politics. The property-owning classes had always opposed the war; to overcome their resistance was one of Demosthenes' hardest tasks. For a man without his recognized incorruptibility and unimpeachable patriotism, it would have been impossible. We are reminded of the best periods of Athenian history when we realize the tremendous sacrifices to which he committed the men of wealth. The moment had now come when they not only had money but paid it, as Demosthenes had once said they would in his speech *On the Symmories*; and the very man who had then insisted that not a penny was to be had from the rich men for a useless war against a merely presumptive enemy, now succeeded in passing measures of Draconian severity when the real enemy was at the door. Even the old demand of the *Olynthiacs*, that the masses relinquish their theater money, was now put into effect, unpopular though it was.¹⁵

Obviously there is no falser or more one-sided explanation of Demosthenes' financial measures for making the big property holders pay up, than to regard these as simply a

matter of partisan politics. Even two years earlier, in the *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes had made a bold attack on social problems.¹⁶ This was quite in accord with his ambitious national demands, and he had recognized this connection clearly from the start. Athens was lost if the coming war was to be the concern of one class alone, whether poor or rich. Demosthenes must have admitted to himself that his unbounded faith in the good *Tyche* of Athens and of Greece could not all at once break down the inner reserve of that cultured and prosperous social stratum which the official class policies had long since alienated sharply from the state. He had to be content if everyone did his duty and no one tried to shirk. But what Demosthenes really wanted was something higher. A great moment of history had arrived; and he hoped that it would so impress the two hostile classes that he could bridge the gap between them, govern impartially, and unite all elements of the populace in the single ambition to forget social resentment and dedicate themselves with wholehearted loyalty to their country's cause. Though a great deal had been thought and written about the truly *just* state and its ideal structure, nothing had come of this but theories and ideals. And yet the inward disintegration had gone so far that before Athens could hope to stand the great test of the war, these ideals had somehow to be put into effect. The hour of the *nation* had arrived, and the strength it brought with it could not help furthering the achievement of what had hitherto seemed possible only in the airy nowhere of a philosophical Utopia. The program for domestic politics in the *Fourth Philippic* bears witness to the new spirit of social sacrifice that found its expression in the financial policies at the beginning of the war period. It thus well merits systematic examination such as it has not as yet received.

Meanwhile Philip was waiting for a favorable opportunity to intervene in Greek affairs so that he might have an excuse

to invade central Greece; for only by a great success on land could he hope to get out of his rather awkward situation, avoid being permanently hemmed in by the Athenian fleet, and determine the outcome of the war, possibly with a single stroke. For this purpose, as in 346, he made use of the Delphic Amphictyony. It happened somehow, perhaps under official provocation, that the delegate from Athens was insulted by the representatives of the Locrians, who were allied with Philip; this led to acts of violence between the Locrians and the populace of Delphi; and the Sacred Council of Pylagorae decreed that military steps should be taken against the Locrians. This decree was passed virtually on the instigation of the Athenian delegate himself, who was no other than Aeschines.¹⁷ For the sake of his honor we should like to assume that on this occasion he wanted to demonstrate again the correctness of his sentiments; for after serving as a delegate in the Delphic Council following the peace of 346, he had been accused of unpatriotic conduct. But even if this is so, he must have been blinded by his wish to play a leading part once more; for the decree of the Pylagorae could only result in calling upon Philip to put it into effect. When Aeschines' report was being read in the Assembly at Athens Demosthenes sprang to his feet, much perturbed, and cried out, "You are bringing the war right into the country, Aeschines, an Amphictyonic war!"; and Athens refused to ratify the decree. But it was already too late. Philip moved into central Greece with his army; and now Athens was suddenly faced with the necessity of a battle in the open field. Demosthenes had emphatically warned against this in the *Third Philippic* on the ground that the Athenians were no match for the Macedonians in military operations.¹⁸ He had then tried to show that the art of warfare had become greatly refined since the Deceleian war, when the Athenians had followed Pericles' policy, letting the enemy invade the country while bending all their energies to the city's defense; by

the time of the *Third Philippic* this would have been like pitching themselves headlong into an abyss. It is noteworthy that in estimating the prospects of a war against Philip in the *Third Philippic*, Demosthenes had exactly reversed his earlier estimate in the speech *On the Symmories*, when war with Persia had been in the offing. This is made all the more striking by the way in which he uses the same pair of concepts to characterize the war in each of these speeches: *ἀγών*, the mere soldierly trial of skill, and *πόλεμος*, war in the strict sense. At the time of Athens' complete financial exhaustion after the Social War, Demosthenes had advised against fighting Persia, even if in its military aspects the encounter should turn out to be no more than a chivalrous *ἀγών*, which Athens, as her officers then declared, would be perfectly able to stand; for he saw that any genuine war would require ships, money, and territory besides. By the time of the *Third Philippic*, however, Athens' situation had improved. Demosthenes had then believed that the easiest way to deal with Philip was by "war" in this very sense, namely, by blockading the enemy and making trouble for him in other ways along his own coast line; in an *ἀγών*, however, with the issue to be decided on the open field, the Athenians would have been no match for the Macedonian army with its up-to-date military technique. Their best policy, therefore, had been to avoid a battle with Philip, and to keep him bottled up in his own country. To be sure, a number of alliances had now been concluded since the time of the *Third Philippic*, and Athens' power had been appreciably strengthened. But Demosthenes' outcry at the news from Delphi¹⁹ proves that he still holds firmly to the view of the *Third Philippic* and is therefore extremely disturbed by Aeschines' rash performance. He intimates later that Aeschines was acting in the pay of Philip, so that Philip's march to the Attic border might result in the downfall of the anti-Macedonian régime in Athens and thus bring the

war to a swift and bloodless end. Be that as it may, it turned out otherwise. With lightninglike speed Philip occupied Elatea on the Boeotian border, thus becoming a direct menace to his own Theban allies, who had been unreliable for some time. In an incomparably dramatic and stirring description in his speech *On the Crown* Demosthenes has preserved the memory of this fearful moment when Athens was threatened with panic and dissolution.²⁰ The news was broken in the oppressive silence of the Assembly, and the herald called out, "Who wishes to take the floor?" But neither soldier nor politician arose. Then Demosthenes stepped to the platform and calmly explained to the people that this hour was one that had had to come; there was now no time to be lost. Athens was less in danger than Thebes; therefore he advised offering an alliance to the Thebans at once if they would align themselves definitely on the Athenian side; he urged furthermore that all men capable of bearing arms be sent to the border to strengthen the resolution of the more friendly of the Thebans against their pro-Macedonian opponents. He himself went to Thebes as an envoy, carrying all before him, despite the traditional hostility of the Thebans to Athens.²¹

Here politics ceased and arms decided. They decided against Demosthenes. After a few successful engagements, the Greeks (among them Demosthenes, serving as an ordinary hoplite) fought a losing battle at Chaeronea against Philip's army, steeled as it was by one long war after another. Demosthenes' old opponents Aeschines and Phocion reproached him for not seeking death in the battle. That would, in fact, have been a proper finish for a hero's life; and certainly it would have spared Demosthenes a great deal. But even if he did set his teeth and do his soldierly duty as well as any of his fellow citizens, his heroism was not of the sort to seek death at any price at Chaeronea. He was fanatically devoted to his ideal; and that ideal would not permit

him to die gloriously when there was still the faintest chance of its being realized. That he, who had always demanded inexorable soberness in the estimation of danger, was even now unable to stop believing in this possibility as in a miracle, despite his sense of the actual—just that was *his* form of tragedy. But how could it have been otherwise when his long years of dogged striving toward this single goal were all at once rendered futile by the almost inconceivably swift verdict of battle?

After the defeat, the Athenians set about fortifying their walls; they had resigned themselves to a siege, and Demosthenes lent his energies and his wealth to this immediate problem so symbolic of his entire existence from this time forth. He took his stand by the polis and resolved to defend it to the utmost. He expected that Athens would suffer the fate of Olynthus. But the really tragic thing was that the people's inner power of resistance was broken. It is almost inconceivable that the Athenians of this time could ever have come to take these last desperate defense measures; it is not that they were unprepared for a siege, but that they really preferred a change of leadership as a cheaper way of obtaining the indulgent terms of peace for which Philip had promptly had the cleverness to declare himself ready. At any rate, while he punished disloyal Thebes, he spared the "misguided" Athens. Naturally he could have no wish to stain his victory by using force against the preserver of Hellas' glorious traditions. He was shortly to go to Corinth and solemnly proclaim a Greek confederacy under Macedonian leadership; was this to be built upon the smoking shambles of the metropolis of Greek culture? If Athens, the Greeks' deliverer, were to be wiped off the map, would they have seen any point in his projected Persian expedition, which had no other historical justification than as an act of revenge on the barbarians for destroying this very Athens? In fact, the hardest task in his program for Greek politics

was to give Athens a place in the scheme; for this was not to be done by brute force. It was rather a psychological problem requiring the greatest tact; and Philip's discernment that this problem was not to be mastered all at once but called for patient handling over a long period, gives us no small idea of his political sagacity.

For historians of the old school, Greek history ended when the Greek states lost their political liberty; they looked upon it as a closed story, mounting to a heroic finish at Chaeronea. Modern scholars have replaced this conception with an ampler one, making this very moment the beginning of the period when Greek civilization really came to influence the world at large—the so-called Age of Hellenism. From this point of view Chaeronea becomes a meaningless incident, and Demosthenes' whole lifework a needless interruption of the irresistible march of fate. The personality of Philip, as the man who was instrumental in effecting this providence, is now raised to a gigantic stature; his human contour is blurred and merged inseparably with the shadow of the world-spirit itself, touching the clouds as it stalks over lands and peoples; while all those who felt themselves called upon to resist him dwindle to ugly little pygmies. Among these is Demosthenes. It now goes without saying that he was no politician; but was he even a patriot? The eminent Droysen, author of the *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, once laid this question before an unfortunate candidate in a doctoral examination; and he was certainly much astonished when this poor delinquent's healthy sentiments rebelled at the idea of delighting the great professor with a clear and pitiless *No*, and he ventured to assert that Demosthenes had been an ardent patriot, though he left to Droysen's omniscience the final Rhadamanthine verdict on the orator's political talents.²² There is no denying the amazing change. We must look on this as an inevitable result of a shift in the perspective; but today we ought to have advanced far enough to see that

perspectives are never absolute. From the standpoint of a later period Demosthenes is a passing episode on the way to cosmopolitanism and world empire; and nobody will deny that in this direction the Greek genius proved itself capable of even greater achievements, though it would gradually have worn itself out if it had retained its previous form of existence. But is it not surprising that those very persons who emphasize so strongly the historical necessity of this process have had no eye for the necessity of such a personality as that of Demosthenes and the heroism that goes with it? Does the reason perhaps lie in the fact that while they are quite able to conceive the dynamic necessity in history's material events they do not see clearly enough the organic necessity that has its roots in the spiritual structure of historical organisms?

Ever since the beginnings of higher civilization in Hellas, the Greek city-state had not only given life its outward frame; it had even determined the classical form of the Greeks' intellectual and moral existence as human beings. After the end of the fifth century it began to lose its hold, and this process was visible to the deeper-seeing men of the time in many symptoms of inner decay. No one painted the contrast between the present and the great past of Greece in more tragic colors than did Demosthenes. But the more vivid this past was to him and to all his more discerning contemporaries, not as a mere shadowy historical memory, but as the very inner form and substance of their being, so much the less could they think of tamely abandoning the outward stability of the city-state to the first serious danger that menaced it from without. This was by no means a question of farsightedness or of shortsightedness, but one of self-defense, of their sense of freedom and their strength of will. For if any non-Greek power, whether Persian or Macedonian, were to achieve world dominion, the typical form of the Greek state would suffer death and destruction. This might

escape an ethical rationalist like Isocrates, but not a full-blooded man like Demosthenes, who kept his feet on the ground. Demosthenes felt that the city-state was the *conditio sine qua non* of Hellenic existence, and he so defended it. His political thinking thus had a fixed objective. From his point of view there would have been no farsightedness in thinking beyond this objective, but rather betrayal both of himself and of the very substance of Greek political life; and anyone who did not feel this just as passionately as he did was either a degenerate or a regrettable fool, but certainly no great spirit ahead of his times.

It is impossible for the modern observer not to take sides when he contemplates the struggle in which Demosthenes consumes himself. The whole period is rent asunder, and the fissure runs through our own souls as well. Greek liberty has fallen; and above its ruins rises the new world of Hellenism. This, with its supranational character, its cosmopolitan culture and religion, its release of the spirit from the ties of the soil, from sectionalism, even from nationalism, has become the prerequisite basis for the world religion of Christianity as well as for the universal philosophy and science without which our present-day culture could not have arisen. But the Greeks purchased this gain in spiritual breadth at the cost of losing their traditional substantiality, the roots of their national existence, and their wholeness of body and soul. Granted that the time was then ripe for this development, which first made Greece capable of enriching the world at large, and that Greek culture first reached us in this universal form, nevertheless the more consciously we ourselves strive to give intellectual and political expression to our own national character, the closer kinship we feel toward the Greece of the earlier period. Demosthenes' fight is deathless, though he fought for a mortal nation. Only when the great historical forms of society are nearing their end do they develop that inner consciousness and will for self-preservation

that enables them to continue influencing humanity even after their downfall, by a supreme spiritual quality not to be acquired in other ways. This, indeed, is almost a law of the human spirit; and this is what happened to the classical form of the Greek state, the polis. Not until the moment of its greatest danger did it find its permanent spiritual form: philosophically in the *Republic* and *Laws* of Plato, politically in the speeches of Demosthenes.

But let us return to history. Anyone who had assured himself that the Macedonian hegemony would lead to the inner unification of the Greeks, was bound to be disappointed. Philip surrounded Athens with four Macedonian garrisons placed at respectful distances, and left everything else to his supporters and agents in the cities. The cities, indeed, now had ostensible autonomy. This old formula of the Peace of Antalcidas was dear to the Greeks, and he granted it to them readily. But the guarantor of this autonomy was to be Macedonia herself: if there should ever be any insurgence or revolution in the cities, she had the right to demand that the alliance be made effective. This was essentially the basis of the new régime in Hellas. Philip had promptly followed up his victory by summoning delegates from all the Greek states to a conference at Corinth, at which the new system was given a permanent constitutional form. He here turned Isocrates' ideas to account, though of course in Macedonia's favor. Philip did not go so far as to annex Greece; but he saw to it that all the states in the peninsula joined in an alliance entirely under his control. Isocrates' ideals also received some recognition in the pronounced aim of this alliance, solemnly proclaimed at the time of its founding; for the first resolution passed by the Synedrion was the declaration of war against Persia.²³ The difference was that this war of conquest, which was passionately described as a war of vengeance, was not looked upon as a means of uniting the Greeks, as Isocrates would have had it, but was

merely an instrument of Macedonian imperialism. Philip had seen clearly that he could not achieve world dominion, still less preserve it, without the aid of Greek culture; and in employing this implement, he gave it a new significance in history. But although the Greek people thus came to play a uniquely influential rôle as pioneers of culture and, to that degree, as inheritors of the Macedonian empire, politically they had simply dropped out of the ranks of free peoples, even if Philip abstained from formally making Hellas a Macedonian province. The Greeks were themselves aware of this. Outwardly, the "autonomous" city-states kept their relations with Macedonia on a fairly strict level of rectitude. Inwardly, the time was one of dull pressure and smoldering distrust, flaring up to a bright flame at the least sign of any tremor or weakness in Macedonia's alien rule—for that is how her surveillance was generally regarded. This excruciating state of affairs continued as long as any hope remained. Only when the last ray of hope was extinguished and the last uprising had met disaster, did quiet finally settle down upon Greece—the quiet of the graveyard.

During this time Demosthenes was politically isolated. It took courage to entrust him with the *Funeral Oration* for those who had fallen at Chaeronea; but although the genuineness of the speech that has come down to us under this title has recently been defended with new arguments in the light of many significant details, we do not recognize in it the real Demosthenes.²⁴ The strength of his soul somehow seems to have been paralyzed. From this time on he was forced to relinquish the field of public life to his old antagonist Aeschines. But consider what sort of public life this was! To play a leading rôle in it could no longer have given him any satisfaction. Not until Aeschines attempted to reconstruct the past, viewing it from a dismal present,—and started a controversy over the subject of history's final verdict on Demosthenes that has lasted even to our own day,

—not until then did Demosthenes once more raise himself out of the anguish of his inner struggle with brutal reality and stand up for his actions once again. Ctesiphon had moved that Demosthenes be awarded a golden crown, and Aeschines had prosecuted him for this motion. Thereupon Demosthenes, stepping before the court in Ctesiphon's defense, laid his hand on the crown, which his opponent hoped to wrest from him under the protection of Macedonian arms. The situation is tremendously symbolical. Just as Aeschines' speech of accusation reviews the whole range of Demosthenes' policies, Demosthenes' own speech *On the Crown* is necessarily a defense of everything he has done from the very beginning of his political career. Already several years have elapsed since the murder of Philip and the bloody episode in which the young Alexander suppressed the Greeks' first great uprising. From Asia, whither the young conqueror has led both Macedonians and Greeks in his whirlwind advance, come romantic tidings of Greek victories over the Persians and the collapse of the empire of the Achaemenids. The Greeks listen with astonishment, but are at bottom unconcerned. What is happening so far away is none of their business. But when after long postponement Aeschines' suit against Ctesiphon comes up for trial in Athens, all Greece pricks up its ears and people stream from every part of the country to watch this great spectacle, which has been called the battle of the orators, and which is much more than a battle of words. Here, on the ideal plane of history, in accusation and defense, they watch with passionate concern the reënactment of their fateful tragedy.

Again the scenes of the drama pass before them, each hotly contested. Again the Pnyx resounds with the power and passion of the *Philippics*, long since silenced, but now imbued with tragedy. A while ago the great question was, *What ought we to do?* This now has shifted to the preterit, *What ought we to have done?*²⁵ The new question is even harder

to answer, for now the problem is how to accept a fate that has already been decided against those who elected it. Demosthenes describes the difficult situation that he faced at the beginning of his activity as a statesman—the gathering dangers, the Greeks' unsuspecting attitude, the venality and the cowardice of the leaders. And it was he who had taken his place on the political front and tried to arouse some feeling of what Athens owed to herself.²⁶ Or was this an error? Ought she perhaps to have put herself in the same class as the Thessalians and Dolopians, by helping Philip to carry out his plans?

“What was our city to do, Aeschines, when she saw how Philip was trying to establish his tyrannous dominion over the Greeks? Or what should I, as counselor in Athens, have said or proposed,... I who knew that up to the very day when I took my place on the platform, my country had always striven for the first prize of honor and renown, . . . I who saw how Philip himself, the man against whom we were fighting, was so bent on sovereignty and power that he had even let his eye be gouged out, his collarbone broken, his hand and his leg disabled—had indeed given up every member of his body that it was *Tyche's* pleasure to take from him—simply and solely that honor and renown might be his for the rest of his life? And certainly no one will dare say that it would have been fitting for this man, brought up in Pella,—an insignificant little hole of a place at the time,—to become so high-minded as to conceive a desire for the sovereignty of Greece, while you Athenians, who have before you every day the monuments of your ancestors' greatness in every word you hear and in every thing you see, should have been so depraved as to betray your liberty to Philip by your own deliberate offer. Surely no one would say that. Thus the one thing left for you to do, and the necessary thing to do, was to oppose in the name of justice all his acts of injustice. This you have done from the first, as was right and

fitting; and I was the man who proposed this and kept advising it, as long as I was active in politics. I acknowledge it freely. But what else ought I to have done? I ask you that."

The statesman is free to make decisions as long as he remains an active volitional agent, even if circumstances confine his volition within definite bounds. This is a sentiment that Demosthenes has often expressed in the *Philippics*. But time transmutes the uncertainty of the present into the rigid and unalterable certainty of the past. There is a moment when man comes face to face with his own earlier willing and doing as items of history; he then sees them as necessary, and as part of the whole course of events in which he has been involved as a volitional agent. This translation from the imperative into the preterit, this projective transformation from the plane of the ethical mandate into the inescapable necessity of events, is the metamorphosis that Demosthenes performs on his own life and work in the speech *On the Crown*. In the drama of the *Philippics* he has taken an active part; in the speech *On the Crown* he is the hero who has broken the rules of the theater by surviving the catastrophe, and now relives his tragedy in retrospect. He sees the looming fate that was to be his heritage from the time of his very first entrance.²⁷ He sees the inexorable power of the past that has made it impossible for him as an Athenian statesman to relinquish tamely the ancestral prestige of his fatherland to an opponent hitherto regarded with little respect. But Demosthenes has also learned to make his listeners feel the enemy's demonic greatness with the admiration of genuine hate, a feat that no subsequent historian has ever had the sheer poetic power to accomplish.²⁸ Again we feel that sense of the omnipotence of *Tyche* which has been present at every moment of the great crucial orations. But this is not the goddess who floats by on a sphere, stretching out her hand to mortals that they may seize it with renewed hope; it is rather that "senseless *Tyche*" whom we meet in

the tragedies of Euripides, the *Tyche* who frustrates all man's wit by her inconstancy.²⁹ But the oration is not all tuned to this pitch. It traces Demosthenes' whole development: his youth and school days, his civic life, his sacrifices for the state, his ardent love for Athens. It scourges the mores of the times and the corruption of the politicians. The old consuming hatred mounts to new levels of distortive power, even to the point of the bizarre; and Aeschines is blasted with its lightnings—that same Aeschines who had provoked this one last contest in the confident expectation that his own superior insight would enjoy a belated triumph, with Demosthenes at last fallen, confuted by history itself. But though Athens was powerless against the might of her Macedonian conqueror, she retained her independence of judgment and declared that no history could confute Demosthenes. So at the very time when the last king of the Persians was losing both battle and empire to Alexander at Arbela, Demosthenes came before the public tribunal of Athens as a victor and received the crown, while his opponent, defeated, left Athens forever.

But the tragedy was not yet finished, even if Demosthenes had supposed so in his speech *On the Crown*. The fates that we encounter in real life often run their course more slowly than those of the theater. Nothing is more terrible than this lingering inner malady constantly interrupted by new flashes of hope. When Alexander's chief treasurer, Harpalus, absconded with the rich spoils of Asia and sought refuge in Athens, there seemed to be an opportunity, the first since the murder of Philip, to organize a revolt throughout Greece while the conqueror was busied with his Oriental campaign. After the first negotiations Demosthenes saw that the project was hopeless, and fell out with his old comrades in regard to it; whereupon they assailed him with ugly defamations and brought suit against him. He was imprisoned, but escaped and lived on Aegina for several years as an exile.

Then when Alexander suddenly died in the flower of his age, and Greece rose again for the last time, Demosthenes offered his services and returned to Athens. But after winning a few brilliant successes, the Greeks lost their admirable commander Leosthenes on the field of battle; and his successor was slain at Crannon on the anniversary of Chaeronea; the Athenians then capitulated, and, under pressure of threats from Macedonia, suffered themselves to condemn to death the leaders of the "revolt." Demosthenes' old comrades Hypereides and Himeraeus were seized by the Macedonians and executed in Thessaly; he, however, had meanwhile sought asylum at the altar of Poseidon's temple on the little island of Calauria. He was there surrounded by the enemy's spies, and died by a dose of poison that he had kept concealed in his stylus.

Thus the heroic but ill-starred struggle of his life finally came to a fitting close. In the true sense, his life was a whole. It had been dominated by one supreme ideal—one that no longer appealed to all his contemporaries, but one that he was utterly unable to renounce: that of his people, his country, and their liberty. In him the Greek spirit revealed for the last time the latent power of this ideal. How could anyone fail to marvel at this tenacious strength of will, which no mere fate could break? We see it again in the extreme tension of feature in the great portrait with which Athens, forty years later, honored him for eternity. It is ennobled by his grandeur of spirit and vitalized by the inner fire of the one great passion that possessed him. But it is ennobled even more by the consecration of the suffering that spreads its shadow over the nervous countenance, so deeply grooved with care.

ISOCRATES' ORATION FOR THE PLATAEANS,
AND THE SECOND CONFEDERACY

THE DATE of Isocrates' oration *For the Plataeans* cannot be determined exactly; its *terminus post quem* is the destruction of Plataea, an event which Diodorus (XV 46, 6) places in the year 374-3, and Pausanias (IX 1, 8) in 373-2. There are no cogent arguments by which this much vexed problem can be settled. The oration has recently been given a searching treatment by G. Matthieu in his *Les idées politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris 1925), p. 87. Matthieu rightly insists that even though the speech is put into the mouth of a citizen of Plataea after the destruction of the city, it is really a political pamphlet like other Isocratean speeches, and need not have been intended for delivery before the Athenian Assembly or the Synedrion of the allies as an actual discussion of Theban encroachments, as it professes. Here the *Nicocles* and the *Archidamus* are sufficient parallels.

But Matthieu goes on to make this a reason for changing the date of the speech, and tries to fit it into the background of the peace conference at Sparta in 371 on the ground that many of the political views that Isocrates here expresses seem to be connected with the ideas which we find in Callistratus' speech at that conference (Xen. *Hell.* VI 3, 10 ff.). Here I cannot agree. I feel, on the whole, that Matthieu goes too far in his systematic attempt to bring Isocrates into close touch with practical politics as far as possible, as if the rhetor could hardly have failed to take a stand of his own at each of the more important turning points in the political development. Matthieu hopes to find in the speech *For the Plataeans* a presentation of Isocrates' own views on the situation up for discussion at Sparta in 371, as I have said; and this enables him to trace back to Isocrates the policies

of Callistratus at the Spartan peace conference. I do not think this is correct either. Isocrates is by no means a practical politician in the sense in which this can be said of Callistratus or of Philip of Macedon later on; and I feel that the rather laborious effort to construct a continuous line of Isocrates' political development from the *Panegyricus* to the *Plataïcus* has little chance of success. The original program of Panhellenic unification in an expedition against Persia, worked out in the *Panegyricus*, is altogether visionary, and the rhetor's position in the *Plataïcus* expresses throughout the normal particularistic policies of Athens at the time of the second confederacy; there is no royal road leading from the one to the other. Moreover, any attempt to connect the program of the confederacy and its founders with the *Panegyricus*—and such an attempt is demanded by this interpretation—is inevitably doomed to failure. It will not do to overlook all those ideas in the *Panegyricus* which cannot be reconciled with the policies of the confederacy, while one singles out the one item in the speech—Athens' claim for maritime hegemony—that happens to fit in with them.

What Isocrates' connection with the leading men of the confederacy actually was, is best shown in the valuable report of the author of the biographies of the ten orators (Pseudo-Plut. 837 C):... Τιμόθεος ὁ Κόνωνος, σὺν ᾧ καὶ πολλὰς πόλεις ἐπῆλθε συντιθεὶς τὰς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου πεμπομένας ἐπιστολάς· ὅθεν ἐδωρήσατο αὐτῷ τάλαντον τῶν ἀπὸ Σάμου περιγενομένων. Matthieu (p. 84) ought not to object to dating these journeys of Isocrates in the year 365, as he himself considers doing, instead of putting them at the time of the beginning of the second confederacy, with Drerup and Münscher; for these journeys cannot be dissociated from the time of the expulsion of the Samians, with which Pseudo-Plutarch explicitly connects them. It is about as clear as it can be, that the *Plataïcus* also was written to order. That is what differentiates it basically from the rhe-

torical ideology of the *Panegyricus* with its blend of the grandiose and the unreal. The art of the speech is made to subserve a quite concrete political situation—the situation brought about by the Thebans' arbitrary destruction of the Boeotian city Plataea "in the midst of the peace" (i.e., the peace of 374), and by the Plataeans' plea for assistance from Athens, where the exiles found asylum. It would be turning everything topsy-turvy to suppose that merely because Isocrates saw in Thebes an obstacle to Greek unity he decided to take a hand in this affair and thus gave Athens' confederative policies the decidedly anti-Theban twist that led to the peace of 371; and this is just what happens if one follows Matthieu in regarding the oration *For the Plataeans* as part of a deliberate campaign to carry out in practice the program laid down in the *Panegyricus*.

It can, however, be shown that the *Plataïcus* must have been written quite soon after the destruction of Plataea, and that it is wrong to think of Isocrates as waiting till some years later and then resorting to the fiction of a complaint against Thebes provoked by that outrage; for by this time the first indignation had presumably subsided, and a much larger problem was up for discussion: the problem of the united Boeotian state, the very issue that actually led to the withdrawal of Thebes from the peace conference of 371. The *Plataïcus* is not concerned with Thebes' position in the congress of all the Greek states, but with her status in the Athenian confederacy just after she has violated her obligations as a member. This is a purely internal affair. And although the Athenians are already becoming increasingly alarmed by Thebes' efforts to secure political guardianship of the Boeotian towns, there is as yet no fear that Thebes might make bold to withdraw from the confederacy if she should be called to account because of the Plataean episode. When Isocrates mentions this possibility (which the pro-Theban politicians in Athens will turn to account in recom-

mending an indulgent attitude toward Thebes), he does so only to show that it is not worth taking seriously (*Plat.* 33-38). This could hardly have still been the attitude of the Athenian delegation in 371 at the time of its departure for Sparta; on the contrary, Callistratus was by then firmly resolved to jettison Thebes should the peace conference run afoul of the project for a united Boeotian state.

By that time Thebes' forcible unification of Boeotia had gone considerably farther than at the time of the *Plataicus*. In 371, as Xenophon reports (*Hell.* VI 3, 1), not only was the destruction of Plataea a *fait accompli*, but the inhabitants of Thespieae had also been driven from their city by Thebes. In *Plat.* 9, however, Isocrates tells us merely that, at the time of the speech, Thebes had forced the Thespians and Tanagraeans *εἰς τὰς Θήβας συντελεῖν*. This was the first step toward the end of the independence; but they had as yet by no means become *ἀπόλιδες*, as Xenophon characterizes their condition at the beginning of the peace negotiations of 371. Indeed *Plat.* 13 presupposes that at the time of the fall of Plataea there was still a Lacedaemonian garrison in Thespieae to protect the inhabitants against Thebes. Callistratus' policy, which led to the abandonment of Thebes in the peace conference of 371, did not really take definite shape until the events at Plataea, and at first amounted to nothing more than a firm resolve to countenance no arbitrary special action on the part of Thebes.

This decision finds expression in the *Plataicus*; and evidently it was in order to smooth the way for this, both in Athens and in confederacy circles, that the brochure was written. As the founding of the second confederacy had not brought the realization of Isocrates' Panhellenic ideals any nearer, but had actually made it more remote, he had no reason for dissatisfaction with his new rôle; for this brought him, for the very first time, into contact with the actual politics of the Athenian state. It is tempting to conjecture that

the honor of this commission was procured for him by his friend and pupil Timotheus. If it was, there will be some probability in Diodorus' statement that the destruction of Plataea occurred in 374-3 under the archonship of Socratides; for in November, 373, the trial of Timotheus, which led to his recall as commander-in-chief, was held in Athens. Isocrates' detailed account of the achievements of his pupil and his tragic fall (*Antid.* 101-139) shows, even after two decades, how much he himself had been affected by this blow. It is hardly to be supposed that immediately after the event he would have felt any inclination to write for Callistratus, who had revealed himself to be an enemy of Timotheus at that critical time.

NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹ Karl Julius Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III 1, 2d ed., §§ xiii-xiv. Naturally I have no intention of discussing the entire body of literature on Demosthenes.

² A fairer and more understanding estimate of Demosthenes is given by Pickard-Cambridge in *The Cambridge Ancient History* VI (1927), pp. 221 ff.

³ In the historical works of E. Curtius, K. J. Beloch, and Eduard Meyer, and in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, which deal primarily with political history, this realization forces its way to the surface, and a number of paragraphs are inserted to give a cross-sectional survey of the intellectual and spiritual development. But whereas the famous chapters on cultural history in Mommsen's history of Rome well serve their purpose, it is quite impossible to treat culture as a mere appendix when we are dealing with Greek history. The inner development of the Greek spirit is substantially one with the political fate of the nation. This is never more true than in the fourth century, though this is the very period when politics strives hardest for specialization. But this only makes the close interconnection more evident.

⁴ Friedrich Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* III 1 ("Demosthenes"), 2d ed. (Leipzig 1893). This work is of fundamental importance for all questions of rhetorical form. If it fails to touch the problem of form in the deeper sense of the word, the reason is that it too much judges Demosthenes by a later school rhetoric already rigidly schematized, and measures his speeches by standards of that sort.

⁵ This, and no mere striving for material completeness or supplementing of previous literature (e.g., Hellanicus), is the deeper reason for the insertion of the so-called *Pentecontaetia* in Thuc. I 89-118.

⁶ Thuc. I 73-78.

⁷ Thuc. I 75, 3: ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. This is emphasized in what follows. Isocrates gives a plausible simplification of the thought of this Thucydidean passage in *Areop.* 6: διὰ τὸ δεδιέναι . . . ἐπρώτευσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων. His

thought is full of Thucydidean ideas in spite of being so far removed from Thucydides on the whole.

⁸ Thuc. I 77, 6.

⁹ Cf. my *Paideia* I, p. 496. This is a clear *vaticinium ex eventu*. Pausanias' outrageous conduct toward the rest of the Greeks in his activity outside of Sparta after the Persian War, to which the orator refers, has already been brought up in connection with Lysander and his harmosts and their excesses after the Peloponnesian War.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* II 2, 19.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* II 4, 30.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* III 5, 8-15. I do not know whether anyone has as yet noticed the fact of the complete parallelism between this speech with its leitmotiv and the speech of the Athenian in Thuc. I 77, 6. This parallelism cannot be other than deliberate. To mention but one example, we may point out how Xenophon connects his history with the episode of the Melians in Thuc. V 84-115, when dealing with the imminent fall of Athens in *Hell.* II 2, 10. Even if one does not see this in Xenophon's general formulation in § 10, the immediately preceding section prevents any misunderstanding; for there Lysander's recolonization of the Melians is referred to expressly. When, in the very same breath, Xenophon makes the Athenians dread the fate of the Melians for themselves, his insistence on this change of rôles is unmistakably a reference to the argument of the Melians in Thuc. V 90 that it is to the interest of the Athenians to let equity reign, as they might easily find themselves in the same situation (καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν οὐχ ἥσσον τοῦτο ὅσω καὶ μεγίστη τιμωρία σφαλόντες ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γένοισθε). This prophecy is now fulfilled. We may conclude from these observations that Xenophon regards his work as continuing that of Thucydides in more than the mere fact that it joins on to the earlier work at a definite point of time. It is obvious that in such passages as these he has striven for unity with Thucydides not only in his description of events, but in his inner attitude as well. This gives us a serious problem to consider: How far does he really keep to the spirit of Thucydides in this effort to give meaning to his subject-matter? where else does this effort reveal itself? and how far was it possible for Xenophon to achieve this objective?

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* III 5, 10.

¹⁴ Cf. Thuc. I 69, 1; II 8, 4; V 9, 9.

¹⁵ Thuc. I 10, 2. The well-known prevailing opinion is that this passage and the entire *archaeologia*, in which it appears, belong to the earliest portions of Thucydides' work. For a different suggestion cf. my *Paideia* I, p. 485. I intend to return to this problem elsewhere at greater length.

¹⁶ It is striking how our ancient sources overlook the economic problem of liquidating the war. That it costs money to run a war was as true in Greece as it is today. Moreover, the fact that wars arise from economic causes was recognized from the first. But in the Greek classical period the principle of reparations, by which the victor makes the vanquished economically responsible, was absent. This gives the economic situation after the Peloponnesian War a complexion quite different from that which modern analogies would lead us to expect. From the very moment that the treaty was concluded, Athens could devote all her natural energies to the problem of reconstruction.

¹⁷ Thuc. II 65, 12-13.

¹⁸ Thuc. III 82-84.

¹⁹ The great Athenian statesmen are criticized in *Gorgias* 503c and more particularly in 515c ff., 518b-519a. For Socrates as "the one true statesman," see *Gorgias* 521d; for "the true politics," 521a.

²⁰ Cf. my *Paideia* I, pp. 405 ff., on the sophists and the crisis of the state. The sophist discussed in my text is the so-called Anonymus Iamblichi, first discovered by F. Blass, *Kieler Universitätsprogramm*, January 27, 1889. The text may be found in H. Diels' *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* II; there is a valuable commentary by Richard Roller: *Untersuchungen zum Anonymus Iamblichi* (Diss. Tübingen 1931). Cf. especially chapter 7 (Diels) on *εὐνομία* as the basis for both private and community life. It is interesting to note how the writer emphasizes the importance of civil authority for economic stability and for the return of economic confidence. We tend to contrast this attitude rather sharply with Plato's effort to build up a purely ideal basis for the laws, working from within outward; but the connection between economics and the state must have been a burning issue at the time.

Even the Doric-writing author of the *Δισσοὶ λόγοι* (I, 8) (Diels, *Vors.* II, 4th ed., p. 335) shows how the war has led to entirely new ethical problems, making express reference to Sparta's victory.

²¹ Cf. my "Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Plato" (1924). (The article is reprinted without change in *Die Antike* X, 1934).

²² βίος ξενικός καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος (Arist. *Pol.* VII 2, 1324a 16). The ἀποδιδόναι ἅν τις τι παρά του λάβῃ, which is the whole of justice according to the old and wealthy Cephalus (Plato *Resp.* 331b-c), is characteristic of the metic's attitude toward his social obligations.

²³ Plato *Epistle VII*, 326a-b. The phrase λέγειν ἡναγκάσθην in this passage does not refer to the well-known written formulation of the same idea in the *Republic*, but to oral communications. Cf. *Gnomon* IV (1928), p. 9.

²⁴ This view of the moral and intellectual movement that began with Plato and Socrates has only recently become established. Even in Wilamowitz' great work on Plato (1919), Plato's political experiments were regarded as mere episodes in the course of his life; and it was quite characteristic that such a historian as Beloch should deal with Plato only in his summary chapter on the rise of science, without going into either the *Republic* or the *Laws*. The ephemeral nature of all such paper dissection, which cuts across the living tissues of history, ought to be clear enough today. Cf. E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1925), as well as my own studies "Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Plato" (1924, reprinted in *Die Antike* X, 1934) and "Platos Stellung im Aufbau der griechischen Bildung" (*Die Antike* IV, 1928), especially §§ 2 and 3. Naturally it is impossible to give here a complete account of all the work that has been done on these matters.

²⁵ The fragments of the tragedies of the tyrant Dionysius are collected in Nauck's *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, 2d ed., 1889, p. 793. Cf. *Frg.* 4: ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς ἀδικίας μήτηρ ἔφν.

²⁶ Cf. *Die Antike* X, pp. 11 ff. Thucydides brings out in various ways the inner contradiction in the life of the contemporary state, in its vain effort to identify might and right. This is, indeed, one of his basic insights. Cf. especially the dialogue of the Athenians and Melians in *Thuc.* V 84-115.

²⁷ Cf. H. Gomperz, "Isokrates und die Sokratik," in *Wiener Studien* XXVII (1905), pp. 163 ff., and XXVIII (1906), pp. 1 ff.

²⁸ See the fragments of the *Olympicus* in Diels, *Vors.* II, Frg. B 7-8a. Cf. A 1, 4.

²⁹ Cf. the criticism of Sparta's domination in Isocr. *Paneg.* 110 ff.

³⁰ Cf. Theopompus in the thirteenth book of the *Philippica* (*F. Gr. Hist.*, Frg. 105 Jacoby) and the note *ad loc.* II D, pp. 374-375.

³¹ There is no doubt that the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates, so far as it deals exclusively with Athens' claims to a share in managing the politics of Greece, has some importance as representing the sentiments of the whole generation that founded the second confederacy, and not merely those of such an individual as Timotheus, Isocrates' favorite pupil. The *Panegyricus* seeks not only to put the most favorable light on Athens' historical services to Hellas, but also—and significantly—to disarm any criticism of the Athens of the period of the Peloponnesian War. Cf. Georges Matthieu, *Les idées politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris 1925), p. 74. Matthieu believes that the *Panegyricus* should be brought into direct connection with the political aims of the second confederacy; and Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen* II, pp. 380 ff.) makes no bones about speaking of the *Panegyricus* as simply the "program" of the confederacy. But this will not stand up under careful examination. Cf. my appendix "Isocrates' Oration *For the Plataeans* and the Second Confederacy," where I have shown the difference between Isocrates the ideologue and Isocrates the tool of the practical politicians.

³² Cf. Callistratus' great speech for the policy of mutual understanding at the peace conference at Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* VI 3, 10 ff.).

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹ Cf. Plato *Resp.* I 329c.

² Cf. the detailed treatment of Demosthenes' youth and the ancient testimonia regarding it in Arnold Schaefer's *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* I, pp. 235 ff., and in Friedrich Blass' *Die attische Beredsamkeit* III 1, 2d ed., pp. 10 ff.

³ For the guardians, see Demosth. *Aphob.* I 4. For the contemptuous epithet "Scythian," see Aeschines III 172 and Dinarchus *Adv. Demosth.* 15.

⁴ For Aristotle's will, see Diog. Laert. V 11-16, particularly § 13: ἐπιμελείσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους καὶ Νικάνορα, μνησθέντας ἐμοῦ, καὶ Ἑρπυλλίδος . . . τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἐὰν βούληται ἄνδρα λαμβάνειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀναξίῳ ἡμῶν δοθῇ. In Demosth. *Phorm.* 8 we may find an analogue to the will of the elder Demosthenes, who gives his wife's hand to a designated man in the event of his death: ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ὁ Πασίων ἐτετελευτήκει ταῦτα διαθέμενος, Φορμίων οὐτοσὶ τὴν μὲν γυναῖκα λαμβάνει κατὰ τὴν διαθήκην τὸν δὲ παῖδ' ἐπετρόπευεν. This act resembles that of the elder Demosthenes in the further respect that the second husband simultaneously becomes guardian of the children.

⁵ Demosth. *Aphob.* I 11.

⁶ Demosth. *Aphob.* I 7.

⁷ The inventory of the estate and the balance sheet were checked over and subjected to criticism by Buermann in *Neue Jahrbücher für das klass. Altertum* CXI (1875), pp. 800 ff. Otto Schulthess attacked Buermann in some detail in *Programm Frauenfeld*, 1899: "Die Vormundschaftsrechnung des Demosthenes."

⁸ Cf. Plato *Resp.* VIII 558b.

⁹ The will itself had disappeared. Cf. *Aphob.* I 40.

¹⁰ Demosth. *Onet.* I 10.

¹¹ Of the three speeches *Against Aphobus* that have come down to us, the third is often regarded as spurious. The problem needs a new approach. This has since been made successfully by G. M. Calhoun, *Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc.* LXV (1934), pp. 80-102. F. Blass (*op. cit.* p. 232) eventually gave a rather thoroughgoing discussion of it. Cf. also E. Drerup, *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik* (Paderborn 1916), p. 48, n. 46. This is an important mat-

ter because of the evidence in the third speech as to the outcome of the trial.

¹² For what follows, cf. especially the first speech *Against Onetor*.

¹³ Cf. Demosth. *Onet.* I 6; also *Mid.* 77 ff.

¹⁴ As to the twenty-four books of the *Laws* of Theophrastus, cf. Eduard Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* III 2, 3d ed., p. 865, and H. Usener in *Rheinisches Museum* XVI, pp. 470 ff.

¹⁵ Cf. my *Aristotle* (English ed., Oxford 1934), pp. 19 ff.

¹⁶ As to the study of the Solonic *axones* and their glosses as a branch of the Sophists' teaching, see Aristophanes *Daitaleis* Frg. XV (A. Meineke, *Fragmenta poet. comoediae ant.* II 2, pp. 1031-1033). For the study of the laws as winding up the education of a normal citizen, see Plato *Protag.* 326d. It is not easy to discover from Demosthenes' speeches the nature and extent of his theoretical training. We merely feel it in their high intellectual plane and their formal rigor; Demosthenes does not make a show of the fruits of his reading as does the author of the first speech *Against Aristogeiton*, who copies out a whole Sophistic tract *περὶ νόμων*. Cf. Max Pohlenz, "Anonymus *Περὶ νόμων*," in *Nachrichten der Göttinger Ges. d. Wiss.*, 1924, pp. 19 ff. An attempt to prove the genuineness of this speech has been made by C. H. Kramer: *De priore Demosthenis adv. Aristogitonem oratione*, Diss. Leipzig 1930.

¹⁷ Cf. the basic work of Eduard Norden in *Die antike Kunstprosa* I 1, chap. 1. The scope of this book is elsewhere deliberately confined to a discussion of those external formal devices of Greek literary prose which have been utilized with observable constancy through the centuries. Cf. p. 16: "Es handelt sich für uns also darum, die drei wesentlichsten Charakteristika der Kunstprosa auf ihre Ursprünge zu verfolgen: die Gorgianischen Redefiguren, die mit poetischen Worten ausgestattete Prosa, die rhythmische Prosa." Such a work needs to be supplemented with one depicting the artistic individualities of the chief prose writers and the whole development of oratorical style. In a history of this latter type Demosthenes would have a leading place, whereas in Norden's work he receives very scant attention. But no one could write such a history of the art of prose—an art by no means identical with Norden's "*Kunstprosa*"—with an eye to matters of form alone; for in the building up of the style of a Plato or a De-

mosthenes, the philosophical or political content of the thought is a decisive factor. During the early and classical periods of Greek literature, the history of form is at one with the history of the spirit.

¹⁸ Engelbert Drerup has given special attention to the attorneys in Athens and their connections with politics in his "war book" *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik (Demosthenes und seine Zeit)* (Paderborn 1916). Even if the analogy of conditions in modern parliamentary states has led him to treat a breathing historical personality as a mere schematic embodiment of a slogan of the wartime press, there is still permanent significance in what he says about the typical characteristics of the legal profession in Athens. This profession has also been studied in its relation to cultural history by one of the most eminent students of Greek law: R. J. Bonner, *Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens: The Genesis of the Legal Profession* (University of Chicago Press 1926). Cf. esp. pp. 200 ff.

¹⁹ Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Isocr.* 18: μηδεὶς δ' ἀγνοεῖν ὑπολάβῃ . . . ὅτι δέσμας πάνυ πολλὰς δικανικῶν λόγων Ἰσοκρατείων περιφέρεσθαι φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβλιοπώλων Ἀριστοτέλης (V. Rose, *Aristot. fragm.* 140, Leipzig 1886). Dionysius expresses his doubts about the fact and tries to explain it away, for it does not fit into his picture of Isocrates. Isocrates (*Antid.* 2), in defending himself against the σοφισταί who objected to his διατριβή on the ground ὡς ἔστι περὶ δικογραφίαν, is obviously aiming at Aristotle's attack, which must have occurred at the time when he was still a member of Plato's Academy and introduced the study of rhetoric. Isocrates declares that this disparagement is like comparing Pheidias with a master potter. Cf. *Antid.* 37 ff. and *Soph.* 19 ff.

²⁰ For Demosthenes' equipment as an orator, cf. particularly F. Blass *op. cit.* pp. 10-20, where the ancient tradition is subjected to critical analysis.

²¹ Tales about this were current in Athens. (Cf. the biography of the Ten Orators and Plutarch's biography.) These stories were in agreement to the extent that none of them assumed Isocrates to have been the young Demosthenes' teacher, though they made reference to certain unknown private individuals through whom he had supposedly acquired the τέχνη of Alcidas or Zoilus or

some other contemporary rhetor. There may be some truth in this. But the insinuation that he did this covertly—*per nefas*—is obviously a later construction put upon this tradition in Hellenistic times, when little was known about the publication of works in the classical period, particularly if these happened to be lectures in the schools of the rhetors and philosophers during the first half of the fourth century. To these, my remarks on ἀνάγνωσις and ἐκδοσις in the Peripatetic school in my *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1912), pp. 131 ff., and especially pp. 135 ff., undoubtedly are already applicable. Probably it was not until later that, on the basis of these stories and others like them, Demosthenes was linked with Isocrates; for this seemed a good way to explain the fact that even in his earliest speeches he showed himself completely familiar with the Isocratean art. Copies of τέχναι could easily pass beyond the confines of the esoteric circle. How else could Aristotle have compiled his τεχνῶν συναγωγή?

²² To appreciate this, it is sufficient to read an Isocratean period such as the one in the first oration *Against Aphobus* 60-61, which, despite the art of its syntactical structure and the employment of periodic construction in a passage particularly important for the argument, still seems rather stilted. This is, to be sure, a *tour de force* of a sort that Demosthenes does not permit himself any too often.

²³ Of course there was as yet no real τέχνη of ὑπόκρισις for orators at the time of Demosthenes, as Aristotle explains in *Rhet.* III 1, 1403b 20-35. But this passage shows that this side of oratory was then considered the most important (ὁ δὲ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὕτω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται) and that ὑπόκρισις was considered primarily a matter of φωνή. Here too, as with respect to λέξις, poetry had led the way—in tragedy and in the rhapsode's art of epic recitation (which we know from Plato's *Ion*, though only at a comparatively late period, when the poet no longer did his own reciting). Glaucon of Teos appears to have written on ὑπόκρισις and φωνή in the recitation of poetical works; at least this is how I interpret Aristotle's words (*ibid.* 24). Aristotle now calls for a corresponding treatment of rhetorical recitation, which had long since succeeded the tragic ὑπόκρισις in the practice of the time.

That the orators then had to learn from the actors is shown by the well-known stories of Demosthenes' connections with celebrated actors, which we find in the ancient biographies; evidently this was something new. (For the testimonia, see Blass *op. cit.* p. 22.) It is significant that while Aristotle, like a true Platonist, complains of this tendency as a sign of the times, he demands in the very same breath that this side of rhetoric be more vigorously developed.

²⁴ Aesch. *de falsa leg.* 34.

²⁵ Cf. Cicero *Brut.* 142 and the parallel testimonia in Blass *op. cit.* p. 23 n. 2

²⁶ Cf. Aesch. I 94; II 165; II 180; Din. I 111.

²⁷ Cf. Aesch. I 117, 170 ff.

²⁸ Demosth. *Zenothem.* 32. In connection with this passage cf. Blass *op. cit.* p. 31, and Drerup *op. cit.* p. 48.

²⁹ Demosth. *Phorm.* 28 ff.

³⁰ Demosth. *Steph.* I 30: *σολικίζει τῇ φωνῇ* (sc. Phormion). Because of *ἀπειρία τοῦ λέγειν* he is represented before the court by friends. Cf. *Phorm.* 1 and 57.

³¹ Demosth. *Phorm.* 43 and 45.

³² Demosth. *Phorm.* 53.

³³ The first speech *Against Stephanus* (XLV), which was written for Apollodorus, is genuine; orations XLVI, IL, L, LII, LIII, LIX, likewise written for Apollodorus by some logographer, are spurious.

³⁴ Aeschines (II 165) reveals an acquaintance with the facts of the case which is quite inexact, to say the least. He asserts that Demosthenes first wrote a speech for Phormion (of course Aeschines refers to it in the plural) and then turned it over to Apollodorus, his client's opponent (*ἐκφέρειν τοῖς ἀντιδίκους*). This was definitely disproved by the two speeches for Phormion and Apollodorus which were published after Demosthenes' death. When modern haters of Demosthenes such as Drerup (*op. cit.* p. 50) promptly assume that Aeschines' verdict is typical of the professional ethics of the logographers and of Athenian public sentiment at large, that is false on the face of it. Plutarch, on the contrary, who knew well enough the facts of the case (*Demosth.* 15), no longer had any conception of the conditions obtaining in

fourth-century Athens, and measured his hero by the yardstick of his own philosophical canon of virtue.

³⁵ Cf. Chap. VI, note 38, below.

³⁶ Cf. Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen* (Berlin 1896), pp. 534 ff. Bruns regards this problem, however, from a too exclusively moralistic point of view.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹ Cf. my appendix to the present work, p. 199 below.

² Cf. Xen. *Hell.* VI 3, 10 ff. Of the members of the Athenian delegation—Callias, Autocles, Demostratus, Aristocles, Cephisodotus, Melanopus, Lycaethus, and Callistratus—Callias represents the old aristocracy with its Spartan sympathies, and Callistratus stands for the sober-minded policy of coming to an understanding with Sparta. Autocles, however, is pro-Theban and anti-Spartan, as his speech shows (VI 3, 7); Melanopus is at least known to have been an opponent of Callistratus (cf. A. Schaefer *op. cit.* I, p. 131). To designate Callistratus' policy as "Cimonian dualism," as Eduard Meyer has done (*Geschichte d. Altert.* V, p. 407), strikes me as a failure to appreciate its essential qualities. The way in which Callistratus shifts his course immediately after the Theban victory at Leuctra is proof that his policy is expressly devoted to preserving the balance of power with elastic adaptability regardless of whether it leads to a dualism or not.

³ Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 27.

⁴ Xen. *Resp. Laced.* I, 1.

⁵ Isocr. *Phil.* 104.

⁶ Cf. p. 12 above.

⁷ Plut. *Demosth.* 5.

⁸ Cf. pp. 88 and 106 below.

⁹ Aesch. II 105. For the scheme for maritime supremacy see Diod. XV 78.

¹⁰ Isocr. *Areop.* 15. The prevailing views concerning the date of this important document strike me as incorrect. Some scholars would put it after the Social War (Drerup, Münscher, Mesk), others during the Social War (Ed. Meyer, Miltner). I shall discuss elsewhere the reasons requiring an earlier date.

¹¹ For Isocrates' arguments against equality and his respect for the principle *suum cuique*, see *Areop.* 21. For his defense against the reproach of unfriendliness to the people, see 56 ff. Cf. also *de pace* 128.

¹² I give more precise reasons for my opinion elsewhere.

¹³ Isocr. *Areop.* 2 and 66.

¹⁴ As to the time when this tract was composed, cf. C. G. Cobet, *Novae lectiones* (1858), pp. 756 ff., and the abundant literature that has since appeared. In Chap. 5, 9, the author himself makes it evident that he is writing soon after the Phocians have abandoned their occupation of the shrine at Delphi and the Thebans have taken it over. Unfortunately this does not help us much; for the traditional chronology of the Phocian War is so hopelessly confused that it will always be disputed no matter how often it is "put in order." As to the question of the pamphlet's genuineness, cf. Friedrich in *Jahrbücher für class. Philol.*, 1896. The chief theses of the pamphlet are discussed by R. Herzog in the *Festschrift* for Blümner (1914), pp. 469-480. It seems to me that the mentality and interests of the author of *Πόροι* do not fit Xenophon.

¹⁵ *De vectig.* I, 1.

¹⁶ On the problem of the metics, cf. *de vectig.* 2.

¹⁷ On the silver mines, cf. *de vectig.* 4 ff.

¹⁸ Here we should probably bear in mind also the legislation denying citizenship to the children of marriages between Athenian men and non-Athenian women. The same Aristophon who was the chief butt of the opposition after the Social War had earlier (cf. *Ath.* XIII 577 B-C), in the archonship of Eucleides, made this provision a law. Whether he also stood behind the policy for metics against which the author of *Πόροι* is fighting, is something that we have no way of knowing. Cf. Otto Müller, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des attischen Bürger- und Ehrechts," in *Jahrbücher f. class. Philol.*, Suppl. Bd. XXV (1899), pp. 666 ff.

¹⁹ Here Ed. Schwartz has led the way with his article "Demos-thenes' erste Philippika" in the *Festschrift* for Theodor Mommsen (Marburg 1893), where he makes a vigorous approach to problems of political history, taking the state speeches as his point of departure; his Göttingen pupils Stavenhagen and Kahle have studied the forensic speeches in this particular connection. (Cf. note 21 below.)

²⁰ It seems to me significant of the situation that in *Antidosis* 93 (353 B.C.), where Isocrates draws up a list of his pupils as deserving well at the hands of Athens, he fails to mention Androtion, who was a man of some fame. The suit against Androtion was then finished; the suit against Timocrates was still pending.

But Lysitheides, who was one of the men attacked in this latter suit, is mentioned with praise by Isocrates.

²¹ Cf. Ed. Schwartz' article on Androtion in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie d. cl. Altert.* I, Sp. 2174. The traditional date of the speech *Against Androtion* (355-4) has been confirmed by recent research. Cf. F. Kahle, *De Demosthenis orat. Androtioneae, Timocrateae, Aristocrateae temporibus* (Diss. Göttingen 1909). In this work and in C. Stavenhagen's *Quaestiones Demosthenicae* (Diss. Göttingen 1907), which shortly preceded it, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' chronology of the speeches, which was taken from the learned handbooks of the Hellenistic age (Dionys. *ad Amm.* I 3, p. 724), is otherwise subjected to a radical criticism in many respects. These two acute studies do not agree, however. Their findings and those of U. Kahrstedt in his *Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin 1910) have been subjected to a further revision in the useful work of E. Pokorný, *Studien zur griechischen Geschichte im 6. und 5. Jahrzehnt des 4. Jahrh.* (Diss. Greifswald 1913), which has brought us back in the most important respects to A. Schaefer's chronology based on Dionysius' data. It might seem as if a great deal of acuteness and learning had here been in large part wasted. But a sharpening of the critical conscience as opposed to blind faith in tradition is always a step in advance; and so is any insight into the narrowness of the boundaries of the ascertainable—boundaries that have restricted our research into the history of antiquity, even in those periods for which the surviving material is much more abundant. The best that we have is those texts which hang together. Even if we usually cannot obtain complete success in reconstructing the course of history in detail, it is all the more worth while to get a lively understanding of these texts—a goal from which we still are often too far removed.

²² Cf. Demosth. *Androt.* 5-20.

²³ Attack on Androtion's honor: *Androt.* 21 ff.; on his administration: *Androt.* 42 ff.

²⁴ For the plaintiff's personal motives see *Androt.* 1-3. The assiduousness with which private revenge is stressed as the motive behind the accusation cannot help sounding rather suspicious. F. Blass (*op. cit.* p. 259), to be sure, accepts this quite seriously;

but he also believes that Demosthenes took charge of the case for Diodorus purely out of indignation at the failure of the Council to have the warships built. A. Schaefer is at least willing to consider that party politics may have entered in.

²⁵ Demosthenes speaks ironically of Androtion as *καλὸς κάγαθός* in *Androt.* 47.

²⁶ Plato *Resp.* VI 493a.

²⁷ The inflammatory side of Demosthenes' oratory has never been understood by the older scholars who dealt with the speeches, such as Schaefer and Blass. It is only natural that their moralizing approach has encountered an abrupt reaction—no less moralizing and no less unhistorical. The methods of agitation deserve a special study that would include a history of political catchwords. The best commentary so far is to be found in the editions of Henri Weil.

²⁸ Demosth. *Androt.* 51.

²⁹ Demosth. *Androt.* 53.

³⁰ Demosth. *Timocr.* 190-193.

³¹ Demosth. *Androt.* 15.

³² Whether this happened before or after the war is a matter of dispute, as is the time of the speech *Against Timocrates* and that of Aristophon's *psephisma*, which it presupposes. Cf. Kahle *op. cit.* pp. 33 ff., even though the date that he decides upon (354-3) remains uncertain. Anyway, this lawsuit came later than the one against Androtion.

³³ Cf. Demosth. *Timocr.* 111 ff.

³⁴ Demosth. *Timocr.* 24-27.

³⁵ Kahle (*op. cit.* p. 37) thinks that he finds in the speech *Against Timocrates* the earliest traces of Demosthenes' shift from the rich men's party to his later political position, because the orator obviously is already attacking Eubulus in the speech *Against Aristocrates*, and yet Kahle would place the speech *Against Leptines* close to the one *Against Androtion* (355-4) both in its date and in its politics. This latter observation is sound enough. But even if the suit against Timocrates dragged on somewhat longer, it is impossible to separate this speech from the one against Androtion, with which it is closely bound by the fact that the same plaintiffs are assigned to the job and the same clique is

the object of attack. Taken in themselves, *Timocr.* 112 and 124 speak neither for nor against any connection of the speech-writer who puts these words in the plaintiff's mouth with either the *πλούσιοι* or the *πένητες*: both passages are cut to the measure of the public, the *δῆμος*, and the *δῆμος* alone. The suggestion in *Timocr.* 124 that the statesmen have changed from poor men to rich, is, for example, used in a similar manner by Isocrates in his *de pace* (124), a work expressly representing the rich men's view. And we have explicit testimony as to the special care that Eubulus always took to fall in with the views of the *δῆμος*. One ought not to think of the concepts of the poor and the rich as representing two sharply distinct parties in Athens, even if the reaction of 355 was the work of the wealthier stratum. Least of all should one think that in Demosthenes' later estrangement from Eubulus he was merely transferring his allegiance to a strong established party designable as the party of the *πένητες* as opposed to the *πλούσιοι*. Such an interpretation would only obstruct our understanding of this important series of events.

³⁶ Demosth. *Timocr.* 160-186 is almost entirely taken from the speech *Against Androtion* (*Androt.* 47-56 and 65-78). Only the short section *Timocr.* 169-171 has been inserted between. There is need of a complete study of all the doublets in Demosthenes. In the absence of such a study, debate over the genuineness of certain speeches rich in such doublets (the *περὶ συντάξεως*, for example) is left somewhat up in the air.

³⁷ Though the speech *Against Leptines* is earlier than the speech *Against Timocrates*, I shall deal with them in reverse order so as not to disturb the inner connection of the suits against Androtion and Timocrates.

³⁸ Cf. Demosth. *Lept.* 144-146.

³⁹ Cf. Plut. *Demosth.* 15. It has been correctly pointed out even as far back as Schaefer (*op. cit.* I, pp. 374 ff.) that none of Demosthenes' opponents ever speaks of his connections with Chabrias' widow. Nevertheless, his *συνηγορία* for the minor son Ctesippus may well be a fact even if this tale was invented in later years to provide a motive for Demosthenes' exertions in Ctesippus' behalf. But it is obvious enough that in promoting their attack on Leptines' law, the party leaders found in this *δευτερολογία*

an excellent device for attracting the people's attention to a special case particularly well suited to appeal to their sentiments.

⁴⁰ Cf. Demosth. *Lept.* 29.

⁴¹ Cf. Demosth. *Lept.* 143.

⁴² Cf. Demosth. *Lept.* 167.

⁴³ Cf. Demosth. *Lept.* 161: ἀλλὰ χρή γ' ἀνθρώπους ὄντας τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγειν καὶ νομοθετεῖν οἷς μηδεὶς ἂν νεμεσήσῃ, καὶ τὰγαθὰ μὲν προσδοκᾶν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχέσθαι διδόναι, πάντα δ' ἀνθρώπινα ἡγεῖσθαι.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹ Cf. in particular Arist. *Athen. resp.* (the passages in Kenyon's index, p. 144). The whole historical portion of this work is built up on the principle of the succession of the *προστάται τοῦ δήμου*.

² This connection has been disputed by Cobet in his *Novae lectiones*, p. 758, and maintained by A. Boeckh in his *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (Berlin 1886), 3d ed., II, p. 689, though in matters of detail Boeckh regards the proposals in the pamphlet *On Revenues* somewhat critically. For proof that these proposals were afterwards put into effect, see Rud. Herzog in the *Festschrift* for Blümner, pp. 478-480.

³ This problem is discussed by E. Pokorny *op. cit.* pp. 77 ff. Drerup (*op. cit.* pp. 51 ff.) is of a somewhat different opinion.

⁴ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 54, Ps. Dion. Hal. *Ars rhet.* IX 10. Demosthenes, in *Rhod.* 5, already refers to the content of the speech as *ὑπὲρ τῶν βασιλικῶν*; this is obviously what has provoked Dionysius' criticism of the title *περὶ συμμοριῶν*. Cf. *ad Amm.* 4.

⁵ In addition to Niebuhr's well-known opinion cf. Henry Lord Brougham, *Works* VII (last edition, Edinburgh 1872; my references here are to the old edition of 1856), and Georges Clemenceau, *Démosthène* (Paris 1926). The history of the appreciation of Demosthenes in modern Europe, particularly in England and America, has been sketched by Charles Darwin Adams in his attractive little book *Demosthenes and his Influence* (London 1927, in the series *Our Debt to Greece and Rome*). Adams has shown well what Demosthenes meant to the democracies of the eighteenth century and the way in which nineteenth-century German scholarship reacted against this by putting the great Macedonian rulers Philip and Alexander in a better light while often underestimating Demosthenes. Adams does not, however, reconcile these two opposing views in a higher unity.

⁶ The Social War must have been ended by this time, or Athens could not have considered plunging into a new war with Persia; this has been pointed out by Ed. Meyer also, though without any supporting arguments (*op. cit.* V, p. 494). Beloch (*op. cit.* III 2, 2d ed., p. 261) tries to tie up the speech *On the Symmories* with the negotiations that must have taken place in Athens during the

last phase of the Social War preceding the conclusion of the alliance with Artabazus. But this suggestion is insufficient to break down the testimony of Dionysius (*ad Amm.* 4), who places the speech in the archonship of Diotimus (354-3).

⁷ Cf. p. 52 above.

⁸ Cf. *de vectig.* 5, 5, which attacks the schemes of those who, immediately after losing one war, would like to restore Athens' hegemony by starting another. This passage is additional evidence against Beloch's critique of the traditional date of the speech *On the Symmories*. (Cf. note 6 above.)

⁹ Demosth. *symm.* 14 ff.

¹⁰ Demosth. *symm.* 3.

¹¹ Demosth. *symm.* 9.

¹² Demosth. *symm.* 24.

¹³ Plut. *Demosth.* 13 = Theopompus Frg. 326 (Jacoby *F. Gr. Hist.* II B, pp. 603 ff.). In his commentary on this passage (II D, p. 396) Jacoby rightly remarks, however, that here as elsewhere, Theopompus' judgments are not altogether consistent. Cf. Frg. 327, where he points out Demosthenes' moral courage in the face of the raging masses (I agree with Jacoby in reading here, as at the end of Plut. chap. 25, *Θεόπομπος*, not *Θεόφραστος* with Linds-kog and Ziegler, the most recent editors). This split verdict of Theopompus is significant. He simply cannot help having his impressions determined by the final outcome, and he has a tendency to Philippize. Though he is supposedly the first psychological historian, he never grasps the subjective inner necessity in Demosthenes' political development and conduct. Drerup has given these matters very scholarly treatment in his *Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums* (Würzburg 1923), but the character of his work is so obviously biased that I cannot follow him here. His treatment is entirely dependent on the prejudices voiced in his "war book" *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik*.

¹⁴ This is especially true of Theopompus' two-sided verdict on Philip of Macedon. See pp. 136 f. below.

¹⁵ Cf. my *Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his Development* (English ed., Oxford 1934), pp. 3 ff. As to the ancient testimonia for Aristotle's development see pp. 33-38.

¹⁶ Cf. Ed. Schwartz, "Demosthenes' erste Philippika," in the

Festschrift for Th. Mommsen (Marburg 1893). Schwartz' work has been carried on by Stavenhagen, Kahle, Kahrstedt, and Pokorny in their doctoral dissertations cited above; also by Drerup and, with certain modifications, by Wendland (*Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1910, pp. 294 ff. and 318 ff.). But there are still some who take Demosthenes' proposals for reorganization of the navy much too positively.

¹⁷ See Paul Cloché in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* XLVII (1923), pp. 98 ff.; also his book (which I did not see until I had finished the main text of this work) *La politique étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338 avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1934), which is in many points a valuable supplement to Beloch's well-known *Die attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884), and gives a sober and wary appraisal of the research done since that time. I regret that when it comes to the present important issue I cannot agree with Cloché's conclusions. Let it be said here emphatically that there are many points at which I am unable to follow Beloch's conception of Demosthenes' politics; I certainly cannot accept it as a whole. I have tried to avoid any polemic with respect to matters of detail.

¹⁸ That the rich men had grown tired of paying taxes after the Social War is emphasized in Isocr. *de pace* 128 (where the tax burden of the symmories is the object of complaint) and in *de vectig.* 6, 1.

¹⁹ Thuc. VI 19, 2: καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνοὺς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν ἀποτρέψειε, παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ' ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτοὺς, παρελθὼν . . . ἔλεγε τοιαύδε. Blass, however (*op. cit.* p. 278), considers naval reform the principal goal of the speech *On the Symmories*. In *de cor.* 102 Demosthenes reverses the position that he has taken in *symm.*, stressing the fact that by his later naval law in the war against Philip he has reduced the burden of the poorer classes and compelled the rich men to contribute more heavily to the trierarchy. This again is a clear illustration of the shift in his political position that has occurred in the meanwhile. (Cf. note 21 below.)

²⁰ Demosth. *Phil.* I 14: μηδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοκῶ τινι καινὴν παρασκευὴν λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν με τὰ πράγματα ἡγήσθω.

²¹ We need a study of the traditional tactics and diplomatic

language used by the orators of the wealthy and conservative party in approaching the Athenian demos. Cf. Ps. Dion. Hal. *Ars rhet.* IX 10, who illustrates this rhetorical art of κλέπτειν just by examples taken from Demosthenes' oration *On the Symmories*. He points already to the model of Thucydides, quoting the oration of the Spartan king Archidamus (I 80-85) who also tries to avert the imminent danger of war by demanding a gigantic rearmament. Archidamus and Nicias (cf. note 19 above) are both representatives of a conservative and peace-loving minority.

²² Demosth. *symm.* 24 ff.

²³ Demosth. *Rhod.* 6.

²⁴ Demosth. *symm.* 1-2.

²⁵ Cf. Demosth. *symm.* 19-20.

²⁶ Dion. *Thuc.* 54. When Blass (*op. cit.* 279), on the contrary, puts more stress on the differences between the speech *Against Leptines* and the speech *On the Symmories*, that is because of the natural differences between the forensic and the deliberative oration. But the didactic ethos is remarkably similar in each of the two speeches, and must reflect Demosthenes' own attitude toward the political problems of this period.

²⁷ Cf. p. 45 above.

²⁸ I here pass over Sparta's efforts to regain her influence in Arcadia during the sixties of the fourth century—efforts that finally led to Epaminondas' last invasion and the battle of Mantinea. (Cf. Xen. *Hell.* VII 4 to the end.)

²⁹ Demosthenes afterwards (*de cor.* 18) characterizes the situation in the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas at this time as an ἄκριτος . . . ἐπὶ καὶ παραχῇ—a reminiscence of the final sentence of Xenophon's *Hellenica*.

³⁰ Pausanias (IV 28, 2) gives only a very summary account of Messenia after its liberation from Sparta. A. Schaefer (*op. cit.* I, p. 462) conjectures that the Athenian alliance with Messenia dated from 355. At any rate, it began soon after the outbreak of the Phocian War, whereas the Arcadians did not ask Athens for an alliance until the Thebans were again being forced to the defensive (Demosth. *Megal.* 4). The earlier alliance (cf. Xen. *Hell.* VII 4, 2) between Arcadia and Athens, which was negotiated by Lycomedes in 366, is never mentioned by Demosthenes; it must

therefore have had only temporary importance. Like the alliance between Athens and Messenia, it was defensive; it did not affect Athens' obligations to Sparta but was simply intended to make Arcadia independent of Thebes. The *casus foederis* became a reality for Athens in the war of the Arcadians against Elis (364) when Athenians fought on the Arcadian side (cf. Xen. *Hell.* VII 4, 29). Perhaps Athens' military assistance to Arcadia under Lysistratus, which is mentioned by the author of *de vectig.* 3, 7, and is otherwise hard to place, belongs in this context. The grouping of the states at Mantinea (362), when Athens came to the aid of Sparta against Thebes, either terminated her connection with Arcadia or pushed it into the background—all the more rapidly because Arcadia was then disunited and the Mantineans were on the side of Sparta and Athens.

³¹ Cf. Demosth. *Megal.* 1 ff. Dionysius (*ad Amm.* 4) places the speech *For the Megalopolitans* in the year of the archonship of Thudemos, 353-2. Recent scholars have produced no valid reasons for rejecting this date, so far as I can see.

³² While religious sensibilities were still shocked at the obtaining of loans from rich shrines by force, the average businessman-politician had become well enough accustomed to it of late by the Arcadians' use of the sacred treasures of Olympia in the war with Elis (Xen. *Hell.* VII 4, 33 ff.).

³³ Demosth. *symm.* 3 ff. Cf. *Megal.* 6 ff.

³⁴ Demosth. *Megal.* 3.

³⁵ Isocr. *de pace* 18.

³⁶ Demosth. *Megal.* 27: οὐ[κ εἶναι] στήλας, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμφέρον εἶναι τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φιλίαν (text corrected by Dobree). Demosthenes neatly avoids taking any personal responsibility for the Machiavellian contrast here so sharply formulated. He puts it in the mouth of the Arcadians, who choose this means of showing that their alliance with Thebes will not keep them from coöperating with Athens if the Athenians will give them *de facto* support; for the present their alliance with Thebes is merely a piece of paper. It is obvious, however, that Demosthenes considers the Arcadians' logic entirely convincing.

³⁷ Henry Lord Brougham, *Works* VII, p. 54. Blass (*op. cit.* p. 291 n. 5) cites the celebrated "Dissertation on the Eloquence of

the Ancients," but only in connection with Brougham's opinions concerning the formal rhetoric of the speech *For the Megalopolitans*. Brougham himself is here chiefly concerned with matters of style; but as a schooled politician he makes in passing the discerning remark: "The . . . speech for Megalopolis is a calm and judicious statement of the sound principle of foreign policy on which the modern doctrine of the balance of power rests." For him this speech is, so to speak, the Bible of his political system. The importance of the speech in connection with the rise of the idea of the balance of power in modern politics ought to be examined more carefully.

³⁸ Cf. p. 43 above.

³⁹ Demosth. *Megal.* 20. This glance into the future is interesting enough. It shows that Demosthenes has already reckoned coolly with the possibility of a *rapprochement* with Thebes later on. For the time being he hopes to try playing off Thebes and Sparta against each other; but Sparta already needs stronger counterbalancing than does Thebes. Perhaps a connection with Arcadia, Thebes' ally, will be a step in this direction. Demosthenes himself states later that he has always considered Athens' connection with Phocis unfortunate; and his insistence on the value of legal correctness in political procedure both here and in the speech *On the Symmories* makes it quite understandable that he would not relish supporting the unsavory cause of the Phocian temple-robbers. But behind this there may already lurk a desire to take advantage of Thebes' momentary weakness and thus make her again dependent on Athens as at the time of the founding of the second confederacy. If we bear in mind that such *rapprochement* with Thebes is the very thing that Eubulus' policy calls for (*de cor.* 162), we can see the possibility that in referring to these remoter aspects of the problem Demosthenes is seeking to make the ruling powers more cordial to the alliance with Arcadia. If so, this would not mean that Demosthenes has already broken with Eubulus, but rather that he is trying to make him follow his own principles to conclusions that must inevitably lead him further and further from his strict noninterventionist standpoint. There are so many gaps in our knowledge that we cannot be sure of this. But at least it is not impossible to give a plaus-

ible interpretation of Demosthenes' attitude at the time of the speech *For the Megalopolitans*.

⁴⁰ Cf. Pausanias VIII 6, 2. 27, 10 (derived from the same source as Paus. IV 28, 2); Polybius II 48 and especially XVIII 14. In the latter passage Polybius, himself a Megalopolitan, defends his Arcadian countrymen with a staunch local patriotism against the charge of betraying the Greek cause, which Demosthenes afterwards brought up against them (*de cor.* 295). Naturally Demosthenes could have done this only when he had embraced his later Panhellenism; it would have been utterly impossible for him to make such a charge at the time of the speech *For the Megalopolitans* with its Machiavellian particularism. Polybius must have understood this particularism well; but the national and ethical ideas of the later Demosthenes remained strange and incomprehensible to him, no matter how much he tended to appreciate Demosthenes in other respects. (Cf. XVIII 14, 1.) Isocrates (*Phil.* 74) already presupposes that both the Messenians and the Arcadians are on Philip's side.

⁴¹ Dionysius (*ad Amm.* 4) puts the speech for the Rhodians in the archonship of Theellus in 351-0, a dating which A. Schaefer has defended (*op. cit.* I, pp. 436 ff.). But this hypothesis encounters difficulties in the reference in § 12 to the failure of Artaxerxes Ochus' expedition against the Egyptian revolt, for which he was making preparations as early as the speech *On the Symmories* (354-3). Unfortunately Diodorus' chronology of the events in Egypt is itself confused; but a number of circumstances indicate that Ochus made this Egyptian expedition before 351-0, even if we cannot determine the year exactly. More promising is the suggestion of Focke (*Demosthenesstudien*, Stuttgart 1929, pp. 18 ff.) that this occurred in 352 and that the speech for the Rhodians was delivered in the second half of that year. We cannot draw any sound conclusions from the reference to Artemisia as queen of Caria in § 11, for it is not certain that the *νῦν* in this passage actually refers to the period just after the beginning of her reign. Nevertheless, I consider that Focke's conjecture is the most probable one.

⁴² Cf. Demosth. *Rhod.* 30. The Athenians are to be *κοινοὶ προστάται τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας*. This means that they must seek

to be strong in foreign affairs as well. One should not forget that in later years Alexander himself made the democracies the foundation stones for his control of Ionia. (Cf. Beloch *op. cit.* III 1, 2d ed., p. 402.) Anyone defending the renegade Rhodian democrats before the Athenian *ecclesia* found himself in a difficult position; Demosthenes was thus compelled to resort to agitative methods (§§ 17 ff.). Obviously he has calculated the effect on the masses when in § 18 he has the audacity to maintain that it would be better for Athens to have all the Greeks for enemies, provided they are all good democrats, than to have them all as friends if they are all good oligarchs. Such soundness of principle deserved a better fate than that the Athenian demos should reject the petition of the Rhodians! Similarly, in §§ 19 ff., the newly arisen oligarchy in the island states is represented as a menace to the stability of the Athenian democracy. But who is so naïve as to suppose that Demosthenes himself believed in all this as literally true! This is pure argumentation and nothing else. It is usual, to be sure, to take these passages at their face value, overlooking the contrast between them and Demosthenes' attitude in the speech *Against Leptines*, no matter how striking that contrast may be. But the fact remains that in the democratic sentiments of the speech for the Rhodians, Demosthenes' procedure is thoroughly Machiavellian, no less than in his handling of legal matters. To those who confront him with τὸ δίκαιον and the treaties, he replies: First let our enemies begin to respect the treaties; then we shall do so, too. He will stick to his project, even if it should not be strictly legal, as long as the enemy also has no legal ground to stand on (§ 28).

⁴³ Demosth. *Rhod.* 11.

⁴⁴ Demosth. *Rhod.* 5-8. Obviously Demosthenes must here be meeting an objection which has been raised by his former political friends.

⁴⁵ Demosth. *Rhod.* 9-10: μὴ λύοντα τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. In this formulation he has his eye on Eubulus and the noninterventionists.

⁴⁶ Isocr. *de pace* 22: μὴ γὰρ οἶεσθε μήτε Κερσοβλέπτην ὑπὲρ Χερρονήσου μήτε Φίλιππον ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως πολεμήσειν, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἡμᾶς μηδενὸς τῶν ἄλλοτρίων ἐφιεμένους.

⁴⁷ Cf. Demosth. *Rhod.* 24: ὁρῶ δ' ὑμῶν ἐνίοις Φιλίππου μὲν ὥς ἄρ' οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ' ὥς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν προέληται φοβουμένους.

⁴⁸ Didymus in *Demosth.* XIV 52 (Theopompus Frg. 164 in Jacoby *F. Gr. Hist.* II B, p. 571). The time of the fictitious speech of Philocrates in Theopompus is obviously earlier than the peace of 346.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

¹ Cf. Chap. IV note 47, above.

² Cf. the *hypothesis* of the oration as well as the very interesting way in which Euthycles introduces himself in *Aristocr.* 1-5. It is entirely as an individual that he has been selected to make the accusation, whereas Diodorus and Euctemon, the plaintiffs in the speeches against Androtion and Timocrates, were mere creatures of the party. In this very fact we can see how Demosthenes' situation has changed. In making this attack he no longer had behind him a solid group ready to provide him with suitable men to serve as tools for his purposes; nor did he any longer let himself be used as a key man in the political assault. He now stood entirely on his own feet. (Cf. *Mid.* 190.) It was therefore impossible for anyone but one of his own personal friends to act as plaintiff; and Euthycles, like Demosthenes himself, had been directly interested in the safety of the Hellespont ever since the time when they had shared command in that region as joint trierarchs and begun storing up their experiences. So I cannot agree with Ed. Schwartz, Kahle, and Pokorny (see esp. *op. cit.* 27), who think that Demosthenes wrote the speech *Against Aristocrates* "for the radical party."

³ Beloch (*op. cit.* III 1, p. 489 n. 2) believes that Demosthenes is writing this speech simply for his "client" Euthycles. If that were so, Demosthenes could not be made responsible for the policies here represented. Beloch feels that these policies are quite foolish, since the only support which Athens could then have had in Thrace was that of Cersobleptes. The incorrectness of this assumption from the standpoint of any contemporary observer will appear in the later course of this work. It is of the very first importance that Demosthenes be regarded all along as the originator of the policy for which Euthycles is fighting. Beloch's conception of the author's relation to the man who delivers his speech before the court is thoroughly false; and it is no better suited to the speeches *Against Androtion* and *Against Timocrates*, for here too the plaintiffs are simply carrying out orders from above. In all these cases the plaintiffs' statements of their motives have been accepted too uncritically. Even Aristocrates himself, the

proposer of the *psephisma* against which Demosthenes is protesting, is, like Leptines, an underling of the men in control.

⁴ The polemic against the *phētopes* in *Aristocr.* 206 ff. is repeated almost word for word in the *Third Olynthiac* 25 ff., where it is admittedly directed against Eubulus. Here the speech *περὶ συντάξεως* is also a pertinent example, if we may consider it genuine (cf. p. 135 below and Chap. VI note 23); for here too we find extensive passages of the speech *Against Aristocrates* repeated—those very passages, indeed, which were directed against the wealthy *phētopes* most influential at the time.

⁵ Cf. Demosth. *Aristocr.* 92.

⁶ νόμος ἐν' ἀνδράσι: cf. Demosth. *Aristocr.* 86 and 218. The wording of the *psephisma* is reproduced only piecemeal in the speech *Against Aristocrates*, never as a whole. Cf. §§ 16, 34-35, 91, and other passages.

⁷ Cf. the way in which Liborius Vorndran follows in the footsteps of his teacher E. Drerup in his "Die Aristocratea des Demosthenes als Advokatenrede und ihre politische Tendenz," Diss. Würzburg 1922 (*Rhetorische Studien* 11, ed. by E. Drerup, Paderborn 1922).

⁸ Cf. note 4 above.

⁹ Ed. Schwartz' "Demosthenes' erste Philippika" (*Festschrift* for Mommsen, 1893, p. 27). Schwartz is followed by Kahle (*op. cit.* p. 32) and Pokorny (*op. cit.* pp. 81 ff.).

¹⁰ Wendland (*Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1910, pp. 320 ff.) has already made similar objections to Ed. Schwartz' interpretation as going too far. Cf. the more recent work of L. Vorndran (*op. cit. passim*), with whom I entirely agree on this point, though I cannot follow his peculiar interpretation of the facts.

¹¹ Cf. U. Kahrstedt *op. cit.* pp. 111 ff., also P. Wendland's counterarguments in *Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1910, p. 322, and Kahrstedt's answering article, "Zur politischen Tendenz der Aristocratea," in *Hermes* XLVI (1911), pp. 464 ff. In the more recent literature see especially Pokorny's careful and circumspect criticism (*op. cit.* pp. 95 ff.), and the work of Paul Cloché (*op. cit.* p. 195). It seems to me necessary as a matter of principle to leave Persia out of account as an unknown quantity; when Kahrstedt attempts to estimate the influence of this factor, to which Demos-

thenes and the rest of our sources never even refer, he does so purely by a process of elimination (cf. *Hermes* XLVI, p. 468). Demosthenes does take Persia into account in some degree later on, as we may see by *IV Phil.* 31 and 52 ff. But by that time the king of Macedonia had long been a factor in international politics, as even Persia had had to recognize. I think it is a mistake to explain Demosthenes' attack on Charidemus by assuming that he had political motives for supporting that "hero of Democracy" Chares, the commander of mercenaries, against Charidemus, his rival. This hypothesis is merely an induction based on the enmity of the two generals; if Demosthenes thought of Chares at all, he certainly did not do so because of any party allegiance; for ever since he had begun to draw away from Eubulus he had not really belonged to either of the parties, but had rather stood between them. (Cf. also his own words in this connection in *Mid.* 190.)

¹² Cf. Demosth. *Aristocr.* 102-103.

¹³ The chronology of the events in Thrace is much disputed. All we know clearly is that in the speech *Against Aristocrates* Philip is not considered a very serious menace to Thrace, and that there must have been some reason for this erroneous estimate, as matters stood at that moment. That such an estimate could have been possible at a time when Philip was actually in Thrace, as Kahrstedt asserts, is virtually out of the question. Yet, in *Aristocr.* 183 there is a reference to Philip's first invasion of Thrace, which had brought him as far as Maroneia in company with a Theban expedition headed for Asia Minor by way of Thrace under Pammenes. That was in the spring of 353. Amadocus seems to have made Philip come to a halt at that time; at any rate Philip turned back of his own free will. This is enough to explain Demosthenes' friendly attitude toward Amadocus. But either before or during Philip's second Thracian expedition Amadocus went over to the Macedonian side (cf. Harpocration s. v. *Amadocus*) and joined with him against Cersobleptes. Of this there is no word in the speech *Against Aristocrates*. The date of the speech must therefore fall between the two expeditions. Demosthenes dates the second of these for us in *III Ol.* 4, where he says that Philip's attack on Heraeum Teichos, which was one of the events of this expedition, occurred *τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτί* (before 349-8)—i.e., in 352 or

351. Focke, in his *Demosthenesstudien* (Stuttgart 1929) p. 14, attempts to establish a *terminus post quem* for the speech, by connecting the denunciation of the Megarians in *Aristocr.* 212 with the trouble between Megara and Athens, which he thinks must have immediately followed the setting up of the commission for the sacred *orgas* at the beginning of 351 (Dittenberger, *Sylloge* I³, p. 279). But as we do not know whether the *psephisma* that has come down to us was the only Athenian resolution in this affair or had already been preceded by others of the same sort (Demosth. *Or.* XIII 33 refers to *ψηφίσματα* against Megara and Phlius that have not yet been carried out), we do not know what to conclude. Thus the date of the speech *Against Aristocrates* can fall anywhere in 352 or 351. Even if the siege of Heraeum Teichos should have occurred in 351 rather than a year earlier (and for this there is perhaps some evidence in the fact that Philip was taken seriously ill during the siege, but attacked Olynthus "at once" as soon as he recovered, i.e., in 349-8; cf. Demosth. *I Ol.* 13), this would still fail to settle the question whether the speech *Against Aristocrates* was delivered in 351 or in 352. Neither are we helped by knowing that Phayllus is mentioned as the Phocian leader in § 124; for recent efforts to determine the time of his death have wavered between 352 and the winter of 352-1 (cf. Pokorný and Focke). So the date given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (352-1) has really not been disturbed.

¹⁴ Demosth. *Aristocr.* 121: ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῶν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος. This, however, does not yet mean "our most powerful enemy," but only "our bitterest enemy."

¹⁵ Cf. note 13 above.

¹⁶ Demosth. *III Ol.* 4.

¹⁷ Thuc. II 100, 2. Cf. Fritz Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (Munich and Berlin 1930), pp. 84 ff.

¹⁸ For the history of the Chalcidians cf. Allen B. West, "The Formation of the Chalcidic League," in *Classical Philology* IX (1914), pp. 24 ff., and *The History of the Chalcidic League* (Madison 1918) by the same author. Important supplementary material and criticisms of the prevailing views with respect to the structure and development of the Chalcidic state are to be found in an article by Franz Hampl, "Olynth und der chalkidische Bund"

(*Hermes* LXX, 1935, pp. 177 ff.), which reached me only after the completion of this book. Hampl shows that from the time of the first colonization of Olynthus by the Chalcidians in 479 there was a Chalcidic state; so that it is wrong to suppose that this did not come into being until as late as 432 or even 420 or 400, as others have thought. This state is identical with Olynthus. Hampl demonstrates that the two designations *Χαλκιδαίης* and *Ὀλύνθιοι* were used as legal synonyms from time immemorial. This is a matter of critical importance and in my opinion has been proved with complete success. To hold that the Chalcidic state was dissolved by Sparta after the war of 382-379 is simply false.

¹⁹ Cf. Geyer *op. cit.* p. 122.

²⁰ On the rise of Philip see Beloch *op. cit.* III 1, 2d ed., pp. 468 ff. Philip's treaty with Olynthus has been newly discovered in the third of the valuable series of excavations carried out on the site of ancient Olynthus by The Johns Hopkins University of Baltimore under the leadership of Professor David Moore Robinson in 1934. Professor Robinson had the kindness to make accessible to me the text of the newly discovered inscription with his restorations prior to publication. He has since published the text with a detailed commentary in *Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc.* LXV (1934), pp. 103 ff.

²¹ The time interval cannot be exactly determined. (Cf. note 13 above.) If anything has been proved by the remarkably acute discussions of Schwartz, Kahle, Pokorny, and Focke, it is the purely negative discovery that our information is too partial for anything to be decided with certainty. In the long run our sense of truth will not be satisfied by switching back and forth the events that fall in this interval, and trying out every possible permutation of dating. The fact is that we simply do not know whether it was in 352 or in 351 that Philip undertook his second Thracian expedition, which brought him to Heraeum Teichos.

²² Demosth. *I Ol.* 12.

²³ Demosth. *I Phil.* 17. Ed. Schwartz attempted to revise the dating of this speech in "Demosthenes' erste Philippika" in the *Festschrift* for Theodor Mommsen (Marburg 1893). He has been followed by Stavenhagen, Kahle, Kahrstedt, and Pokorny.

²⁴ Demosth. *I Phil.* 1.

²⁵ Demosth. *I Phil.* 2.

²⁶ A comparative study of the ethical elements in the political speeches of Thucydides and Demosthenes promises to give us valuable insight into the nature of the Demosthenic rhetoric and politics. I have occasionally had such analyses made in the philological seminar at the University of Berlin.

²⁷ The whole first part of the *First Philippic* (§§ 2-12) is given over to the problem of the right and resolute will to action.

²⁸ Demosth. *I Phil.* 3. The example of Athens and her situation after the Peloponnesian War is instructive. This was the low point to which she had sunk back during the last years, and from which she now had to lift herself. It was from Isocrates that Demosthenes learned the use of historical examples; but the ones he chooses have an essentially dynamic quality that makes them utterly different from those of Isocrates.

²⁹ Demosth. *I Phil.* 4-6: ethical analysis of Philip's position.

³⁰ Demosth. *I Phil.* 7-12. Here the results of the analysis of the enemy are applied to the Athenians' own inner attitude.

³¹ Demosth. *I Phil.* 11.

³² Demosth. *I Phil.* 16-18. Besides Thermopylae and the Chersonese, Demosthenes mentions in the third place an expedition against Olynthus. In this connection cf. p. 121 below.

³³ Demosth. *I Phil.* 19 ff.

³⁴ Demosth. *I Phil.* 30.

³⁵ Regarding the revision of the *First Philippic*, I must refer to the special study which I am going to publish elsewhere.

³⁶ This numbering is noteworthy; for in the ancient editions, which in this respect are followed by our own, the three *Olynthiacs* were ordinarily placed before the *First Philippic*, at any rate in the later editions. In Harpocration's lexicon the *First Olynthiac* is actually numbered as the *First Philippic*, and our *First Philippic* is counted as the fourth.

³⁷ Demosth. *I Phil.* 40-41.

³⁸ Demosth. *I Phil.* 35.

³⁹ Demosth. *I Phil.* 41.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

¹ Demosth. *I Ol.* 13.

² Cf. p. 112 above, and Mabel Gude, *A History of Olynthus* (Baltimore 1933).

³ Cf. Demosth. *I Phil.* 38-41.

⁴ Demosth. *Aristocr.* 107-109. Libanius in his *hypothesis* to *I Ol.* also puts a time interval between the declaration of peace and the Olynthians' petition for an alliance with Athens. His source is evidently some excellent older work of scholarship of the type that we find in Didymus. Libanius' testimony with respect to the stipulation by which the treaty between Philip and Olynthus excluded any separate peace, has been indirectly confirmed by the newly discovered inscription of Olynthus (cf. p. 112 above.). According to Libanius, Olynthus concluded her separate peace with Athens in the absence of Philip. (Cf. also Demosth. *III Ol.* 7.) If the words of *Aristocr.* 109—(Ὀλύνθιοι) ὑμᾶς . . . φίλους πεποιήνται—refer to this peace, as we should naturally expect, then Libanius presumably has Philip's Thessalian expedition in mind when he speaks of his absence. (Cf. Schaefer *op. cit.* II, p. 114.)

⁵ Diod. XVI 52, 9.

⁶ Demosth. *I Ol.* 7.

⁷ The alliance was concluded at the time of Philip's invasion of Chalcidice. Cf. Schaefer *op. cit.* II, p. 117, n. 1.

⁸ Demosth. *I Ol.* begins: ἔστι δὴ τά γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα ψηφίσασθαι . . . ἥδη τὴν βοήθειαν . . . Evidently others have already put a motion proposing that Athens should come to the aid of the Olynthians, and Demosthenes is giving this motion his support.

⁹ Cf. Dionys. *ad Amm.* 9. Here we see how Dionysius or his source makes use of the *Atthis* of Philochorus in establishing the dates and order of the speeches. As he finds three auxiliary expeditions of the Athenians mentioned in Philochorus (Frg. 132 *F. H. G. I.* p. 405, Mueller), he regards each of these βοήθειαι as a consequence of one of Demosthenes' three speeches. There is general agreement today that this is a purely arbitrary assumption. Nor will anyone still take seriously Dionysius' attempt to arrange the three speeches in the order II, III, I—a hypothesis

that stands or falls with this assumption and was disputed even by Dionysius' contemporary, the rhetor Caecilius of Caleacte. Philochorus himself did not speak of the three expeditions as following up Demosthenes' proposals; indeed it is altogether unlikely that any of these proposals was put into effect or even accepted at all. Cf. Schaefer *op. cit.* II, pp. 140 ff., and Hartel, "Demosthenische Studien," in *Ber. Wiener Akad. phil. Cl.* LXXXVII-LXXXIX (1877-1878). Some attempt to fit the speeches into a concrete situation must of course be made; but because of the gaps in our historical knowledge, such an attempt can succeed at best only so far as the circumstances presupposed by the speeches may emerge from them with their characteristic outlines.

¹⁰ Cf. Demosth. *I Ol.* 16-20. This short middle section contains the practical proposals. It is noteworthy that Demosthenes repeats the proposals of the *First Philippic* without referring back to that speech. Presumably he does this in order not to discredit his proposals in advance or make it hard for his opponents to accept them by underscoring the fact that they have already been rejected once.

¹¹ Demosth. *I Ol.* 2 ff.

¹² For the part played by the gods in the destiny of Athens, see Demosth. *I Ol.* 10.

¹³ Cf. Theophrastus' four books *πολιτικῶν πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς*. Cicero (*de fin.* V 4, § 11) points out that it is by treating politics in this manner that Theophrastus' political theory differs from Aristotle's: *hoc amplius Theophrastus, quae essent in republica inclinationes rerum et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum utcunque res postularret.*

¹⁴ I have already discussed the problem of *Tyche* or *Moirā* and the question of how much can be imputed to human action according to Solon, in my *Paideia* I, pp. 196 ff., and in more detail in "Solons Eunomie" (*Sitz. der Berl. Akad.*, 1926, pp. 73 ff.). For the views of Thucydides on personal responsibility and the way in which *αἰτιᾶσθαι τὴν τύχην ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ*, see Thuc. I 140 (Pericles' war address!).

¹⁵ Demosth. *I Ol.* 10-11.

¹⁶ Demosth. *I Ol.* 12-15.

¹⁷ The problem of the Greeks' conception of the way things happen in the life of mankind—of individuals and whole peoples alike—is of the utmost importance in understanding their poetry as well as their political speeches and their historiography. With respect to Greek prose especially, this has hardly been given serious attention. The older dissertations on the *Tyche* of Thucydides or Polybius have been much too externally and mechanically put together; for the most part they amount to no more than superficial collections of material, though it is quite impossible to get at the heart of the problem with this lexicographic technique. What we need is an analysis of all the ways in which the very fact of occurrence is conceived and depicted by contemporaneous writers. The histories of Greek philosophy usually pass over these important questions quite unheedingly. I hope to be able to approach this problem with greater precision.

¹⁸ The idea of *καιρός* runs through the entire first part of the speech. Cf. §§ 7, 8, 9 (toward the end), and 11.

¹⁹ Cf. Demosth. *I Ol.* 21 ff., the third part of the speech. The main theme is stated in § 24: *δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς . . . τὴν ἀκαιρίαν τὴν ἐκείνου καιρὸν ὑμέτερον νομίσαντας ἐτοίμως συνάρασθαι τὰ πράγματα.*

²⁰ Cf. Demosth. *I Ol.* 24–27. The orator closes the third part of the speech (§§ 25, 27), like the first (§ 15), with the idea that the Athenians will find their own soil invaded if they are not ready to carry the war outside. This is his strongest lever.

²¹ Cf. pp. 94 ff. above.

²² This same lofty educative view of the task of a national leader in such a state as Athens can be found before Demosthenes among the greatest statesmen, such as Solon and Pericles. For Solon cf. my *Paideia* I, pp. 192 ff.; for Thucydides' depiction of Pericles as the model leader, see *Paideia* I, p. 506.

²³ Demosth. *περὶ συντάξεως* 36. The "new order" has reference to the financial and administrative organization recommended by the speaker. On this expression cf. *symm.* 17, 23, and elsewhere.

²⁴ After Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 215) and Ed. Schwartz ("Demosthenes' erste Philippika," *Festschrift* for Mommsen, 1893, pp. 54 ff.) had briefly declared that the spuriousness of the speech *περὶ συντάξεως* is both unproved and unprovable, without showing ground for their decision (cf. also P. Wendland, *Göt-*

tinger Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1906, p. 364), this problem was subjected to philological research of a more precise kind. Cf. I. Heimer, *de Demosthenis or. XIII*, Diss. Münster 1912, and Fr. W. Levy, *de Demosthenis περὶ συντάξεως oratione*, Diss. Berlin 1919. These scholars have given their chief attention to the well-known correspondences between this speech and other Demosthenic orations and the problem of the priority of the different versions of passages common to both. On the basis of such a comparison carefully performed, Levy concludes that the *Olynthiacs* have already been utilized in the speech *περὶ συντάξεως* and have been transcribed at some length. He therefore places the speech immediately after the *Third Olynthiac* at the end of 349-8, in accordance with the apparent leanings of Eduard Schwartz, who wanted to think of it as closely connected with the *Olynthiacs*. Heimer puts the speech in the spring of 350. H. Francotte (*Le Musée Belge*, 1913, pp. 271 ff.), who bases his work more on the chronological allusions, puts it in 353-2; and more recently Fr. Focke (*op. cit.* pp. 12 ff.) has dated it in 351. Undoubtedly the temporal references in the speech—especially the passage on the “accursed Megarians” and the struggle over the sacred *orgas* (§ 32)—point to the period between 352 and 350, as Focke, in my opinion, has correctly shown. But this complicated problem cannot be solved purely from the chronological side, and Focke has only briefly touched on the question of the relationship of the doublets in our speech to the corresponding passages of the *Olynthiacs*. On this side of the problem there are still grave obstacles in the way of an early decision. Levy has not given serious enough attention to the chronological evidence. If, however, these two methods of research should actually lead to different dates of origin, then the spuriousness of the speech would be proved. I intend to study this question anew.

²⁵ Cf. Demosth. *II Ol.* 3.

²⁶ Cf. Demosth. *I Ol.* 9: νῦν δὲ . . . ἡύξῃσαμεν . . . Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς καὶ κατεστήσαμεν τηλικούτον ἡλικὸς οὐδεὶς πω βασιλεὺς γέγονεν Μακεδονίας.

²⁷ According to Polybius VIII 11, 1 (*F. Gr. Hist.* II B, p. 541, Frg. 27, Jacoby), Theopompus says of Philip that Europe has never yet produced another man comparable to him.

²⁸ Demosth. *II Ol.* 5 ff. Cf. esp. § 10: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν . . . ἀδικοῦντα κάπιορκοῦντα δύναμιν βεβαίαν κτήσασθαι. . . .

²⁹ Demosth. *II Ol.* 11-13.

³⁰ Demosth. *II Ol.* 14-16.

³¹ Demosth. *II Ol.* 17-21. Cf. Theopompus' crushing verdict on the morals of Philip and his entourage (*F. Gr. Hist.* II B, pp. 582-585, Frgs. 224-225 Jacoby). Agreement between two critics who differ so widely in native constitution is unquestionably of value as evidence for the factual basis of their judgment.

³² Observe the simile based on the health of the body in *II Ol.* 21, by which Demosthenes establishes this proposition. This simile immediately calls to mind the political insight of Solon (Frg. 3, 17 ff. Diehl), who applies it to the inner health of a state.

³³ Demosth. *II Ol.* 22. In Hellenistic times the idea that any particular city or personage might have a *Tyche* of its own was very widespread. The great Romans took this over, and Sulla and Caesar each believed in his own special *Tyche*.

³⁴ As to the necessity of actively helping Olynthus and the present willingness to do so, see Demosth. *III Ol.* 1-9.

³⁵ For the Periclean origin of the *theorica* see Plut. *Per.* 9. The demagogue Cleophon introduced the diobely, as we now know from Aristotle *Ath. pol.* 28, 3. Cf. Schwahn's recent article "Theorikon," in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie d. cl. Altert.* V, Sp. 2233 ff. The radical democrat Demades called the *theoricum* "the cement of democracy" (Plut. *Plat. quaest.* p. 1011 B).

³⁶ Demosth. *I Ol.* 19-20.

³⁷ Cf. Schwahn *op. cit.* Sp. 2236.

³⁸ Demosth. *III Ol.* 10-13. Demosthenes does not directly demand that the *theorica* be transformed into *stratiotica*; but he does demand the appointment of *nomothetae* to get rid of the laws that stand in his way. From the cautiousness of this procedure, Libanius, in the fifth section of his *hypothesis* for Demosth. *I Ol.* (Butcher), asserts that there was already a death penalty in force for the proposer of such a measure; but the scholia on *I Ol.* 9 (p. 33, 11, Dindorf) refer to this law as a sequel to Apollodorus' proposal for giving the people the annual option of using the surplus of the state treasury for either theatrical or military purposes. The *psephisma* of Apollodorus, which is known to us from

[Demosth.] *c. Neaeram* 3-5, was dated by Schaefer as at the supposed time of the battle of Tamynae on Euboea—350—when the suit against Meidias was in process. But we no longer have any direct way of knowing when this battle occurred, as Blass has proved unintentionally by his attempt to revise the dating; and accordingly our sole resource in determining the date is the approximate simultaneity of Apollodorus' proposal with the policies of the *Olynthiacs*. It is, indeed, also clear that Demosthenes would not have demanded the appointment of *nomothetae* to do away with the theoric laws if this had already entailed the death penalty (as Weil and Blass have rightly insisted). Thus the *psephisma* of Apollodorus cannot have preceded the *Olynthiacs*, but must have followed them, and is certainly connected with Demosthenes' policies. Eubulus' law establishing the death penalty for proposals of this sort was passed after Apollodorus' *psephisma* had at last been successfully overturned by the *παράνομον*-charge of Stephanus (cf. *c. Neaeram* 5). Stephanus, a personal enemy of Apollodorus, whom we know from his suit against Phormion, was naturally only a straw man for Eubulus; and here, just as in the speech *Against Androtion*, the motive of private revenge is simply put forward as a plausible excuse. The truth is that Stephanus' charge against Apollodorus was entirely political, as was proved by Eubulus' law. With this law Eubulus attempted to reinforce his pacifistic and economic policies and at the same time to strengthen his own position—a counterblast to the steady advance of Demosthenes and his growing following. It is fairly probable that when Demosthenes wrote a speech for Apollodorus to use in his suit against Stephanus, he did so, as has been surmised, because of their political connections. (Cf. Blass *op. cit.* pp. 316 ff.)

³⁹ Demosth. *III Ol.* 21.

⁴⁰ Demosth. *III Ol.* 23-29.

⁴¹ Demosth. *III Ol.* 30-32.

⁴² Demosth. *III Ol.* 33-36.

⁴³ In that part of the *Third Olynthiac* which contains the criticism of Eubulus (esp. §§ 26-31), §§ 207-210 of the speech *Against Aristocrates* have been utilized sentence by sentence and almost word for word. Cf. pp. 103 f. above.

⁴⁴ See pp. 103 f. above.

⁴⁵ The question of whether the *φύσις* of the present generation is worse than that of its ancestors, is brought up in Demosth. *περὶ συντάξεως* 25.

⁴⁶ Seemingly neither of these two proposals of the *First* and *Third Olynthiacs* is put forward as a definite motion. This fact, which by no means stands alone, has led recent scholars such as Eduard Schwartz, Paul Wendland, and others, to look upon Demosthenes' state speeches as brochures written to be distributed as works of literature, merely keeping the form of delivered speeches—a situation with which we have long been familiar in the orations of Isocrates. In this direction K. Hahn (*Demosthenis contiones num revera in contione habitae sint quaeritur*, Diss. Giessen 1910) has gone the farthest. This view has been soundly criticized by C. D. Adams (*Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc.* XLIII, 1912, pp. 5 ff.). Cf. also E. Drerup, *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik*, p. 58. It is significant that Demosthenes' speeches were carefully polished up for publication; here the form created by Isocrates was influential in many respects—for example, in omission of testimony, proposed motions, etc., as I have shown with respect to the *First Philippic* (cf. p. 120 above); of the *Second Philippic* it is just as obvious (cf. p. 164 below). That the speech *On the Symmories* also led up to a motion which has not come down to us but which emerges quite clearly in its main outlines from the published speech, is undeniable. These are only a few examples. How, then, can anyone who assumes that these speeches are mere literary brochures explain the fact that certain stock passages are used successively in one *δημηγορία* after another twice and even three times? This would be unthinkable in our own newspaper articles, and even Isocrates avoids any repetition of this sort in his brochures. (The long quotations from his own work in the *Antidosis* are another thing altogether.) If it is right to explain the repetitions in Demosthenes' forensic speeches *Against Androtion* and *Against Timocrates* as well in accord with the usual practice in forensic speeches, this interpretation is not a whit less natural for the state speeches. Moreover, the form of the Demosthenic speech is incompatible with any attempt to explain it as a mere *γραφικὸς λόγος*. It has its birth in the heat of the

political struggle: for these speeches are written to win the decisions of the *ecclesia*; they are not intended primarily for silent reading, but for the ear of the listening crowd. In their written form they still follow this law and this alone, even if a good deal that was possible in the spoken speech must now be suppressed as *ἀπρεπές*, as the speeches against Aeschines reveal.

⁴⁷ Cf. Demosth. *Mid.* 77 ff.

⁴⁸ Cf. Demosth. *Mid.* 13 ff.

⁴⁹ For the *προβολή*, see *Mid.* 1; for the postponement of the case, *Mid.* 112.

⁵⁰ Cf. Demosth. *Mid.* 206 concerning Eubulus' earlier attitude at the time of the *προβολή*, and his present attitude now that Demosthenes has become his political opponent. As to the other rich men who are expected to appear before the court in Meidias' behalf, cf. §§ 208 ff. and 213 ff. Demosthenes as standing alone: § 190.

⁵¹ Cf. *Mid.* 189—an important passage for Demosthenes' consciousness of his own importance as a politician and an orator.

⁵² Cf. Demosth. *Mid.* 218.

⁵³ The chronology of the speech *Against Meidias* is very difficult, and is entangled with that of the speeches against Boeotus. It needs to be restudied, as Blass (*op. cit.*, pp. 328 ff.) has put too much hypothetical matter into his discussion of this problem. Dionysius tells us that the speech, which was not delivered in court, was worked out in 349-8. At all events it is clear that the beginnings of the speech go as far back as the Olynthian and Euboean expeditions.

⁵⁴ Cf. Schaefer *op. cit.* II, pp. 156 ff. Beloch (*op. cit.* III 1, p. 500) passes over this phase very briefly without even naming Eubulus and Aeschines, the instigators of this step, despite its significance for their policy. This ought logically to have altered Beloch's whole picture of them.

⁵⁵ Cf. the reports on the embassy which the two opponents Demosthenes and Aeschines have given us in their speeches *περί τῆς παραπροσβείας*. For Demosthenes' rôle in the hearing before Philip, cf. Aesch. II 34 ff.

⁵⁶ He emphasizes this later on in *de cor.* 18.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

¹ Cf. pp. 51 ff. above. Isocr. *de pace* 23-26 and *passim*.

² Cf. Isocr. *de pace* 119 ff.

³ Cf. Isocr. *Phil.* 45: ὁρῶν τὰς πόλεις μήτ' ἔχθρας μήθ' ὀρκων μήτ' ἄλλου μηδενὸς φροντισούσας πλὴν ὅτι ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν ὠφέλιμον αὐταῖς εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ στεργούσας μόνον καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν περὶ τούτου ποιούμενας. . . .

⁴ Isocr. *Phil.* 40: οἶδα γὰρ ἀπάσας (scil. τὰς πόλεις) ὠμαλισμένας ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν.

⁵ Cf. Isocr. *Phil.* 81 and *Ep. I*. Now that Sparta has been beaten at Leuctra and dropped from the ranks of the leading states, the aim of this epistle, if we may judge from the proem (the sole section remaining), is to offer the Syracusan tyrant the very rôle that the Isocrates of the *Panegyricus* had originally designed for Sparta and Athens jointly—that of seizing the leadership of Hellas (cf. *Ep. I* 8). Whether the writer is still contemplating a war against Persia is unclear. Unclear too is what he means by the *συναγωνίζεσθαι* of Athens in *Ep. I* 8. The logic of the sentence makes us expect that after the elimination of Sparta at Leuctra Dionysius is to step into her place; the sentence would then imply that he is to coöperate with Athens on an equal footing. To be sure, Isocrates uses the word *συναγωνίζεσθαι* again in *Phil.* 56 in reference to Athens' coöperation in the Persian expedition under Philip's leadership, which the rhetor desires. This time the word is used merely as a polite way of expressing the subordination of Athens. But such subordination could not be so easily taken for granted in the year 370 after the successful peace at Sparta, the time when the letter to Dionysius was supposedly written; indeed this would be quite incredible in the light of the terms of that peace. So unless the proem is a forgery whose author has simply projected the situation of the *Philip* backwards, under the stimulus of such passages as *Phil.* 56 and 81, we must assume for better or for worse that the word *συναγωνίζεσθαι* has different meanings in the two passages.

The genuineness of this proem has yet to be proved; the rather hasty observations of Wilamowitz in *Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 391, are by no means sufficient. The "influence of the fine Platonic

criticism" of *Phaedrus* 275e, which Wilamowitz rightly suspects in § 3, only makes the matter more complicated; for who will believe nowadays that Plato's *Phaedrus* was in existence as early as 370-367? Eduard Meyer's suggestion (*Gesch. d. Alt.* V, p. 442) that Isocrates did not finish the letter, cannot be reconciled with the wording of *Phil.* 81 (ἄπερ ἐπέστειλα καὶ πρὸς Διονύσιον τὸν τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον), where the letter is referred to as actually having been sent, not merely begun with good intentions. But in that event it is mysterious that only the proem should have been preserved. Nor is the mystery at all lessened by the fact that two other epistolary proems have come down to us (*Ep.* VI and *Ep.* IX) addressed to the children of Jason and to Archidamus. Wilamowitz is likewise unable to do very much with these; he even holds that the latter is certainly spurious.

The letter to Philip traditionally ascribed to Speusippus (*Socraticorum epist.* XXX, p. 629, ed. Hercher), which E. Bickermann and Joh. Sykutris have discussed acutely in *Ber. Sächs. Akad. phil.-hist. Kl.* LXXX (Leipzig 1928), holding it to be the only genuine letter among those ascribed to Speusippus, asserts in § 13 that Isocrates had later taken the λόγος that he had originally written for Agesilaus, and "sold it, with slight changes, to the tyrant Dionysius," as if the tyrant had ordered it. If Speusippus was so well acquainted with the letter to Dionysius in 342, the year when his own letter to Philip was alleged to have been written, then Isocrates' letter must have been published as a whole from the very first, and must have resembled the *Philip* and the *Panegyricus* in its content; for I have no doubt that by the λόγος of Isocrates which he πρῶτον ἔγραφεν Ἀγησιλάῳ (ἡγησιλάου *cod.* V, ἡγησιλάῳ *corr.* B), the *Panegyricus* is meant, as this oration was primarily intended for Sparta, and at this time that meant for Agesilaus. It nevertheless remains possible that the author of the Speusippic epistle, like ourselves, got his knowledge of Isocrates' letter to Dionysius entirely from that passage of the *Philip* (§ 81) in which Isocrates refers to it, and that he, like many more recent authors, promptly concluded that the parallelism of the situation to which Isocrates there refers also involved a similarity of content between the lost document and the *Philip*—of which Isocrates says nothing. (Cf. next note.)

⁶ Beloch (*op. cit.* III 1, 2d ed., p. 523) promptly suggests that Isocrates' lost letter to Dionysius proposed that the tyrant should take the leadership in a Persian war. But there is no word of this either in the proem, which is all that remains of Isocrates' first epistle, or in his own cross reference in *Phil.* 81. Eduard Meyer (*op. cit.* p. 443) and Wilamowitz (*op. cit.* p. 391) are rightly more cautious with regard to the presumable aim of the epistle. Beloch, however, does not let his hypothesis prevent him from considering Isocrates' alleged proposal as quite worth discussing, though it would have been even more illusionary than that of the *Panegyricus*. But to what lengths will blind prejudice not go!

⁷ The disputes of modern scholars over the racial stock of the Macedonians have led to many interesting suggestions. This is especially true of the philological analysis of the remains of the Macedonian language by O. Hoffmann in his *Makedonen* etc. Cf. the latest general survey of the controversy in F. Geyer *op. cit.* pp. 30 ff. and his chapter on prehistory, *ibid.* pp. 19 ff. But even if the Macedonians did have some Greek blood—as well as Illyrian—in their veins, whether originally or by later admixture, this would not justify us in considering them on a par with the Greeks in point of race or in using this as a historical excuse for legitimizing the claims of this bellicose peasant folk to lord it over their cousins in the south of the Balkan peninsula so far ahead of them in culture. It is likewise incorrect to assert that this is the only way in which we can understand the rôle of the Macedonian conquest in Hellenizing the Orient. But we can neglect this problem here, as our chief interest lies in discovering what the Greeks themselves felt and thought. And here we need not cite Demosthenes' well-known statements; for Isocrates himself, the very man who heralds the idea of Macedonian leadership in Hellas, designates the people of Macedonia as members of an alien race (*οὐχ ὁμόφυλον*) in *Phil.* 108. He purposely avoids the word *βάρβαροι* but this word is one that inevitably finds a place for itself in the Greeks' struggle for national independence and expresses the views of every true Hellene. Even Isocrates would not care to have the Greeks ruled by the Macedonian people: it is only the king of Macedonia, Philip, who is to be the new leader; and the orator tries to give ethnological proof of Philip's qualifications for this

task by the device of showing that he is no son of his people but, like the rest of his dynasty, a scion of Heracles, and therefore of Greek blood.

⁸ Cf. p. 191 below, and Ulrich Wilcken's excellent study "Philipp II. von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee" (*Sitz. der Berl. Akad. der Wiss.*, 1929, pp. 291 ff.). Wilcken has shown concretely in what sense Isocrates gave the "stimulus" for Philip's policies; or perhaps we might better say that he has shown how Philip succeeded in turning to Macedonia's political account the existence of a man like Isocrates and the new spirit that he represented—a spirit transcending the bounds of ordinary politics. In this Wilcken has also put a curb on the too naïve overvaluation of Isocrates as politician that we find in Beloch and many other recent scholars. The facts were actually much more complicated, as Wilcken rightly insists. Perhaps Ernest Barker has intentionally exaggerated a bit when he writes (*Cambridge Ancient History* VI, p. 518) that Isocrates' pamphlets had no effect, a contention which Wilcken attacks. But certainly Philip never became a mere instrument of Isocrates' ideas; if anything, the situation was quite the reverse.

⁹ Cf. Isocr. *Phil.* 81-82.

¹⁰ Cf. Isocr. *Phil.* 73 ff.

¹¹ Cf. Isocr. *Phil.* 15 and 152.

¹² Beloch (*op. cit.* III 1, 2d ed., p. 359) speaks of Aeschines' speeches as "mit das Vollendetste, was die Beredsamkeit aller Zeiten hervorgebracht hat, völlig ebenbürtig den Reden seines Gegners Demosthenes in denselben Prozessen." This verdict is altogether incomprehensible. Beloch's failure to recognize Demosthenes' greatness as a politician makes him deaf even to his greatness as an orator. The oration *On the Crown* is far superior to Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon*; but Demosthenes' noblest achievements are not confined to his forensic speeches, but reach even greater heights in the *Philippics*. In Aeschines there is nothing at all comparable to these.

¹³ Cf. Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen* (Berlin 1896), pp. 570 and 578.

¹⁴ Cf. Demosth. *de pace* 10.

¹⁵ Prediction of the present reverses: Demosth. *de pace* 10. His

earlier predictions: *de pace* 4-9, particularly § 5, where we find his prophecy about Euboea. For the theory that correct prediction is a criterion of the true statesman, cf. Solon Frgs. 3 and 8 (Diehl) and the whole of Pericles' speech in Thuc. II 60 ff.

¹⁶ Here we may think of people of the type of the old Aristophon, the spokesman for the radical democrats, whose fight against the peace of Philocrates is brought out by Theopompus (Frg. 166 in Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, II B, p. 572). Inasmuch as Theopompus goes so far as to put the principal speech against the peace in the mouth of Aristophon, the man must still have been a person of some importance at that time, even if he failed to carry his point.

¹⁷ Cf. Thuc. II 65, 9, and the scholium on Demosth. *de pace* 12. In this scholium we already find the comparison between Demosthenes and Pericles which Schaefer (*op. cit.* II, p. 285) aptly carries further, probably under the influence of Plut. *Demosth.* 14.

¹⁸ For what follows, cf. Demosth. *de pace* 17-19.

¹⁹ Cf. pp. 88 ff. and Chap. IV, note 39, above.

²⁰ For Thebanophile passages see Demosth. *de pace* 15, 18, 24. In the last of these he is again fighting for his old policy (cf. *Megal.* 18) of no longer disputing with Thebes over the ownership of Oropus. This Athenian claim was one of the chief obstacles to an understanding between Athens and Thebes.

²¹ For the relinquishment of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes cf. *de pace* 25.

²² For Aeschines' conduct at Philip's victory celebration, cf. Demosth. *de falsa leg.* 128 and 338, and Aeschines' reply in II 162.

²³ As to these speeches, cf. Demosthenes' detailed report in *II Phil.* 19-26. That Athens' friendship with Sparta is driving the rest of the Peloponnesians into the arms of Philip has already been suggested in Demosth. *de pace* 18. Dionysius (*ad Amm.* 10) gives the year 344-3 as the date of the *Second Philippic*, and this has been confirmed anew by Beloch's researches (*op. cit.* III 2, p. 290) following Schaefer. The situation, however, is not the same as that which we meet in connection with the obviously later embassy of Python to Athens, of which Demosthenes speaks in *de cor.* 136 (cf. *Halon.* 20 ff.); and the *Second Philippic* is not Demosthenes' answering speech to Python, to which he there refers.

²⁴ On the encircling of Athens (*περιστοιχίζεσθαι*) cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 27.

²⁵ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 28-30.

²⁶ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 32.

²⁷ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 28. It is quite clear that the answer which the orator proposes making to a certain unspecified foreign power has dropped out after the words ταῦτ' ἤδη λέξω in § 28. It is improbable that this omission is a mere accident of the tradition; the proposal as originally formulated must have been deleted by Demosthenes himself in preparing the final text of the speech for publication. This is just what has happened in others of his published speeches. Cf. the way in which the πόρου ἀπόδειξις in *I Phil.* 30 was afterwards deleted in the published version. (See p. 120 above.) As philologists we should be especially grateful that we can put our hands on traces of editing both here and in *I Phil.*—valuable evidence against the modern theory that Demosthenes' political orations are mere literary brochures, not speeches actually delivered. (Cf. Chap. VI, note 46, above.)

²⁸ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 28: καθ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὕστερον βουλευσεσθε.

²⁹ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 15: τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους συλλαμβάνειν οὐ μέλλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένους εἰσπέμπει καὶ χρήματα' ἀποστέλλει καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχων αὐτὸς ἐστὶ προσδόκιμος. Also § 16: ἀφ' ὧν νῦν ποιέει. Cf. G. M. Calhoun, *Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc.* LXIV (1933), pp. 1 ff., who again proves beyond a doubt that *II Phil.* has to do with a concrete situation of which we can still trace the contour rather clearly, even if it cannot be determined with precision. Thus it is quite out of the question to suggest that *II Phil.* is a general propagandist oration or "Hetzrede"—an appellative which Beloch (*op. cit.* III 2, p. 290) also applies to Demosthenes' speeches in the Peloponnesus. The fact is, as Calhoun points out, that a correct understanding of this document is of some importance in judging all Demosthenes' politics after the peace. For the earlier literature on the speech, cf. Calhoun *op. cit.*, who has traced the interesting history of the problem to its very beginnings. But we still do not know which embassy was to receive the Athenian answer mentioned in § 28; and accordingly the date of the oration also remains undetermined. Libanius' *hypothesis* (§ 2) shows that even in ancient times this was something that no one knew anything about, though it was believed that it might be ascertained ἐκ τῶν

Φιλιππικῶν ἱστοριῶν. It was thought that there might have been an embassy from Philip and also one from the Messenians and Argives at the same time (on this point cf. Schaefer *op. cit.* II, p. 332) to make complaints about Athens' relations with the Peloponnesians and with Philip. We do not know enough about the rules and customs of the Attic *ecclesia* to know how much could be said openly against foreign envoys in their presence; and accordingly we cannot decide whether the frankness with which Demosthenes expresses himself concerning the insidiousness of Philip and the stupidity of the Peloponnesians presupposes their absence. If so, we are left, of course, to form our own conclusions.

³⁰ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 28.

³¹ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 35.

³² Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 37. The connection between the attack on Aeschines in the final part of *II Phil.* (28-37) and Demosthenes' suit against him on the ground of *παραπρεσβεία* has been pointed out many times since Libanius. But the speech cannot be accounted for by this motive alone, as I have shown above.

³³ Cf. Isocr. *Ep. II* 15. Isocrates' letter to Philip, which is now commonly regarded as genuine, can be dated by a reference to a certain mortal peril that Philip has needlessly encountered in the war (§§ 3 ff.). In all probability Isocrates has in mind one of the three occasions on which Philip was seriously wounded (Didymus, *Demosth. comm.* col. XII 64 ff., has designated them more precisely). The second of these, which befell the king in 344 in the course of the Illyrian War, has been identified by B. von Hagen in *Philologus* LXVII (1908), p. 122, and independently by Ed. Meyer in *Sitz. Berl. Akad.*, 1909, pp. 761 ff., as the one mentioned in Isocrates' second epistle. In this way the letter is unequivocally dated 344. But the solution of this problem gives rise to another and more difficult problem. Ever since Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 398), it has been considered pretty certain that Isocrates' letter to the crown prince Alexander, which the author designates at the outset as an enclosure accompanying a letter to Philip, belongs to the genuine second epistle. Wilamowitz was not disinclined to consider this note to Alexander genuine also; he even thought he could see a trace of the old man's peculiar subtlety in the bantering allusion to Aristotle as an educator of

princes, in spite of—or perhaps because of—the fact that in many ways this was hardly apt. But now that the epistle to Philip has been assigned to the year 344, the enclosure for Alexander can no longer be held to belong to it; for Aristotle did not come to the court of Macedon until 343-2 (Diog. Laert. V, 10). Hagen gets around this difficulty by trying to shift the second epistle “to the beginning” of 343, but in so doing he still fails to reach the year of Pythodotus’ archonship (343-2), which did not begin until July. Ed. Meyer and, more recently, Matthieu (*op. cit.* p. 165) have appreciated the force of this and have admitted that the fifth letter thus must have belonged to another letter to King Philip. This main letter, compared with which the note to Alexander must have been of only incidental importance, must somehow—strangely enough—have become lost. For the only other surviving letter to Philip (*Ep. III*) either is spurious, as Wilamowitz contends, or belongs to a later time when Aristotle was no longer teaching Alexander (after the battle of Chaeronea). We must confess that the hypothesis of a lost letter is a very unsatisfactory way out of our predicament. It seems to me that here our only resource is to recognize that the letter to Alexander must be abandoned as spurious. And indeed it would have been highly injudicious for Isocrates to let himself go so far as to make ironical game of the crown prince’s friend and teacher from so great a distance with a mere word or two. Moreover, when the letter represents Aristotle as trying to reveal to the soldierly youth the tricky subtleties of Platonic dialectic, instead of reading the poems of Homer with him and trying to make him appreciate the high duties of his royal calling, this seems all too much like the absurdity of the unquestionably spurious letter of Alexander to Aristotle, in which here reproaches his tutor for publishing the lectures on metaphysics hitherto accessible to himself alone. (Cf. Arist. *Fr.* 662 R.)

³⁴ Philip’s ambassador this time was Python, a pupil of Isocrates. Cf. note 23 above.

³⁵ Cf. Demosth. *II Phil.* 17: λογίζεσθε γάρ ἄρχειν βούλεται, τοῦτον δ’ ἀνταγωνιστὰς μόνους ὑπέληφεν ὑμᾶς.

³⁶ Cf. Demosth. *IV Phil.* 32 and the scholia. Philip’s connection with Hermias is important in determining whether he ever considered a war with Persia. This possibility has been disputed

by Ed. Meyer (*Sitz. der Berl. Akad.*, 1909, p. 765), who is certainly wrong with respect to the period after Chaeronea.

³⁷ Of course there obviously were immediate grounds for apprehension at this time. Cf. *III Phil.* 34: *νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζαντίους πορεύεται*. Also § 17: *καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Θράκην παρὶόντα καὶ τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ σκευωρούμενον*. Nevertheless, cf. p. 174 below.

³⁸ Cf. Demosth. *III Phil.* 8 ff.

³⁹ Cf. Demosth. *III Phil.* 15-20.

⁴⁰ For the comparison with earlier hegemonies, see Demosth. *III Phil.* 23 ff.; for Philip's *πλεονεξίαι*, cf. §§ 25 ff.; for further stress on the passive attitude of the Greeks, cf. § 22. *διορωρύγμεθα κατὰ πόλεις* § 28. For passages in which the attitude to Philip's advance is compared with the attitude toward certain natural phenomena, see § 29 (medical comparison with a *περίοδος ἢ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ*) and § 33 (meteorological comparison with the *χάλαξα*). This is one of the most remarkable reiterations in the speech. Cf. likewise the series of instances of Philip's *ὑβρις* in § 32, following the summary of his *πλεονεξίαι* in §§ 25 ff. For the old Greek incorruptibility and sense of liberty, cf. §§ 36 ff.; for Athens' position as the champion of Greece as a whole, cf. §§ 70 ff.

⁴¹ Cf. Chap. IV above. Arnaldo Momigliano, in his recent "Contributi alla caratteristica di Demostene" (*Civiltà Moderna*, 1931, pp. 711 ff.), sees Demosthenes by and large as a practical politician of a particularistic stamp. But, as Piero Treves (*Rivista di Filologia* LX, 1932, pp. 68 ff.) has already shown, Momigliano has been too one-sided in trying to understand Demosthenes from his early period alone, failing to give sufficient weight to his later development under the influence of that mighty instrument of historical destiny, Philip of Macedonia.

⁴² There was, of course, a growing feeling of national solidarity among the Greeks of the fourth century, which received its expression in philosophy and rhetoric. But when modern historians have compared this situation with that of Germany or Italy in the nineteenth century, they have made the mistake of reading into this Panhellenism the modern tendency toward the creation of the unified national state—which is far removed from Isocrates' idea of the *δμόνοια* of all the Greeks and the *ἡγεμονία* of Philip. I am glad that in making this criticism I can agree with the views

of Piero Treves, whose stimulating little book *Demostene e la Libertà Greca* (Bari 1933) did not reach me until after my text was completed.

⁴³ The strain of Panhellenism can be traced with increasing clearness through all Demosthenes' speeches after the Peace of Philocrates. Even the program of the speech *On the Peace*, with its idea of isolating Philip, involves future coöperation with the other Greeks, especially the Thebans and Peloponnesians. In *II Phil.* cf. such passages as §§ 2, 8, 10, 12. The speech *On the Chersonese* was, to be sure, delivered in a specifically Athenian emergency; but the interest of the Greeks as a whole is never left out of sight. Cf. §§ 46, 49, 55. The *Third Philippic* is entirely dedicated to the danger that threatens all Greece. Cf. § 20: *βουλεύεσθαι περὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐν κινδύνῳ μεγάλῳ καθεστῶτων*. Cf. also §§ 25 ff., especially § 28. Similarly in §§ 36 ff., where the past and future are compared, it is the whole of Hellas that is considered, not Athens alone; cf. also the enumeration of Philip's offenses.

⁴⁴ As I construe *IV Phil.* 34, Demosthenes is here directly opposing the anti-Persian nationalism of Isocrates and his like-minded associates, by contrasting it with his own anti-Macedonian nationalism, which he considers the sole attitude for the truly practical politician to take.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

¹ These events are at present dated according to Philochorus (see Didymus' commentary on Demosthenes I 14-25). According to this dating, Oreus was freed by the Athenians and Chalcidians in June, 341 (when Sosigenes was still archon), and Eretria fell in the autumn of the same year (under the archonship of Nicomachus). On each of these occasions the motion was proposed by Demosthenes.

² Cf. Demosthenes *III Phil.* 71. The names of the states to which envoys are to be sent are to be found in all the manuscripts except Parisinus S. Concerning the two recensions of the speech and their authenticity, cf. Spengel, *Abh. Bayr. Akad.* III i (1839), p. 157; IX 1 (1860), p. 112. G. Pasquali, in his *Storia della tradizione* (Florence 1934), p. 274, touches on the question in passing, suggesting that both versions are genuine.

³ The rather sparse fragments of a *Χιανός* and *Ῥοδιακός* of Hypereides (cf. Chr. Jensen's edition, pp. 141 and 146) may very well have come from speeches delivered on the occasions of the embassies to which Demosthenes refers. (Cf. *Vit. X or.* 850 A.) On the embassy to Persia cf. note 13 below. Naturally there must also have been negotiations preceding the alliance of Byzantium with Athens (cf. *de cor.* 80). In *de cor.* 94 Demosthenes says that Athens owes him a crown in recognition of his services in rescuing Byzantium.

⁴ On Demosthenes' first embassy to the Peloponnesus after the Peace of Philocrates cf. pp. 88 and 163 above. *III Phil.* 72 mentions a further embassy in which Demosthenes was accompanied by Polyeuctus, Hegesippus, and others, and which prevented Philip from intervening in the Peloponnesus and Ambracia (in 343-2). The embassy to the Peloponnesus called for by Demosthenes in *III Phil.* 71 (in the more detailed version of the text), along with the embassy to Rhodes, Chios, and Persia in the spring of 341, was performed by himself and Callias of Chalcis in that same year; cf. Aesch. *III* 94-98. Callias was obviously very much a power even at the time of *III Phil.*, for in § 74 Demosthenes remarks rather scathingly that Athens had better not expect Hellas to be saved by the Chalcidians and Megarians alone. At that

time Euboea had not yet been freed by the joint action of Athens and Chalcis.

⁵ Cf. pp. 88 and 160 above concerning this policy, which Demosthenes followed from the very first.

⁶ Cf. Plut. *Demosth.* 17-18. Plutarch here reflects the rather spiteful account of this matter given by Theopompus, who saw no way of explaining Demosthenes' successes with the rest of the Greeks except by assuming that ἡ τοῦ ῥήτορος δύναμις had entirely deprived the people of their power of understanding, particularly with respect to the Thebans, before Chaeronea (*F. Gr. Hist.* II B, p. 604, Frg. 328 Jacoby). As to the golden crown awarded to Demosthenes in the year 340, cf. *de cor.* 83.

⁷ As to the military strength of the Greek allies, cf. Aesch. *Ctes.* 95 and Demosth. *de cor.* 237, in each of which only the number of the mercenaries is given. These were augmented by the citizen contingents.

⁸ Cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 145 ff. for these reflections on Philip's chances in a war with Athens.

⁹ Cf. Demosth. *III Phil.* 34.

¹⁰ Cf. p. 139 and Chap. VII, note 36, above.

¹¹ Cf. Diod. XVI 75, 1; Paus. I 29, 10; Ps. Demosth. *de ep. Phil.* 5.

¹² For the capture of the merchant fleet, cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 139; for the raising of the siege of Byzantium, cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 14, Diod. XVI 77, 3.

¹³ Cf. Demosth. *IV Phil.* 33. The idea of an embassy to Persia, which has already turned up in *III Phil.* 71, is discussed more thoroughly in *IV Phil.* 31-34.

¹⁴ Cf. Aesch. *Ctes.* 222 on Demosthenes as ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ναυτικοῦ. For the new law concerning the symmories, cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 102-108; for the use of the building funds for war purposes, cf. Philochorus in Dionys. *ad Amm.* 11.

¹⁵ On the way in which the new law concerning the symmories tends to run counter to the politics of the speech *On the Symmories*, see p. 78 above. On the utilization of the *theorica* for the war chest, cf. Philoch. in Dionys. *ad Amm.* 11.

¹⁶ Cf. Demosth. *IV Phil.* 35 ff. With respect to the authenticity of this speech, the last word has been said by Alfred Koerte in *Rheinisches Museum* LX (1905).

¹⁷ On the Locrian episode in the Amphictyonic Council and its consequences, cf. Aesch. *Ctes.* 106 ff., Demosth. *de cor.* 140 ff.

¹⁸ In judging the soundness of Demosthenes' policies, cf. the important passage on Athens' military prospects in a war with Philip in Demosth. *III Phil.* 47-52, which has not received enough attention. Cf. also *de cor.* 145-147.

¹⁹ Cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 143.

²⁰ Cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 169.

²¹ Cf. Theopompus' opinion of Demosthenes' oratorical achievements in Thebes, which he vainly attempts to depreciate (*F. Gr. Hist.*, Frg. 328 Jacoby). Theopompus' own account of the compelling personal qualities of the Athenian statesman amounts to the very highest recognition of his merits, for Demosthenes had to confront four of Philip's ambassadors, supported by the pro-Macedonian party and by the very fact that the king's army was already in near-by Elatea and fully prepared for action.

²² I owe this true anecdote to the kindness of Professor Robert Philippson of Magdeburg, who had the experience himself in the course of an examination by Johann Gustav Droysen. If in comparison with the great decisive movements of history with which we are here concerned, this has some of the trivial comic elements of a too diligent academicism unconsciously failing to do justice to the realities of history, perhaps this very fact will help us in giving the necessary wide berth to all professorial omniscience—both in ourselves and in others.

²³ On the connection between the constitutional form of the Corinthian League and the *Philip* of Isocrates, cf. Ulrich Wilcken, "Philipp II. von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee" (*Sitz. der Berl. Akad.*, 1929, pp. 297 ff.). Wilcken has shown that Philip took over from Isocrates the idea of *συνμαχία* and its applicability to the Persian war; this enabled him to spare the sensitive honor of the Greeks, in form at any rate. It is important, however, that, as Wilcken has proved, it was only at first that Alexander based his relations with the Greeks on the treaty establishing the Corinthian League. Later on he regarded the Synedrion at Corinth as merely a place for publishing categorical declarations of his intent. Cf. U. Wilcken, "Alexander der Grosse und der Korinthische Bund" (*Sitz. der Berl. Akad.*, 1922, p. 117),

and more recently Wilcken's *Alexander der Grosse* (Leipzig 1931), pp. 200 ff. By this time the attempt to keep up the form of autonomy of the Greek cities had become too burdensome for him and no longer corresponded to his views of the actual situation.

²⁴ Cf. I. Sykutris in *Hermes* LXIII, 1928, pp. 240 ff., and P. Maas *ibid.* p. 258, on alleged quotations from Demosthenes' *Epitaphius* in Lycurgus. Against Sykutris cf. S. Trachile in *'Αθηνά* 42, 1930, p. 197, and Sykutris' rejoinder in *'Αθηνά* 43, 1931, pp. 114 ff.

²⁵ Cf. Demosth. *Chers.* 38: *τί οὖν χρή ποιεῖν*; (repeated word for word in *IV Phil.* 11). However, cf. *de cor.* 62: *τί προσήκον ἦν εἰλεσθαι πράττειν καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν*; cf. also §§ 66, 69, 71-72.

²⁶ Cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 66.

²⁷ Cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 18 ff.

²⁸ Cf. Demosth. *de cor.* 67.

²⁹ Cf. particularly Demosth. *de cor.* 252, in answer to Aeschines' remarks on the bad *Tyche* of Demosthenes.

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